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3RESEARCH SUMMARY
The Bingo Project (www.kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject) has hoped to achieve two key objectives: to better
understand how the game of bingo is regulated in different places around the world, and to relate that
better understanding back to debates in law, politics, and political economy about gambling. 
This report – aimed at non-academics interested in
gambling regulation – summarises what we have learned
so far from our research. It describes how the game is
regulated, and the scale of  play. Each chapter identifies
some ‘key themes’ that suggest what can be learned more
broadly from bingo. These cover topics such as the impact
of  prohibition on players and operators; the shift in political
attitudes to bingo over time; the regulation of  game
definition; the use of  proceeds by charitable bingo
providers; and the social nature of  online bingo play. 
Each case study chapter also contains substantive
recommendations, drawn from the research, for those
involved in bingo regulation. These range from a set of
recommendations about legalising bingo in Brazil, to a
suggestion that the focus of  European Union level
discussions of  consumer protection in online gambling be
expanded beyond problem gambling, underage gambling,
and responsible gambling to also encompass the
regulation of  substantive fairness. In each case study
chapter we have also included a table of  the most
important legal cases on bingo. These cases shed light on
how courts in different places have handled disputes over
which level of  government has authority over bingo; how
bingo proceeds should be used; how the game’s
boundaries should be defined; and how far licensing
discretion should extend. 
In the final, comparative chapter of  the report we develop
some over-arching lessons, using our research from across
the four case studies. In particular, we highlight the
following key points:
1 The value of  expanding the concept of  ‘responsible
gambling’ to better reflect fairness for players and
workers.
2 The need for context-specific consideration of  whether
non-commercial actors should be privileged as bingo
operators by regulators, taking into account how such
actors use proceeds, how they are connected to players
as donors, and how they mobilise volunteers.  
3 The need for rules that reflect the distinctiveness of
bingo as a game, and a playing environment.
4 A potential role for gambling regulators in supporting
and preserving everyday, vernacular forms of  play like
bingo.
5 The need to better support international collaborations
across local governments that license low-level forms of
gambling such as bingos. 
6 The uneven effects of  the female-dominated nature of
bingo on its regulation.
www.kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject
Funded by the Economic and Social Research Council,
one of  the UK’s main academic research funders, the
three-year project selected four case studies of  bingo in
England and Wales, Canada, Brazil, and online in the
European Union. We wanted to gain a good overview of
the diverse ways in which bingo is played (online versus
land-based; in commercial halls versus in charitable
facilities), and of  legal approaches (e.g. criminal
prohibition, licensing as charitable activity; licensing as
commercial activity). 
We focused on bingo because it is a globally significant,
but under-studied, gambling form. It is a social, community
activity for many people, and in many places it attracts a
distinctive demographic of  players. In England and Wales
and Canada bingo is especially popular with older, working
class women. First Nations/Native American players are a
key part of  the player base in North America. We hoped
that bingo would provide us with some insights into how
classed, aged, raced, and gendered gambling cultures 
are shaped by regulation. We were also interested in bingo
because it is associated with charitable fundraising as
much as, if  not more than, commercial gambling in many
places. Charities, religious organisations, and non-profit
groups often operate the gaming themselves, making
bingo a key example of  the intersection between playful
speculation and good works. The ‘vice’ of  gambling meets
the ‘virtue’ of  local charity, mutual aid, and community head
on in bingo, and we wanted to know what impact that had
on regulatory priorities in different places.
Our research for the Bingo Project involved 217 interviews,
with 255 people involved in bingo. They included operators
(commercial and non-commercial), regulators (across
many levels of  government, from the municipal to the
supra-national), politicians, specialist lawyers, judges,
employees, volunteers, software designers, and bingo
equipment manufacturers. We conducted a systematic
review of  relevant case law, legislation, and regulatory
guidance, official records of  political debate, consultations,
and annual reports from bingo regulators and operators.
We have a collection of  over 1000 relevant legal cases
across the four case studies, stretching back to 1845. We
also have thousands of  pages of  historical political debate
about bingo, stretching back to 1936. Finally we conducted
observations of  legal bingo games in three of  the four case
studies (we were unable to find legal games in Brazil), to
see how rules and regulations were implemented in
practice.
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“Let’s face it, Las Vegas uses bingo halls as loss leaders. They know they’re going 
to bring in the one spouse that likes to play bingo and the other spouse that’s going
to go and really spend the money where it counts.” (female charity bingo hall
manager, Canada).
Why bingo?
The Bingo Project (www.kent.ac.uk/
thebingoproject/) was a research project funded
by the Economic and Social Research Council –
one of  the UK’s main academic research funders.
It used four case studies of  bingo regulation
around the world to explore the governance of
risk, welfare, and gambling in law, politics, and
political economy. 
That might seem strange.
But gambling has long been studied by
researchers in law, politics, and political economy.
It has been used to think through concepts of
fairness, deserved rewards, worthwhile leisure,
responsible consumption, and the state’s role in
harm prevention.1 It also plays a key role in our
discussions about how market economies should
function. For example:
• gambling is so central to debates about
individual choice and the role of  the state 
that the political philosopher John Stuart Mill
devoted a long section to it in his 1859 book 
On Liberty. 
• as a popular, playful, entertaining form of
engaging with chance for gain, gambling has
to be continuously distinguished in law and
policy from its serious, productive, properly-
capitalist others: insurance; stock market
speculation; weather derivatives, and so on.2
• when economic crises occur, scholars and
politicians often use casinos as a metaphor 
in their critiques of  capitalist excesses. Both
UK Prime Minister David Cameron and US
President Barack Obama spoke of  the dangers
of ‘casino capitalism’ after the 2008 financial
crisis, echoing those who have used the term
to highlight inadequate control over financial
markets.3 As gambling researcher Rebecca
Cassidy (2009) points out, the irony here is that
casinos are actually very heavily regulated. 
So, taking gambling seriously in law and political
economy is nothing new.
However our research project focused on
everyday practices of  bingo rather than
spectacles of  stockmarkets as giant casinos. 
We chose this focus because bingo is a globally
significant, but under-studied, gambling form,
played in many countries and increasingly
popular online. It is a lottery-style game where
players cross numbers, called randomly, off  a
ticket to form patterns and (they hope) win prizes.
It is globally salient, and increasingly transnational
in operation. Although bingo spread globally
through military and missionary circuits in the
early twentieth century (with the Irish courts
asked to rule on its legality as early as 1916),4
as the game has spread online new operators 
are emerging to offer play across borders. 
Bingo is interesting in part because it is so
diverse, with significant variations in play. Some
countries play with 90 numbers, some with 75,
and different patterns are required in different
places to win prizes. During our research players
told us about winning life changing jackpots in
commercial bingo halls, playing down the pub
with old friends for slabs of  meat, buying virtual
cups of  tea (with real money) to share with online
bingo buddies, and getting their handbags
searched for illegal winnings during a police raid.
We met people volunteering to sell tickets at
bingo so that their child would get access to a
sports programme, and we watched drag queen
bingo callers simulate sex acts with players when
particular numbers were drawn. 
www.kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject
1 See for example Gerda Reith. 2002. The Age of  chance: Gambling in Western Culture. London: Routledge.
2 See for example G. Clark. 1999. Betting on Lives. Manchester: Manchester UP; U. Staheli. 2013. Spectacular Speculation: Thrills, the economy
and popular discourse. Stanford: Standford UP;  R. Cassidy et al. 2013. Qualitative Research in Gambling. London: Roultedge.
3 See especially Susan Strange (1986), who coined the term ‘casino capitalism’
4 Barrett v Flynn [1916] 2 Ir. R. 1 (KB).
“Gambling is at the boundary between personal
freedom and state intervention. On one side of the
boundary is the reasonable expectation of adults
who, within the law, exercise their right to live
their lives as they choose. On the other is the role
of the state: to recognise human frailty, and in
particular to respect its duty to protect children
and the vulnerable. As a Government and a
society, we have three options in that respect:
prohibition, a free-for-all or regulation. We have
no doubt about choosing the regulatory route.
(Tessa Jowell, UK Minister of Culture Media and
Sport, in a debate on the Gambling Bill, 1 Nov
2004, vol. 426, col. 28).
“When (asked) what do you do for a living, I
say I rob old ladies of their pensions. Which
usually makes people think that I’m a financial
advisor (laughs)” (male, bingo hall manager,
England).
“What we established here in Brazil was bingo,
bingo as a neighbourhood game, a place for
individuals to socialise” (male, industry
analyst, Rio de Janiero)
“One of my favourite halls we did – I’ll never
forget these two elderly ladies, they must have
been in their 60s, 70s, loving it. They said, ‘we
are loving this. But you know who really loves
this?’ And I said ‘Who?.’ They said ‘our mom.’”
(male organiser of bingo-based entertainment
events in British Columbia, Canada).
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The demographics of  bingo are also distinctive,
especially when measured against the popular
images of  high-spending, glamorous, risk-taking
men associated with casino table games. Bingo is
one of  the few forms of  gambling that attracts
more female than male players: women were over
80% of the players in some of  the bingo halls in
our research. Even online – where there are more
male bingo players than in land based venues –
the game tends to attract more female players
than sports betting, casino games, and online
poker. In many places bingo is especially popular
with older, working class women. Moreover, First
Nations/Native American players are a key part of
the player base in North America. When we
began the research project, we hoped that bingo
would provide us with some insights into how
classed, aged, raced, and gendered gambling
cultures are shaped by law. 
Finally, we were interested in bingo because it is
associated with charitable fundraising as much
as, if  not more than, commercial gambling in
many places. As a result, it raises distinctive and
pressing questions about law and policy within
many jurisdictions.
Charitable gaming – in forms such as raffles,
tombolas, lotteries, and bingos – is the most
widely available form of  legal gambling. As
gambling researcher Sytze Kingma argues,
gambling liberalisation is often reliant on the
“charitable alibi” that the money raised will go to
worthy causes (2008, 448).5 Others refer to the
‘halo’ around charitable gaming that can result in
inadequate regulatory oversight6 (Christensen et
al. 2009). The charitable rationale is of  course key
Bingo and the casino shadow 
In political debate, as in academic
research, bingo has long been in the
shadow of  casinos. But interesting things
can happen out of  the spotlight. In 2012-3
Toronto was consumed by a fight over a
downtown casino. During this time bingo
businesses worked with the provincial
regulator, municipalities, and charities to
negotiate opening new gaming facilities. As
one industry insider put it, with a smile, all
the light was on casinos while “donkey
bingo plods along and gets ahead” (male,
Ontario).
for lotteries, often run by the state or a state-
chosen monopoly provider. However in bingo
charities, religious organisations, and non-profit
groups have often themselves retained a key role
in operating the gaming, making bingo a key
example of  the intersection between playful
speculation and good works. The ‘vice’ of
gambling meets the ‘virtue’ of  local charity, mutual
aid, and community head on in bingo, and
regulatory priorities are consequently complex
and contested. 
What do we mean by regulation?
Bingo may be impacted by a range of  laws,
policies, recommendations, guidance
documents, codes of  practice, standards,
and street-level enforcement mechanisms.
Rule-making by lawmakers and courts, at
various levels, is certainly crucial. But it
exists alongside rule-making by sector
experts in governmental agencies, and rule-
making by non-government groups such as
businesses and charities. Regulation is a
convenient way of  talking about these plural
forms of  legal and political power. One
definition we have found helpful is provided
by Bettina Lange, Fiona Haines, and Dania
Thomas in their book on Regulatory
Transformations: Rethinking Economy-
Society Interactions: “both legal and non-
legal processes for changing the behaviour
of  economic actors according to specific
standards, backed up by institutions and
mechanisms of  enforcement.”7
Some academic researchers argue that
prohibition should not really be considered
a form of  regulation, since the term implies
a preference for less coercive mechanisms
of shaping behavior. For example in her
book on regulation of  the British Railways,
Bridget Hutter argues that “The very use of
the word regulation signals a toleration of
the activity subject to control. Regulation is
not an attempt to eradicate risk, crucially it
is an attempt to manage it.”8 Others argue
that some states are increasingly relying on
criminal law as a form of  regulation, in
arenas such as anti-social behaviour.9 In this
report we include criminal law within our
research on regulation. 
The Bingo Project
5 Kingma, S. 2008. ‘The liberalization and (re) regulation of  Dutch gambling markets: National consequences of  the
changing European context.’ Regulation & Governance 2(4): 448.
6 Christensen, R. et al. 2009. ‘Light and Dark Sides of  Nonprofit Activities and the Rules to Manage Them: The Case
of Charitable Bingo.’ Administration and Society 41 (2): 213–34.
7 p 7. (Hart, Oxford 2015).
“De dona-de-casa a dona da Casa!” – from
housewife to homeowner, official poster with an
old advertisement for the federal lottery, Brazil.
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The Bingo Project aimed to do two things: better
understand how the game was regulated in
different places, and relate that better
understanding back to debates in law, politics,
and political economy about gambling.
Specifically the objectives were: 
1 To provide the first systematic account of  how
bingo is regulated, with the aim of  identifying
the key legal and policy challenges involved in
regulating bingo as experienced by a variety of
stakeholders, and making recommendations to
policymakers, the gambling industry, third
sector stakeholders, and academics. Key
questions included:
1.1 How, and to what end, is bingo regulated
in each jurisdiction? What is the role of
charity, criminal, and commercial law?
Where is enforcement power located, in
law and practice?
1.2 Are laws governing bingo being relaxed
as part of  trends towards global gambling
liberalisation, or is the game being
subjected to increasing regulation? Is play
being standardised, converging towards a
global norm?
1.3 Which rules are most important to various
stakeholders, and why? Which are
ignored, and why? Whose priorities
appear to be reflected in new legislation
and case law?
1.4 What are the key regulatory challenges
and disputes about? How do various
actors understand those challenges, and
seek to resolve them?
1.5 How, if  at all, are responsible gambling
concerns evident in relation to bingo
regulation?
1.6 What similarities and differences emerge
between and within cases, regarding the
regulatory principles; the key
stakeholders; the challenges; etc, and
what do these add to current knowledge?
2 To make a contribution to academic research in
law and political economy by advancing
knowledge of  a neglected site in global
gambling liberalisation debates. In particular,
we aimed to explore how the governance of
risk and speculation are gendered, and related
to concerns about charity. Key questions
included:
2.1 How, and to what extent, does it matter to
regulators that bingo is part of  a
gendered gambling culture? Does the
female-dominated nature of  the game
affect its regulation?
2.2 Which charities and community projects is
bingo money used to fund? What
relationship do those projects have to
bingo players? 
2.3 What strategies, if  any, are being
undertaken by policymakers to support
bingo, and how do these strategies
position the players? Is the current
demographic breakdown of  the players
perceived to be an obstacle to the
development of  the industry, an
advantage, or something else?
2. 4 What does the regulation of  bingo in
different contexts tell us about how
governments perceive the role of  profit-
making within broader community welfare
projects?
Our case studies
To answer these questions we undertook four in-
depth case studies of  bingo regulation, each the
subject of  a chapter in this report.
1 Brazil: Until 1993, bingo was included within
Brazil’s 50 year old prohibition against non-
state suppliers of  popular gambling
experiences and products. In 1993 the federal
government exempted bingo from prohibition,
to provide an income-generating opportunity
for sports organisations. However the new
Brazilian bingo industry and its regulators were
repeatedly ensnared in corruption, organised
crime, and money laundering scandals. Just
seven years after opening the licensed bingo
market the federal government attempted to
close it. By 2007 prohibition had been, in
effect, reinstated as Brazil’s regulatory
instrument for governing bingo, and the game
had been driven largely underground. Our
case study aims to learn the lessons from that
period. It tries understand why bingo – a game
www.kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject
8 Regulation and Risk: Occupational Health and Safety on the Railways. (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001, p 4).
9 See for example Adam Crawford. 2009. Governing Through Anti-Social Behaviour: Regulatory Challenges to Criminal Justice. British Journal of  Criminology. 49 (6): 810-831.
10 See for example Belanger, Y. (ed.). 2011. First Nations Gaming in Canada. Winnipeg: University of  Manitoba Press.
that in Brazil (as elsewhere) evokes family
holidays, charitable fundraising and older
women’s sociality – acquired such menacing
connotations during its brief  period of
commercialisation, and to identify whether and
how trust can be re-built.
2 Canada (Ontario and British Columbia, land-
based). In many parts of  Canada bingo is a
source of  fundraising for charities, service
clubs, and religious institutions, with games run
by volunteers (sometimes in partnership with
private gaming service providers). More
recently provinces have begun to operate
bingos, sometimes leading to disputes with
charities over bingo revenues. The right to
autonomously operate and regulate bingo has
also been an important legal issue in some
First Nations communities. In Canada and the
USA attempts by First Nations/Native American
groups to operate and regulate bingo have a
long connection with struggles for control over
economic development and cultural life on
reservation territories. Although many
researchers have explored ‘tribal gaming’
debates, they typically do so from the
perspective of  casinos rather than bingo.10
We chose Ontario and BC as sites for in-depth
exploration of  these dynamics because they
are both crucial provinces in the history of
bingo in Canada. Ontario is the biggest market,
and BC was the site for lengthy legal struggles
around charitable and provincial involvement in
bingo in the 1990s and 2000s. Kate had
previously done small scale pilot studies
looking at bingo regulation in Alberta, and
Ontario. 
3 England and Wales (land-based). In England
and Wales bingo occurs in range of  venues,
from commercially-run bingo halls, holiday
parks, and amusement arcades, to non-
commercial members’ clubs and miners’
welfare institutes and churches. Operators
have been grappling with declining
attendance, especially since the smoking ban
in 2007. Resulting innovations in where, and
how, the game can be played have prompted
interesting regulatory debates about what
defines bingo. We chose four regions for in-
depth exploration of  these dynamics: South
Wales, North East England (Newcastle and
around); the seaside North West of  England
(Blackpool and around); and Greater London.
Kate had previously done a pilot project looking
at bingo regulation in seaside towns in Kent.
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4 On-line bingo in the European Union (EU)
Online bingo is not equally popular across all
of  the EU’s 28 Member States, but in some –
such as the UK, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Portugal
and Sweden – it is a significant sector. In such
places, EU-level and national-level laws on
gambling interact. The European Commission
decided in 1992 that it would not seek to
submit formal proposals for harmonised
gambling rules, leaving EU Member States with
considerable discretion over regulating online
gambling. However many pieces of  EU
legislation impact on online gambling. These
include measures to regulate misleading and
aggressive marketing practices, money
laundering, online dispute resolution, the
fairness of  consumer contracts, and data
protection. Furthermore, the Court of  Justice of
the European Union has held that the provision
of online gambling services falls within the
scope of  EU rules relating to the free
movement of  services and the freedom of
establishment. Previous research and policy
debates have largely explored the impact of
EU law in relation to sports betting, slot
machines, casino games or online gambling in
general.11While lotteries operated by states,
state-approved monopoly providers, or
charities have also been examined in the light
of  EU and national level regulation, again bingo
has largely been kept out of  the research and
policy spotlight.12
These four case studies were selected to give us
a good overview of  the diverse ways in which
bingo is played (online versus land-based; in
commercial halls versus in charitable facilities),
and of  legal approaches (criminal prohibition,
licensing as charitable activity; licensing as
commercial activity; etc). 
A key priority of  the project was to explore the
diverse laws, policies, and practices that govern
bingo. Hence we explored ‘high’ politics and law,
as expressed in legislation, official records of
political debate, and recorded court cases. We
also collected and analysed codes of  practice,
annual reports from regulators, and high-level
national reports in which bingo was examined. 
If  relevant we explored lower-level political 
debate and regulations, such as those crafted 
by municipal governments, along with licensing
guidelines, inspections check lists, and
compliance forms. 
The Bingo Project
Why only England and Wales?
A case study of  UK bingo regulation would
be, in our view, unwise, because Northern
Ireland’s gambling law is very distinct from
the rest of  the country and needs in-depth
exploration in its own right. In Scotland, local
level licensing procedures for gambling
premises are different to those in England
and Wales. Since local licensing was a key
aspect of  our research we wished to hold
that element of  this case study steady to
allow for valid comparisons between regions
that are covered by the same rules and
procedures. However some commercial
bingo operators that we interviewed in
England and Wales also operate in Scotland.
We also reviewed Scottish cases in our
analysis of  case law on bingo. As a result we
hope that the research has some
applicability there.
11 See eg D. Doukas and J Anderson. 2014. ‘Commercial Gambling without Frontiers: When the ECJ Throws, the Dice is Loaded’ 27 Yearbook of  European law (2008) 237-276; 
S. Planzer. 2014. Empirical views on European Gambling Law and Addiction (Springer)
12 See eg S. Kingma and T. van Lier. 2006. The Leeway of  lotteries in the European Union: A Pilot Study on the Liberalisation of  Gambling Markets in the EU (Dutch University Press).
A list of  ‘bingo commandments’ on a pinboard at a community centre for elderly people in British Columbia, Canada,
positioned next to the official ‘rules of  play’ that are required to be displayed by provincial regulations. 
A bingo acquaintance met during fieldwork in
Canada, 2015. 
THE 10 COMMANDMENTS OF BINGO
1 Thou shall not sit in thy neighbours lucky seat. 
2 Thou shall not stare at thy neighbours card. 
3 Thou shall not take the Callers name in vain. 
4 Thou shall not call false “Bingo”. 
5 Thou shall not wish bad luck on thy neighbour. 
6 Thou shall not harass or threaten to kill ‘the “Caller”. 
7 Thou shall not steal thy husband’s money for Bingo. 
8 Thou shall not brag about how much thou hast won. 
9 Thou shall not whine about how much thou hast lost. 
10 Thou shall not covet thy neighbours winnings. 
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Professor Toni Williams, presenting the Bingo Project's Findings to Brazilian consumer law specialists. 
Because our research was interested in the rules
‘on the ground’ as well as those ‘on the books’,
we also sought to understand how different
groups of  people experienced the regulations.
Hence in each case study we conducted semi-
structured interviews with representatives from
key groups involved in debates about bingo
regulation. The interviews were anonymous and
confidential. In total we conducted 217 such
interviews, with 255 respondents.
Finally, in the three case studies where bingo can
currently be lawfully played we participated in
games in order to learn more about how rules
and regulations were applied in practice, and to
talk informally with staff  and players. We funded
this ourselves: at no point was any ESRC money
used for gambling.
More information on our research methods, the
data we collected, and our approach to analysis
is contained in appendix 1.
Our findings and this report
We are using many outlets to share our 
research findings, including our website
(www.kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject/), our twitter 
feed (@bingo_project), our presentations at
conferences, our academic and non-academic
publications, and our involvement in initiatives that
seek to draw together different stakeholders in
bingo. For example in October 2015 we hosted a
public debate on the key challenges and future
directions in bingo regulation in England and
Wales, involving representatives from the national
gambling regulator, local government, the
Working Men's Club and Institute Union,
commercial bingo operators, and academic
researchers. In May 2016 the Brazil research
team gave presentations on their findings to a
conference of  Brazilian consumer law experts,
and to the 2nd Brazilian Gaming Congress
attended by gambling industry specialists from
around the world. They presented three papers,
including “Bingos no Brasil: fardo ou
legado? Reflexões críticas e contribuições para a
regulação dos jogos na atualidade” (Bingos in
Brazil: burden or legacy? Critical reflections and
contributions to the regulation of  contemporary
gaming”), and “Responsible Gambling in Brazil:
Lessons from the Bingo project”.
This report is a key part of  our on-going work to
share our results with gambling experts who are
not academics. It is intended both for those who
have an interest in bingo already and want to
know more about its regulation in different places,
and those who work in related gambling fields
and want to know what our research on bingo
can add to their existing perspectives. It is
focused more explicitly on the first objective (the
systematic account of  how bingo is regulated)
than the second (the re-framing of  academic
debates about the governance of  risk and
speculation). However in the chapters
summarising the four case studies we have
selected some ‘key themes’ that, we hope, show
what can be learned more broadly from bingo.
These cover topics such as the impact of
prohibition on players and operators; the shift
over time in political attitudes to bingo; the
regulation of  game definition; the use of
proceeds by charitable bingo providers; and the
social nature of  online bingo play. Each case
study chapter also contains substantive
recommendations, drawn from the research, for
those involved in bingo regulation. These range
from a set of  recommendations about legalising
bingo in Brazil, to a suggestion that the focus of
European Union level discussions on consumer
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protection in online gambling be expanded
beyond problem gambling, underage gambling,
and responsible gambling to also encompass the
regulation of  substantive fairness. 
In each case study chapter we have also
included a table of  the most important legal
cases on bingo. These are not intended to give
technical legal summaries of  the cases for use 
by lawyers. Rather they aim to explain the basic
background of  the issue, and the decision, in
terms that a non-lawyer interested in bingo, or
gambling in general, can understand. In each
chapter we selected the cases that were key to
the development of  bingo in that jurisdiction, and
that illuminate some of  the core themes in our
report. They shed light on how courts in different
places have handled disputes over which level of
government has authority over bingo; how bingo
proceeds should be used; how the game’s
boundaries should be defined; and how far
licensing discretion should extend. 
In the concluding chapter we develop some over-
arching lessons, using our research from across
the four case studies. In particular, we highlight
the following key points.
1 The value of  expanding the concept of
‘responsible gambling’ to better reflect fairness
for players and workers.
2 The need for context-specific consideration of
whether non-commercial actors should be
privileged as bingo operators by regulators,
taking into account how such actors use
proceeds, how they are connected to players
as donors, and how they mobilise volunteers.  
3 The need for rules that reflect the
distinctiveness of  bingo as a game, and a
playing environment.
4 A potential role for gambling regulators in
supporting and preserving everyday,
vernacular forms of  play like bingo.
5 The need to better support international
collaborations across local governments that
license low-level forms of  gambling such as
bingos. 
6 The uneven effects of  the female-dominated
nature of  bingo on its regulation.
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Overview of the case
Until 1993, bingo was included within Brazil’s 50-year-old prohibition against non-state
suppliers of  popular gambling experiences and products. Prohibition had been established
during the 1940s under two Criminal Contravention Acts that consolidated piecemeal bans on
specific games into a default rule of  illegality for all forms of  gambling that were not specifically
exempted. This stance was in part justified by lawmakers as being in accordance with
widespread anti-gambling values in the international arena. Bingo was played on a small scale
by religious organisations for fundraising purposes in some parts of  Brazil, but these activities –
although widely tolerated – do not appear to have been subjected to formal state oversight. 
However, in 1993 Brazil exempted bingo from prohibition. The federal government created the
exemption to raise funds for the democratisation of  sports, an obligation that the Brazilian state
had assumed under the 1988 post-dictatorship constitution. The legalisation of  bingo was
intended to provide an income-generating opportunity for sports organisations. Lacking the
required expertise and investment capacity, however, such organisations partnered with
commercial operators. Large and profitable bingo halls were established in many cities,
particularly in Brazil’s prosperous South and South East regions. Bingo businesses grew
rapidly, creating lots of  jobs and generating sustained revenue streams for municipal, state, and
federal governments. But the Brazilian bingo industry and its regulators also were repeatedly
ensnared in corruption, organised crime, and money laundering scandals. Just seven years
after opening the licensed bingo market the federal government attempted to close it. Closure
was resisted through political processes, legal actions and defiance – unlicensed bingo is
played illegally to this day – but by 2007 prohibition had been, in effect, reinstated as Brazil’s
regulatory instrument for governing bingo, and the game had been driven largely underground. 
It is important to learn the lessons from that failure, to understand why bingo – a game that in
Brazil (as elsewhere) evokes family holidays, charitable fundraising and older women’s sociality
– acquired such menacing connotations during its brief  period of  commercialisation. 
To understand the rise and fall of  licensed bingo in Brazil this case study examined the
regulatory systems, processes and requirements established to govern the game. We also
interviewed 24 key informants with relevant experience of  the game and its regulation. We did
not directly observe or participate in any games because bingo halls were unlawful at the time
of the study. However, we sought to access the experience of  bingo play as reported by key
informants and through media accounts and contemporaneous reports.
Scale, distribution, and demographics
of play 
Licensed bingo businesses were established in
every one of  Brazil’s 27 states during the
legalisation era but their distribution across the
country was highly uneven. Half  (468) of  the 924
bingo businesses known to the federal licensing
authority, the Caixa Econômica Federal (CAIXA) 
in the early 2000s were located in São Paulo,
Brazil’s most populous and richest state, and
another 15 percent (140 businesses) were
located in Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil’s fourth
richest state. No other state hosted more than 
7 percent of  the total licensed businesses, and
seven states clustered in the North (Brazil’s
poorest region) together hosted only 2 percent 
of  all licensed bingo businesses.1
www.kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject
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A more comprehensive survey, conducted by the
Parliamentary Commission of  Inquiry on Bingos
in 2005 (after the ostensible closure of  the
market), identified 1547 operating bingos and
confirmed the pattern of  uneven development.
Just 3 percent of  bingo businesses were located
in the North while the rich South and South East
regions together hosted 80 percent of  the sector.
Rio Grande do Sul’s 224 businesses gave it the
same 15 percent market share in this larger
sample as in the CAIXA data. São Paulo state, by
contrast, was less dominant in this study, with its
595 bingos amounting to about 40 percent of  the
total number. This difference reflects the extent to
which the later study found 
a higher proportion of  bingo businesses in other
states in the South and South East. 
1 Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito (CPI dos Bingos), created according to Requerimento 245/2004, Senado Federal,
2006, Relatório Final, Brasília, DF, available at: www.senado.gov.br/comissoes/CPI/Bingos/RelFinalBingos.pdf
Figure 1: Regional distribution of bingos in
Brazil, 2005. 
Source: data reported in the CPI dos Bingos
2006, p.112-3.
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Current regulation of bingo in Brazil
Bingo was exempted from Brazil’s criminal
prohibition against gambling under Article 57 of
Lei “Zico” (Lei nº 8.672/93) – a law named after 
a popular former footballer who subsequently
became the federal government’s minister for
sports. Lei Zico was primarily concerned with the
democratisation and financing of  sport, not with
gambling. 
Substantive rules on bingo governance and
regulation, first enacted in November 1993,
defined bingo as a lottery played as a 90 number
game, and set out detailed accreditation
requirements for marketing and supplying the
game (Decreto nº 2.573/98 Art.74). These rules
covered the minimum occupancy standards for
bingo halls, accreditation of  sports bodies to
enter the bingo market, renewable licensing of
permanent bingo businesses as well as event-
based authorisation of  occasional bingos, returns
to players and remittance of  revenue from entry
fees for sports development and to finance the
regulator, reporting and accountability
requirements, and extensive certification of
equipment, premises, the licensee’s financial
standing, and security and labour and consumer
practices. Municipalities were authorised to tax
bingo businesses as local services and the
federal government drew revenues from business
The rationale for legalisation
Art. 57: Sports clubs and Olympic sports
federations able to demonstrate active
participation in Olympic sports may be
authorised by the Treasuries of  their
respective states to hold events intended to
raise money for sports development by
means of  sweepstakes called Bingo, or
similar. 
[Lei Zico] creates conditions for the
beginning of  a new era of  sport, with an
enhanced role for the private sector and the
reduction of  state interference in sporting
activities … with the goal of  implementing a
sporting democracy. (Dossiê Lei Zico,
p.260).
[Lei Zico aims to] (a) expel from sporting
legislation any authoritarian philosophy,
which is disciplinary, controlling,
centralised, restrictive, elitist and protective
of personal and group interests; … and (c)
enact, in the sports field, the predominance
of a ‘destatisation’ philosophy … eliminating
state interference in the internal business of
sport clubs (Dossiê Lei Zico, p.392)
and employee taxes. However the Decreto made
no provision to finance the states that, until 1998,
formally had primary responsibility to regulate
bingo. Those states that did regulate bingo had
the capacity to levy taxes for regulatory services.
The result was variation across the country in the
funding of  regulators as well as in their regulatory
practices. 
We can differentiate between states where there
were state lotteries and the others. The state
lotteries embraced the cause of bingo. They had
the attitude, so here’s the bingo game, we’ll take
care of anything about the game, we’re going to
regulate the game here…. In Rio Grande do Sul
the ‘bingueiros’ were happy. There it was the
LOTERGS [the lottery of the State of Rio Grande
do Sul], that would take care [of regulation], while
here in São Paulo the LOTESP [lottery of the state
of São Paulo] just existed on paper drawn up by
the Secretary of the Treasury… It never worked…
Here in São Paulo the state put two retired ladies
in charge of regulation without an adequate
regulatory infrastructure. They would receive
applications for authorisation and process them
by the deadline but they would never monitor
them as required by the law. Entrepreneurs soon
realised that what they did would not be
monitored and that’s what started the fragile
relationship between bingos and the public
authorities.” (Male, former bingo owner, São
Paulo emphasis added). 
Brazil experimented with different systems for
allocating regulatory licensing and supervisory
powers during the legal bingo era. However, it
never settled on a model that could maintain
public confidence in the resilience of  the bingo
market against corruption and criminality. Initially
regulatory authority over bingo businesses,
including licensing authority, was dispersed to
State Treasury departments, except in the state of
Rio de Janeiro which gave the responsibility to its
well-established state lottery agency (LOTERJ). In
1998, in the wake of  corruption scandals in five
states with significant commercial bingo markets,
the federal government enacted Lei Pelé (Lei nº
9.615/98), which transferred regulatory authority,
including licensing, to a federal organisation, the
Instituto Nacional do Desenvolvimento do
Desporto (National Institute for the Development
of  Sports – INDESP). INDESP was a small
agency that never developed the capacity to
regulate the bingo industry effectively. It therefore
contracted with larger states that had the most
active bingo industries – 13 out of  27 states – to
continue the regulatory arrangements that they
had created under Lei Zico. 
Generally, licensed bingo halls were large, well-
staffed establishments, with the capacity to seat
hundreds of  players. Many offered electronic
games as well as card-based play. One player
recalled “a huge bingo on two floors. It gave us
dinner, afternoon coffee… everything. … One
floor was only slot machines, another floor was
only card bingo” (Female, Player, Rio Grande do
Sul). Some 15 percent of  Brazilians played the
game, about a quarter of  the number who play
the lottery (CPI dos Bingos 2006, p.121). Players
were an eclectic, albeit class-stratified,
population, according to the CPI dos Bingos.
Their experience of  the play would to a significant
extent depend on their class, gender and age:
Bingo customers vary according to the location,
size and the types of play offered. Seniors are
faithful customers of these establishments.
However, this was more obvious at card-based
bingos. The majority of those playing electronic
bingo are aged between 30 and 50 years old. 
Card and electronic bingos also attract different
clienteles with men more frequently opting for
electronic machines and women for card-based
games. (CPI dos Bingos 2006, p.121)
Although the game is no longer licensed, bingo 
is still played in Brazil. Portuguese language
websites hosted outside the country target
Brazilians for online play; sporadic land-based
bingo games are held to raise money for
charitable purposes; and according to the
Instituto Jogo Legal, an industry think-tank, 
some 463 criminal actions were taken against
clandestine establishments and players in 2013.
The Bingo Project
Sign advertising a church bingo on the highway linking
Porto Alegre, the capital of  Rio Grande do Sul, to the
coast,  11/04/2016. Taken by Maria Luiza Kurban Jobim.
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A third model gradually emerged after 2000, the
year in which the federal government first tried
closing the bingo market. It took this initiative in
the wake of  a corruption scandal involving its
regulator, INDESP. Lei Maguito (Lei nº 9.981/2000)
withdrew INDESP's authority to grant new bingo
licences, put existing bingo halls on notice that
their annual licences would not be renewed upon
expiry, and transferred responsibility for licensing,
supervision and compliance (until the licences
expired) from INDESP to the CAIXA, which ran
the successful federal lotteries. This attempted
closure of  the market was contested at the state
level through measures to maintain state authority
over the bingo market. Some state courts were
willing to issue judicial orders extending expired
bingo authorisations.2
Another attempt to close the market in 2004
(Medida Provisória nº 168/2004), this time through
a Presidential decree issued in the wake of  a
major corruption scandal centred on campaign
financing payments to the governing Partido dos
Trabalhadores (PT), also failed. Courts in some
states, notably São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul,
continued well-established practices of  issuing
discretionary injunctions to extend bingo
authorisations3. There was little consistency in the
exercise of  this judicial power, however, so it was
difficult for business owners, players, regulators
and enforcement authorities to understand what
was legally and constitutionally acceptable.
Moreover, the lucrative nature of  the businesses
affected and the substantial losses occasioned
by closure aroused suspicion that courts – as well
as political processes and the executive – were
being corrupted to secure the continuation of  the
bingo industry. 
There were judges who allowed Bingo Halls to
operate normally….And there was speculation
that these injunctions would cost R$1 million, 2
millions, 5 millions. …[T]he ones who got these
decisions felt like they had won the lottery. When
these suspicious about “judicial decisions’ for sale”
were strengthened by Operation Hurricane, the
Supreme Court had to act in order to bring
judicial uniformity. (Male, politician, Rio Grande
do Sul)
A conjuncture of  three key events during 2006-7
finally brought about closure of  Brazil’s formal
bingo market: 
• A special investigation by the Federal Police
and Prosecution Services (Operation
Hurricane) confirmed corrupt practices in
some courts that had been extending bingo
licences through judicial order, undermining
public confidence in the integrity of  courts. 
• Brazil’s Constitutional Supreme Court affirmed
the federal government’s exclusive control over
gambling regulation.4 This ruling established
that Brazil’s state governments lacked the
competence or power to enact legislation to
permit bingo businesses to operate. 
• A Parliamentary Commission of  Inquiry (the
CPI dos Bingos) reported that businesses
representing the interests of  organised crime –
both domestic and international – had captured
much of  the Brazilian bingo market. The report
found that criminals were using bingo halls to
launder money and that proceeds were
diverted to corrupt government officials, from
federal to municipal levels (CPI dos Bingos, 
pp. 12, 134, 122-149). 
Despite finding that the enabling regulation
enacted during the 1990s had not adequately
protected legitimate bingo businesses and
Brazilian public administration against the
activities of  criminal organisations, the Inquiry
recommended re-opening the bingo market with
stronger and more effective regulation. Several
legalisation bills have been proposed since 2007,
and in 2015 two Special Parliamentary
Commissions were created to work on reform.
However, no measures have as yet come through
the legislative process successfully. 
www.kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject
Organised crime and corruption in Brazilian
bingo: Findings from the Parliamentary
Commission of Inquiry (2006)
Organised crime and gambling are
“conjoined twins”. There is strong evidence
worldwide that casinos and similar
businesses mask the real, illegal business
that actually control them. 
Since the beginning of  their activities in
1993, the bingo halls have rendered a
disservice to the nation… [S]ome of  these
entities have been used to launder money
coming from illegal activities. 
As stakeholders bingo has – sometimes
hidden – individuals notably related to
crimes and misdemeanours, who
sometimes represent the interests of  an
international organised mafia (CPI dos
Bingos 2006 pp.7-8)
The weak regulatory structure governing
bingo in Brazil allowed the sector to be
exploited for other purposes. Proceeds
were used to finance and corrupt election
campaigns and to help launder money from
crimes (CPI dos Bingos 2006, p.455). 
2 Agravo de Instrumento Nº 70005784434, Primeira Câmara Especial Cível, Tribunal de Justiça do RS, Relator: Angelo Maraninchi Giannakos, Julgado em
28/04/2003.
3 Mandado de Segurança Nº 4730320000 Relator(a): Linneu Rodrigues de Carvalho S; Comarca: Poá; Órgão julgador: 7º Câmara; Data do julgamento: 27/05/2004;
Data de registro: 16/06/2004); Mandado de Segurança Nº 70005921507, Quarta Câmara Cível, Tribunal de Justiça do RS, Relator: Araken de Assis, Julgado em
28/05/2003)
4 See Supremo Tribunal Federal, Sumula Vinculante nº 2 DJe nº 31 de 06/06/2007, p. 1. DJ de 06/06/2007, p. 1. DOU de 06/06/2007, p. 1.
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By contrast the regulatory framework developed
in a slow, piecemeal fashion. It relied from the
outset on heroic, unrealistic assumptions about
the ability of  sports organisations to diversify into
the provision of  gambling services such as bingo,
and about the capacity of  new and inexperienced
institutions to regulate the country’s only formal
market for non-state provision of  mass-market
gambling. 
Three specific features of  the regulatory regime
combined to undermine public confidence in the
licensed bingo market. First, the legalisation of
bingo as the onlymass-participation game
provided by non-state actors made the game
attractive to criminal organisations that owned
and operated the country’s popular illegal
numbers game, the jogo do bicho. If  markets for
products such as casinos had been opened up 
at the same time then bingo may have been
sheltered from the pressure to develop quasi-
casino spaces and thus been less vulnerable to
capture by bicheiros, the entrepreneurs of  the
jogo do bicho franchises.
Secondly, the misdirected focus of  the licensing
standards contributed to a loss of  public
confidence in the licensed bingo market. The
scale of  the certification requirements tended to
have the unintended and perverse effect of
precluding entry into the market of  the very
providers that the regulation had been intended
to promote, and which the public might have
considered more resilient against the risk of
capture by organised crime. Businesses were set
up in large spaces to meet the equipment and
minimum occupancy standards enshrined in the
regulations. Such investment was beyond the
capacity of  the sports organisations that entered
the bingo business to generate income for sports
development. Those organisations that wished to
take advantage of  the opportunity opened up by
Lei Zico therefore had to partner with commercial
“There was a problem once the bicheiro
entered the bingo business to launder
money. I am against bingo regulation
without a serious oversight” (Male, former
bingo owner, Rio Grande do Sul).
“We've always had clandestine casinos and
when the bingos were legalised, many of
these people from clandestine casinos
migrated to bingo. (Male, former treatment
provider, Rio Grande do Sul).
operators willing to invest in bingo. In turn this
demand for capital created significant new
opportunities for owners of  jogo do bicho
franchises to diversify, to deploy their expertise in
developing the bingo market and to launder
proceeds from their other illicit businesses.
Likewise, suitability tests were applied as part of
the accreditation process for sports organisations
that fronted bingo businesses on the basis that
they were ultimately responsible for the
commercial investors and operators who ran the
bingos. The purpose of  the regulation may have
been to ensure that persons responsible for
bingos were honest and reputable. It is unclear,
however, that the suitability certifications required,
which focused on the identity of  the licensee, its
status as a registered business in the formal
economy and good standing with various public
authorities, provided useful information to
regulators or players about a bingo provider’s
suitability, probity, integrity, or market conduct.
Requirements that do not respond effectively to
risks potentially undermine rather than strengthen
public confidence because they suggest that 
the regulator is unable to carry out its basic
responsibility of  controlling entry to the market. 
The system they approved was not a good fit for
the plan because there were so many certification
requirements … I wanted to set up a bingo with
Corinthians [a large São Paulo sports club known
for its football team] but it is so big that no one
could afford to obtain all of the required
certificates and pay any outstanding tax
liabilities. But I could pay for the certification 
and the unpaid taxes of [a small Brazilian sports
federation] because it had just two or three
employees and a president. So after I paid for the
certificate and the back taxes I was able to develop
a bingo on behalf of this small sports federation.
And this is what happened all the time. Licences
were obtained in partnership with small sports
rather than the big sports clubs that the
legislators had envisaged. (São Paulo, male,
former bingo owner).
Thirdly, under-investment in effective regulatory
structures contributed to lack of  confidence in the
system’s capacity to keep the bingo market free
of crime. This weakness is linked to the problems
of multi-level regulation that bedevilled the era of
lawful bingo. State and federal institutions
competed with each other instead of  working
collaboratively to regulate the bingo market, and
municipalities which had regulatory powers to
approve bingo locations5 do not appear to have
Key themes
1 A lack of systematic attention to
regulatory objectives, instruments, and
processes contributed to the failure of
Brazil’s bingo market and damaged public
confidence 
“For more than 51% of the people, bingos are
related to criminal practices such as money
laundering, tax evasion, and increasing violence.
To 43%, the bingo halls have no positive features.”
(CPI dos Bingos 2006, p.120)
Brazil’s bingo exemption was a side effect of  the
democratisation of  sports administration rather
than the result of  a carefully considered policy
decision to open up a legal gambling market. This
inauspicious beginning meant that the regulatory
framework for the game lacked a robust
articulation of  objectives, instruments, and
methods. One informant told us that the idea of
legalising bingo in Brazil had stemmed from news
of the UK bingo sector’s sponsorship of  elite
sports, with little consideration of  how it could 
be transplanted to the Brazilian context. 
“A working group was established to evaluate how
to bring resources to [sports development], and
someone said we will do bingo because bingo was
reputed to be strong sponsor of competitive sailing
in England. The model was imported without
consultation. No one had operated bingo or had
any previous experience of this model in Brazil. It
simply did not exist here. Then along came the
legislator with Lei Zico and the model was
approved.” (Male, former bingo owner, São
Paulo).
Nonetheless, a bingo industry developed swiftly
and the game grew, particularly in Brazil’s
prosperous South and South East. 
“Within four months, seven bingo halls
began to work regularly in Porto Alegre
center, there are another 10 applications for
authorisation for establishments of  this kind
in the capital and many plans for the interior.
“It became a craze,” says Rildo Machado
da Silva, Bingo Beach Street supervisor.
“Competition is getting stronger.” Zero Hora
12 November 1994.
The Bingo Project
5 Lei Pelé Decreto Regulamentador 2.574/98. In addition the state of  Rio de Janeiro allowed the bingo regulator to authorise municipalities to offer bingos to raise revenues under
Art. 14 of  Decreto Estadual nº 25.723/1999.
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featured prominently in policy discussions –
although we have found some cases on the
exercise of  these municipal powers.6 Tensions
between federal and state level regulation came
to a head at the end of  the 1990s after INDESP, as
the national regulator, issued orders claiming for
itself  the exclusive competence to regulate the
lucrative electronic bingo market across the
country including in states that already had made
provision for state level regulation.7 INDESP was
subsequently exposed as having been corrupted
to support expansion of  electronic gaming in
bingo halls8. Most of  its regulatory functions were
then transferred to the CAIXA, the federal bank
responsible for lotteries, which simply ignored the
arrangements established in larger states for
regulating bingo. In 2001 INDESP was completely
closed down.9 The frequent changes in the
location of  regulatory authority between different
levels of  government, and the variation across the
country, made it difficult for people to know which
agency was responsible for the bingo market.
“The [regulator] INDESP was a tiny organisation
– 50 or 60 employees to take care of all bingos in
Brazil. Of course it did not.” (Male, former Bingo
owner, São Paulo). 
These three factors – failure to consider the
impact of  partial legalisation in the light of  Brazil’s
existing gambling environment; poorly designed
standards that created perverse incentives; and
under-investment in regulation – combined to
reduce public confidence in the integrity of  bingo
operations and the capacity of  Brazilian
regulators to control the market. 
www.kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject
6 eg Agravo de Instrumento Nº 70005784434, Primeira Câmara Especial Cível, Tribunal de Justiça do RS, Relator: Angelo Maraninchi Giannakos, Julgado em 28/04/2003;
Agravo de Instrumento Nº 70006051601, Vigésima Primeira Câmara Cível, Tribunal de Justiça do RS, Relator: Genaro José Baroni Borges, Julgado em 03/09/2003; Agravo
de Instrumento Nº 70006521009, Quarta Câmara Cível, Tribunal de Justiça do RS, Relator: Wellington Pacheco Barros, Julgado em 08/10/2003. 
7 Portaria INDESP n. 104/98; Portaria INDESP n. 23/99.
8 Boudens, E. 2000. Bingo: usos e abusos. Consultoria Legislativa. Câmara dos Deputados. Centro de Documentação e Informação. Coordenação de Públicações. Brasília. 
9 Medida Provisoria n. 2216-37/2001
Image of  an authorisation issued by the CAIXA authorising the Gaucha Table Tennis federation to run a bingo in
collaboration with a private operator. Source: Apelação Cível Nº 70006541205, Quarta Câmara Cível, Tribunal de
Justiça do RS, Relator: João Carlos Branco Cardoso, Julgado em 11/07/2007.
Bingo Imperatriz in São Paulo, taken from p.1250 of  the
CPI dos Bingos, 2006.
Bingo Pamplona in São Paulo, taken from pp.1254 of
the CPI dos Bingos, 2006.
16
CHAPTER 1: THE REGULATION 
OF BINGO IN BRAZIL 
machines and slot machines were central. Many
blame the problems associated with the bingo
industry on the spread of  machines. 
Slot machines in bingo halls: Some views
from interviewees
“Typical players were the archetypal middle
aged couple who didn’t want to do anything
wrong. After legalisation of  bingo they
began to play the little machines.” (Male,
former problem treatment provider, Rio
Grande do Sul)
“What I like most is the slot machine, but
when bingo started in Porto Alegre there
were no slot machines. I started with card
bingo, then they brought in the slot
machines based on the bingo cards. When
they legalised they started slowly bringing
the slot machines into the bingo halls. Then
they started to make lots of  money with slot
machines and began to expand, began to
make rooms only for slot machines and to
expand the space for them.” (Female,
player, Rio Grande do Sul)
“Slot machines are very harmful. Card-
based bingo I think is social. If  the person is
with others it is not harmful. But the slot
machine, it is individual, it individualises
you, and, it’s you against the machine, and
you want to challenge it… You know the
hours pass quickly. It’s all hallucinogen,
those numbers, those challenges. My
husband had no idea about the extent of
my compulsion. Then he started watching
me. He would call at a certain time and ask
what are you doing? I would tell him I am in
the store. It was such a lie… I was at bingo.”
(Female, service provider and former player,
Rio Grande do Sul).
“I was always against the slot-machine,
why? Because I think the slot-machine will
destroy bingos” (Male, Former bingo owner,
Rio Grande do Sul.)
“In bingo halls in São Paulo, electronic
gaming machines represent 80% of the
profit from gambling houses, sometimes
reaching 90%, which detracts somewhat
from the idea that these places should be
considered bingos and makes them seem
more like casinos” (CPI dos Bingos, p.115).
“Bingo is the gateway to the casino” (Male,
Mayor of  a city in Rio Grande do Sul,
quoted in Zero Hora, 12 November 1994)
Some bingo halls catered to a range of  players,
using time as the basis for dividing up the use of
space. One former São Paulo bingo owner told us
that he had organised his business to attract
elderly people looking to socialise with friends
during the daytime, and local workers wanting to
avoid the city’s notorious traffic congestion in the
early evening. Later at night the bingo catered to
business people or couples looking to extend
their evening after dinner. Finally, during the early
hours of  the morning he targeted night workers
such as security guards, and restaurant and bar
managers who needed time to chill out after their
shifts. 
Since the end of  the legalisation period it is the
smaller, less glamorous, and less visible spaces
that have survived as clandestine bingos. In
particular, our research shows that
impoverishment of  the bingo hall environment,
through confiscation of  fixtures and fittings, has
been used as a deliberate law enforcement
strategy. 
“At one point we had about ten illegal bingo halls
that were working simultaneously in Porto Alegre.
So I went there and closed them and the next day
they were open again. I tried as a strategy to seek
to “de-capitalise” these offenders, seizing all the
material that would include all the furniture, ie
tables, chairs, everything that they used to operate
the bingo. We sometimes took 300 or 400 chairs,
armchairs, tables. Even doing this, some bingos
were still very fast to reopen the establishment,
which shows that they really had a lot of capital
to finance the reopening of these locations.” (Male,
Public Prosecutor, Rio Grande do Sul).
Confiscation of  the fittings of  an illegal bingo hall
did not necessarily prevent the business from
reopening, outfitted with replacement furniture,
but over time even a well-capitalised business
might have difficulty repeatedly raising the funds
required to refit a well-appointed bingo hall to its
former standards. A public prosecutor illustrated
this point with the example of  a once luxurious
bingo facility in Porto Alegre, which:
…[s]uffered a series of  raids from both the
public prosecutor and the Police that aimed
at de-capitalising the business. So in
subsequent re-openings the comfortable
armchairs were replaced with plastic chairs,
the granite tables were replaced with folding
tables and the large screen was never
restored.” (Male, Public Prosecutor, Rio
Grande do Sul)
2 Changing bingo environments in Brazil:
From diversity to clandestine, decapitalised
uniformity
Licensed bingos were diverse. Some bingo
businesses targeted the mass market, charging
low prices, outfitting their interiors simply, and
opening in locations such as shopping malls 
that were already heavily used by the public. 
“Central Bingo with its plastic tables and chairs
and reusable cards mostly attracts the lower 
and middle classes… the public who really
understands bingo” (female bingo manager
quoted in Zero Hora November 12, 1998, p.5). 
“Our clients are ordinary people”, said the owner
of the Royal Bingo, which recently opened with its
plain fittings and the lowest prices in the city.
(Zero Hora November 12, 1998 p.5).
Other bingo businesses targeted affluent men 
as their customers, marketing bingo as a
sophisticated leisure option and the bingo hall as
a conducive environment for both relaxation and
business networking. These places benefited
from considerable investments in playing
environments that conveyed opulence, glamour,
luxury and excess. 
“Bingo X was famous for being one of the most
luxurious places in the city ... the first time I went
it was a beautiful place with lovely chairs and
tables made of marble.” (Male, Public Official, 
Rio Grande do Sul)
“There are some very sumptuous establishments,
such as the Emperor and Empress Bingos, located
in the city of São Paulo. The magnificence of these
bingos is evident from the outside. Their luxurious
interiors are designed to impress”. (CPI dos
Bingos p.116).
“A little over a year ago, the image of a bingo 
hall used to be a common room with long tables,
dining chairs, straw and underpaid workers
trying to have fun or earn some money without
spending a lot. Today a bingo is a carpeted
environment filled with mirrors, full of electronic
equipment and waiters in ties serving imported
whisky. …The old bingo has became a chic leisure
option.” (Zero Hora 1998).
“We bring together people representing 90% of 
the Gaúcho [Rio Grande do Sul] GDP.” (Male,
Director of a large bingo in Porto Alegre, Rio
Grande do Sul, quoted in Zero Hora November
12, 1998).
In particular, some bingo businesses invested
heavily in the creation of  casino-like environments
to attract players, where electronic bingo
The Bingo Project
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A new form of  clandestine operation has
developed since closure of  the market: the pop-
up bingo. This is set up with very little investment
and can be taken down quickly in the event of  a
police raid. An industry expert described a
typical scenario as one in which:
“a Bingo manager who worked ten years in
that place turns to his boss and says ‘sell me
this structure.’ He then mounts a clandestine
Bingo as an itinerant bingo. He sets up in a
shed here today, tomorrow he moves it, two
weeks later he changes the Bingo
somewhere else again, and then the police
will be there and close the business. He
moves, two weeks later he’s in a different
place. We have come to the conclusion by
analysing data from newspaper reports and
conversations with players that Brazil has on
average between 200 and 250 clandestine
Bingos” (Male, Industry expert, Rio de
Janeiro).
Clandestine bingos indicate that there remains
considerable interest in play, but these places
may expose both players and staff  to risks of
violence and prosecution.10While Brazilian law
extends some protection to consumers by
refusing to uphold the debts incurred by a
“pathological” player on grounds of  her
vulnerability11, the hidden nature of  clandestine
bingo limits players’ access to the extensive rights
and powerful remedies of  Brazil’s Consumer
Protection Code.12
“I’ve had the police came several times
[while playing at a clandestine bingo]. They
wave a gun, ask you to raise your hand.
They open your bag, examine you, take
things, money, if  there’s enough money in
the bag they take it thinking it’s from the
bingo.” (Female, bingo player, Rio Grande
do Sul) 
3 A continuing concern with pathology and
addiction
Although some treatment providers who spoke to
us still treat gambling addictions on a small scale,
gambling addiction did not feature heavily in our
interviews as a significant current problem in
Brazil. This is unsurprising given the lack of
widespread legal gambling opportunities (other
than lotteries). However, fears about pathological
gambling cropped up frequently, with some
respondents drawing on experience of  the bingo
legalisation era. 
“At first the game had more men than women. 
As the availability of bingo and video-bingo
increased so too did the ratio of women to men. 
So in the beginning it was 3 to 1 and then it
became 2 men to 1 woman. It depends on the 
type of game, too, so you can’t really talk about
gambling in general… The  lottery is very
different from bingo, which is different from
betting, which is different from poker, video poker.
What the studies show is that these little games
are far more serious than the others, because they
are more addictive, because it is so much faster.
You play there in the machine, you lose track of
time and space quickly then, it’s like the
comparison between cocaine and crack.” (Male,
problem gambling researcher, São Paulo)
Some regarded bingo as a ‘gateway’ to harder
and more intensive forms of  play and suggested
that the transition could happen very smoothly,
despite the difference between the highly social
nature of  traditional bingo and the more
individualised play on the machines. 
“The typical profile of our patients at the time that
the Bingos operated more openly was a person, it
could be a man or a woman, around 47 years old
and the problem started like this: he began to
enter the Bingo playing one or two cards games
for a while, then when he got bored he went over
to the computer. “ (Male, Researcher and
treatment provider, São Paulo)
www.kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject
Another key concern was that the slot machines
found in many bingo halls during the legalisation
era were designed to stimulate repetitive play.
This respondent, for example, identified elements
of machine gaming, including its isolation, 
display designs and the positioning of  the slot
receptacles for tokens or coins, as contributing to
compulsive play. 
The slot machine is the most harmful. I consider
the slot very harmful. They put the coin slot up
here at the level of your eyes, if they put it down
there at the level of your pocket, you will think
about it, because if you take your money out of
your pocket you will think. But it’s up here
instead. (So) you’re putting coins in, you’re 
putting coins in, you’re happy. The hours pass
quickly, it’s hallucinogenic, all those numbers,
those challenges. (Female, service provider and
former player, Rio Grande do Sul).
Such concerns about pathology, compulsiveness,
and over-consumption of  gambling services,
especially in machine form, are not unique to
Brazil. They are central to debates about
gambling policy across the world. However, the
persistence of  these concerns – long after the
end of  Brazil’s lawful market for bingo – indicates
how deeply experiences of  pathology marked
that era and contributed to popular
understandings of  the effects of  legalising bingo.
10 Recurso Crime Nº 71005227848, Turma Recursal Criminal, Turmas Recursais, Relator: Madgeli Frantz Machado, Julgado em 11/05/2015.
11 REsp 1406487/SP, Rel. Ministro PAULO DE TARSO SANSEVERINO, TERCEIRA TURMA, julgado em 04/08/2015, DJe 13/08/2015.
12 Lei nº: 8.078/1990 – Código de Defesa do Consumidor (CDC).
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We think a good case can be made that the
benefits of  lawful bingo – to the communities of
players and workers as well as to the state –
outweigh the risk of  harms. For bingo to play a
role in Brazil’s future, however, it must be provided
in a way that marks a clean break with the past.
We consider it implausible that Brazil at this
moment can create a trusted licensed bingo
market populated by private sector businesses
without robust, effective and well-funded
regulation. 
In view of  our findings, we therefore recommend: 
1 That bingo be legalised as part of  an
integrated set of  reforms to legalise gambling
in Brazil. Although other forms of  gambling are
outside the scope of  this research, inclusion 
of  bingo legalisation within a more general
legalisation programme will help to avoid the
problems that occurred when the game was
legalised as an exception to the general norm
of prohibition.
2 That legalised bingo in Brazil should
encompass online and mobile bingo as well 
as the terrestrial form. This broad scope will
allow Brazil to capture some of  the revenues
currently flowing to Portuguese language bingo
sites outside the country that are marketed to
Brazilians and create a foundation for Brazil to
respond effectively to growth in online and
mobile forms of  bingo. 
3 That bingo be legalised through a regulatory
system that is comprehensive, integrated,
responsive to the distinctive nature of  bingo,
well-staffed and properly funded to develop
staff  expertise and conduct effective
inspections. Regulation of  bingo in Brazil also
must be tailored to the country’s distinctive
history, cultures, legal institutions and political
arrangements. While we believe that Brazil
should not simply transplant a regulatory model
from elsewhere to govern its bingo market, we
think it is useful to consider best practice from
other jurisdictions. We recommend further that
bingo regulation in Brazil should address, inter
alia, the following four concerns:
a The definition of  the game: Because a
blurring of  the lines between bingo and
casinos contributed to the downfall of  the
legalised bingo market we consider that it is
desirable clearly to differentiate bingo as a
specific form of  gaming distinct from slot-
machines and casino games in order to start
the process of  rebuilding trust in the bingo
sector. We recommend the creation of  a
comprehensive definition to cover land,
online and mobile bingo. The rationale for a
comprehensive definition is to encourage
regulators to think about what kinds of  play
should be licensed as bingo games across
the different modalities, and to help reinforce
the distinctive character of  the game. To
carry out this definitional work effectively – in
particular to reduce the risks of  land-based
bingo once again being conflated with
casinos and to demarcate clearly the
boundaries of  online and mobile bingo –
bingo regulators will require training to
develop expertise in bingo operations. 
b The sites of  regulatory authority and
institutions: It is imperative that Brazil settles
upon a viable structure of  regulatory
institutions for legal bingo and then invests
sufficient resources for them to function
effectively. The first and most critical choice
is the locus of  regulatory authority in light of
the perennial conflicts between federal and
state power. We recommend the placing of
licensing, inspection, revenue distribution,
consumer protection and enforcement
powers at the state level as is done in other
federal jurisdictions and we think that Brazil
would benefit significantly from a formal
means to share and sometimes to
coordinate regulatory practice across
different states. We therefore recommend
that Brazilian policy makers introduce a
network model of  regulation through which
“epistemic communities” of  state regulators
work to achieve uniformity without
centralisation.14
c Player protection: In addition to conventional
forms of  regulating market entry, inspection
and supervision, which have historically
been used for land-based bingo, it is
important for Brazil to create systematic and
effective conduct of  business regulation to
govern relationships between providers and
players. 
Recommendations
Today there is no plausible justification for
gambling to remain illegal. (Male, industry
analyst, Rio de Janeiro) 
Almost half of the population is against the
legalisation of bingo halls…Consequently, the
regulation issue is not just about legalisation but
also about capacity to remove the strong stigma of
criminality from bingo halls… Generally people
prefer a well-known formula: State intervention.
Fifty percent of the interviewees prefer the
“Government” to administer the bingo halls. In
the opinion of 78%, the bingos should operated in
designated areas. In sum the hand of the State
should not be invisible”. (CPI dos Bingos 2006,
p.119-120)
It is difficult to see the benefits to Brazil of  its
current approach to bingo. The lack of  a
regulatory model for legal bingo may reduce
access to the game but it does not stop those
who want to play. Illegality generates costs of
enforcement, corruption and foregone jobs and
taxable revenues. Illegality also tends to drive
gambling problems, including the exploitation of
vulnerabilities and fraud, further underground. For
reasons such as these there is considerable
support within Congress to legalise gambling,
particularly to realise the fiscal and economic
benefits that liberalisation is expected to create.
We consider, however, that the legacy of  the
criminality, corruption, and ensuing loss of
confidence in regulatory capacity that ultimately
destroyed Brazil’s retail bingo market, together
with concerns about consumer vulnerability that
are found in the case law as well as the views of
treatment providers, pose serious obstacles to
successful legalisation.13 Furthermore, at the time
of writing, Brazil is enduring political turmoil
triggered by the largest and most extensive
corruption scandals in its history, which
potentially will exacerbate opposition to the idea
of re-opening a bingo market. For reasons such
as these it is doubtful whether the legalisation of
bingo is sustainable without a deliberate strategy
to rebuild trust and public confidence that the
sector will be less corrupt and be better
protected against capture by organised crime
than it was during the 1990s.
The Bingo Project
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14 The idea of  governance through regulatory networks has been developed most systematically in fields such as competition policy and financial regulation where the
domestication of  international standards may play a significant role in national regulation. The idea of  a loose confederation of  “epistemic communities” at state levels, sharing
practice through activities coordinated by the Union government could potentially be adapted to the Brazilian context. For a useful summary and discussion of  regulatory
networks see: Ramsay, Iain. “Consumer law, regulatory capitalism and the new learning in regulation.” Sydney L. Rev. 28 (2006): 9.
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i Regulation of  these relationships should
be based on the principles of  “Know Your
Customer” (KYC) and “Know Your
Provider” (KYP). The KYC principle is
usually associated with crime control and
security, particularly in relation to account
based play online. But we consider that
the principle is important also for player
protection and as such should influence
regulation of  the risks that providers may
exploit vulnerable consumers. The KYP
principle reflects the idea that players are
entitled to feel confident that products and
services are safe, of  good quality and
delivered on fair non-abusive terms. 
ii One option for giving effect to KYC and
KYP principles is to treat bingo players as
consumers under Brazil’s Código de
Defesa do Consumidor (Consumer
Protection Code) and create a regulatory
duty on bingo providers to demonstrate
how they “treat consumers fairly”. This
duty would require bingo providers to
report to the regulator and the public on
the measures they take to ensure that
bingo is provided in ways that uphold the
consumer’s rights under the Brazilian
Consumer Code. These rights are based
on the Code’s general understanding of  
a consumer’s vulnerability as the weaker
party in transactions and more specifically
rights to protection against harmful
products and services, rights to fair
dealing, including protection against
misleading and abusive advertising,
coercive or unfair business methods and
abusive practices, and rights to disclosure
and education, quality products and
accessible dispute resolution.
iii Reporting of  bingo providers’ compliance
with the duty to treat consumers fairly
would require providers to document their
strategy to achieve the specified
outcomes, report regularly on the
measures taken to achieve the outcomes
and their success. These reports would
be subject to audit as part of  regulatory
inspection and supervision and be made
publicly available.
d Crime prevention: Regulation in Brazil must
respond proactively to the public mistrust
caused by the levels of  criminality
associated with the country’s previous
experience of  lawful bingo. In addition to
articulating a regulatory objective to prevent
crime (as is done elsewhere), requiring
providers to comply with Anti-Money
Laundering provisions (as is done
elsewhere), and researching best practice in
other jurisdictions we consider it advisable
for Brazil to impose on bingo providers a
duty to prevent crime, including fraud,
money laundering, bribery and corruption.
The regulation should articulate the
outcomes that compliance with this duty
should deliver, require providers to develop a
compliance strategy to achieve the specified
outcomes and require regular reporting of
the measures that providers take to achieve
the outcomes and the success of  their
measures. Providers’ reports would be
subject to audit during regulatory inspection
and supervision processes and be made
publicly available. While there are good
reasons for the regulation to be drafted as
universally applicable, consideration should
be given to exemptions from more onerous
requirements for small-scale, non-profit and
charitable providers of  bingo. 
4 We make two further recommendations for
institutional practices that Brazil could adopt to
help develop a strong and generally accepted
licensed bingo sector: 
a First we consider that regulatory capacity
would be enhanced if  a portion of  the
revenues from legalised bingo were used to
fund specialist NGOs to develop expertise in
gambling regulation, data analysis, and
communications. The role of  these “Bingo
Watch” organisations would be to strengthen
the capacity of  civil society, independently 
of  the regulator, to assess and where
necessary critique the performances of
bingo providers against their regulatory
duties to treat consumers fairly and prevent
crime. 
b Second, recognising the contributions of
players and workers to the value that bingo
creates, we recommend that a portion of
bingo revenues be ring-fenced to support
local services and causes and that staff  and
players be given a voice in the distribution of
these bingo revenues. 
www.kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject
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Top 20 bingo cases
A note about Brazilian cases: Usually cases in Brazil bind only the parties. They do not usually function as binding precedents for subsequent decisions. 
We have selected the following cases as examples of  the types of  questions that judges have confronted in relation to bingo. We have focused in particular
on cases about the legality of  bingo licences and games to illustrate varying views on this question. 
Decisions about an Action on Constitutional Rights (Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade/Constitucionalidade) are binding and the last case on the list was
taken to the Supreme Constitutional Court on this basis. 
On specific occasions a Brazilian Supreme Court will decide to issue a decision to promote uniformity of  court decisions in a context where there are a lot
of  cases with different results on an important issue. This type of  case – a Súmula Vinculante – does function as a binding precedent. In 2007 Brazil’s
Federal Supreme Court (STF) issued a Súmula Vinculante in relation to bingos, holding that Brazil’s states lacked the competence to legislate about bingo
and so could not pass laws creating licensing and other regulatory powers for bingo businesses within their jurisdictions. 
Our table includes cases from the following courts: Tribunal de Justiça do Rio Grande do Sul (TJRS; Court of  Appeals of  the State of  Rio Grande do Sul);
Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo (TJSP, Court of  Appeals of  the State of  São Paulo); Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ, Superior Court of  Justice); and
Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF, Federal Supreme Court).
The Bingo Project
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Tribunal de Justiça do Rio Grande do Sul – TJRS
Apelação e Reexame Necessário Nº 598267391,
Vigésima Primeira Câmara Cível, Tribunal de Justiça
do RS, Relator: Pedro Luiz Rodrigues Bossle, Julgado
em 11/04/2001
Whether “Toto bola”, a form of  tele-bingo developed and widely sold in Rio Grande do Sul until the state shut it down
because of  corruption, could be lawfully marketed. The applicant had obtained a bingo licence under Lei Zico (nº
8.672/93) and its implementing Decree (Decreto Regulamentador (nº 981/93), which had permitted states to authorise
the development of  “similar games” to bingo. This provision had been revoked before expiry of  the applicant’s licence.
The court confirmed that the applicant’s state licence to market Toto bola remained valid despite the Federal
government’s withdrawal of  authority to issue licences on this basis.
Agravo de Instrumento Nº 70003960085, Terceira
Câmara Cível, Tribunal de Justiça do RS, Relator: Luiz
Ari Azambuja Ramos, Julgado em 11/04/2002
An action brought by an operator who had been denied permission to install electronic gaming machines in a bingo
hall. The court denied the application holding that Electronic Gaming Machines are not legal in a bingo hall since the
legislation only authorised the licensing of  traditional bingo.
Apelação Cível Nº 70004871380, Primeira Câmara
Cível, Tribunal de Justiça do RS, Relator: Henrique
Osvaldo Poeta Roenick, Julgado em 16/10/2002
A bingo operator brought the case to challenge a charge that the State of  Rio Grande do Sul had imposed on bingo
businesses. The operator argued the charge was an illegal tax because operators received no services in return for
payment and that if  the State had simply wanted to raise revenues from bingo it should have created a special tax
called an imposto. The court held that the charge was legal because the funds it raised paid for inspection and
surveillance actitivities required by the licensing activity. The situation in this case is similar to the case below
(Apelação Cível Nº 70005068325), decided three weeks later, but the two cases (decided by different judges) have
conflicting outcomes. 
Apelação Cível Nº 70005068325, Primeira Câmara
Cível, Tribunal de Justiça do RS, Relator: Roque
Joaquim Volkweiss, Julgado em 06/11/2002)
(see above). 
In this case the fee was considered illegal because no surveillance, inspections or oversight were conducted in bingo
halls.
Agravo de Instrumento Nº 70005784434, Primeira
Câmara Especial Cível, Tribunal de Justiça do RS,
Relator: Angelo Maraninchi Giannakos, Julgado em
28/04/2003
The case was brought by a commercial operator, after his bingo licence (issued by the CAIXA) expired and the bingo
market was closed under Lei Maguito. Because there was no longer a regulatory agency available to deal with
renewal of  bingo licences the applicant asked the court to renew his licence. 
The court decided that the law was in a state of  “unacceptable juridical uncertainty” and the operator could have the
licence renewed through a judicial injunction.
Mandado de Segurança Nº 70005921507, Quarta
Câmara Cível, Tribunal de Justiça do RS, Relator:
Araken de Assis, Julgado em 28/05/2003
The case was brought by a commercial operator, after his bingo licence (issued by the CAIXA) expired and the bingo
market was closed under Lei Maguito. Because there was no longer a regulatory agency available to deal with
renewal of  bingo licences the applicant asked the court to renew his licence. 
This decision went further than the previous case, which granted the licence because of  the uncertainty about the
applicant’s rights that the law had created. In this case the court held that commercial bingo is legal and that the
absence of  a regulatory frameowork could not transform it into an illegal activity. It therefore granted the operator a
licence to run bingo. 
Agravo de Instrumento Nº 70005784434, Primeira
Câmara Especial Cível, Tribunal de Justiça do RS,
Relator: Angelo Maraninchi Giannakos, Julgado em
28/04/2003
A local authority had refused to issue a permit (alvara) to allow a buiding to be used for bingo, since the licence to
operate bingo issued by the federal agency (the CAIXA) had already expired and would not be renewed after the
enactment of  Lei Maguito. The court held that the degree of  legal uncertainty surrounding the regulation of  bingo met
the threshold for unreasonableness and as such the company was entitled to continue its bingo activities. This meant




Tribunal de Justiça do Rio Grande do Sul – TJRS
Apelação Cível Nº 70005845771, Terceira Câmara
Cível, Tribunal de Justiça do RS, Relator: Augusto
Otávio Stern, Julgado em 26/06/2003
The applicant in this case was concerned about the many contemporaneous media stories on the closure of  bingo
halls. It therefore sought an order to protect it against any future closure action. The claim was dismissed because the
company was not facing a specific threat or action from a public authority. The court ruled that in the absence of  such
a specific threat or action the applicant could not assume that it would suffer the same fate as other businesses and
that media stories or the facts of  other cases could not be used to secure an order from the court in the applicant’s
case. 
Apelação Cível Nº 70002112969, Segunda Câmara
Especial Cível, Tribunal de Justiça do RS, Relator:
Ícaro Carvalho de Bem Osório, Julgado em
30/06/2003
This case was brought by a bingo operator who sought to enforce a debt incurred by a player who paid with a cheque
that bounced. The court held that a commercial bingo operator could enforce the debt against the player because the
debt had been incurred when bingo had been licensed and therefore legal. 
Agravo de Instrumento Nº 70006051601, Vigésima
Primeira Câmara Cível, Tribunal de Justiça do RS,
Relator: Genaro José Baroni Borges, Julgado em
03/09/2003
A bingo owner brought this case to challenge the zoning / separation requirements on licensed bingos imposed by a
municipality. The court denied the application, holding that it is not for a court to decide whether minimal separation
requirements established by municipalities for sanitary, safety, security or other reasons within municipal authority, are
legal or not. It is instead within the discretion of  the municipality to decide. 
This case was appealed to the Supreme Court. However, the court did not decide on the merits of  the issue because
the Súmula Vinculante decision had been released. As noted below, this special precedent decision upheld the
federal government’s exclusive competence to legislate in the field of  bingo. Consequently, the enactment (by the
federal government) of  Lei Maguito to close the bingo market made questions about the authority of  a municipality to
establish zoning and separation requirements between premises irrelevant (STF – RE: 524501 RS, Relator: Min. EROS
GRAU, Data de Julgamento: 13/06/2008, Data de Publicação: DJe-118 DIVULG 27/06/2008 PUBLIC 30/06/2008).
Agravo de Instrumento Nº 70006521009, Quarta
Câmara Cível, Tribunal de Justiça do RS, Relator:
Wellington Pacheco Barros, Julgado em 08/10/2003
The City of  Bage denied a commercial operator a permit (alvara) because it did not hold a federal-level CAIXA
authorisation (a precondition for the permit). Held that this was outside the municipality’s powers. Given that there was
no legal certainty regarding the level of  government, or agency, to which bingo operators should apply for
authorisation, municipalities had no right to deny permits (alvaras).
Apelação Cível Nº 70008269813, Décima Nona
Câmara Cível, Tribunal de Justiça do RS, Relator:
José Francisco Pellegrini, Julgado em 14/12/2004
This action was brought by a comercial bingo operator against a debtor for repayment of  money the debtor had
borrowed to play bingo. The judge held that although bingo was operated lawfully the lending of  money to enable
someone to play compulsively to the point of  over-indebtedness would not be condoned by law. The debt therefore
was unenforceable. 
RECURSO CRIME Nº 71005227848, TURMA
RECURSAL CRIMINAL, TURMAS RECURSAIS,
RELATOR: MADGELI FRANTZ MACHADO, JULGADO
EM 11/05/2015.
The Ministério Publico (a type of  public prosecutor) brought a criminal action under Art. 50 of  the 1941 Lei de
Contravenções Penais (Criminal Contravention Act) against an employee of  a bingo hall alleging that the employee
was illegally offering games of  chance. The court held that bingo staff  cannot be prosecuted under Brazil’s Criminal
Contravention Act because they do not benefit personally from the profits of  bingo activities. 
Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo – TJSP
Mandado de Segurança Nº 4730320000 Relator(a):
Linneu Rodrigues de Carvalho S; Comarca: Poá;
Órgão julgador: 7º Câmara; Data do julgamento:
27/05/2004; Data de registro: 16/06/2004
This case was brought by a commercial operator, after his bingo licence (issued by the CAIXA) expired and the bingo
market was closed under Lei Maguito. Because there was no longer a regulatory agency available to deal with
renewal of  bingo licences the applicant asked the court to renew his licence. 
The court held that commercial bingo is legal and it granted the operator the requested licence. The court considered
that the 1993 exemption of  bingo from the s.50 of  the Lei de Contravenções Penais (Criminal Contravention Act)
effectively revoked prohibition as it applied to bingo and that once a law is revoked it cannot be revived. Since bingo is
legal it would be unfair to deny the operator a licence to run it. 
Apelação Cível nº 004720-44.2011.8.26.0642. D.J.:
18/08/2015, Desa. Lucila Toledo
This case was brought after a charitable bingo run by a commercial operator failed to deliver the prize to the winner.
The winner took action against the charitable institution but the charity blamed the operator for non-delivery of  the
prize and also argued that the judge had no authority to issue an order for it to award the prize. The court held that the
charity was responsible because the bingo had been marketed in its name and that the judge was entitled to order the
charity to deliver the prize because the bingo had been held on the basis of  a judicial order authorising the event. 
Embargos de Declaração 0.129.718-
13.2008.8.26.0053/50001
This case concerned a challenge to the legitimacy of  the fees that the State of  São Paulo charged bingo halls,
ostensibly to cover the costs of  regulatory services. São Paulo, unlike Rio Grande do Sul, funded its bingo regulation
work though a general “fee on diverse services” rather than a specific tax. The Court rejected the bingo owner’s
challenge, holding that the legitimacy of  the fee was justified merely on grounds of  the police power [which in many
systems of  law is the power to regulate behaviour on the basis of  health, safety, morals, and general welfare].
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Full citation Summary
Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ)
REsp 1406487/SP, Rel. Ministro PAULO DE TARSO
SANSEVERINO, TERCEIRA TURMA, julgado em
04/08/2015, DJe 13/08/2015.
This case concerns the unenforceability of  a debt owed by a problem gambler to a bingo establishment. The debt
was incurred while bingo was lawful although the case was decided afer the restoration of  prohibition. The Court held
that the debt was unenforceable based on the Brazilian Consumer Code’s protection of  the vulnerable consumer.
REsp 1509923/SP, Rel. Ministro HUMBERTO
MARTINS, SEGUNDA TURMA, julgado em
06/10/2015, DJe 22/10/2015.
This case was initiated by the public prosecutor’s office in São Paulo together with the Federal Public Prosecutor. It
sought damages from the operators of  illegal bingos. The court held that the illegal operation of  bingo houses per se
is an economic activity that harms consumer and collective interests so the Public Prosecutor did not have to prove
pain, suffering or psychological damage from the illegal economic activity to claim collective moral damage to
consumer interests. The bingo halls were ordered to compensate society for collective moral damages and to pay a





Sessão Plenária de 30/05/2007
Fonte de Publicação
DJe nº 31 de 06/06/2007, p. 1.
DJ de 06/06/2007, p. 1.
DOU de 06/06/2007, p. 1.
Building on previous decisions, this binding precedent makes a statement about competence to regulate bingo,
lotteries and other games. It holds that the exclusive competence to legislate in this field lies with the Union (federal)
government. States may not legislate to license bingo or in anyway regulate it unless there is a general federal law
authorising them to do so. The consequence of  this decision is that state laws and regulations on bingo and lotteries
have no effect without an enabling federal law. Because this case is decided specifically as a binding precedent it
means that any future claims about the operation of  bingos at the state level must be decided consistently with this
Supreme Court precedent. Thus until a new federal law is enacted, states cannot authorise the development of
commercial bingo in Brazil and state courts cannot hold that commercial bingo is allowed. 
MI 766-AgR,
Rel. Min. Joaquim Barbosa, julgamento em 21-10-
2009, Plenário, DJE de 13-11-2009.
STF – AgRg 765 – j. 30/11/2011 – rel. Dias Toffoli
This case concerns a challenge to the previous decision that bingos could not be run because of  a lack of  federal
authorisation. Claiming a constitutional right to run a bingo business, the applicant asked the court to issue an order to
compel the State (Union) to pass enabling legislation for bingos. The court agreed that in principle this type of  order
can be used to oblige the Union to fill a legislative omission that prevents full enforcement of  rights or liberties. It held
in this case, however, that the remedy could not be used to force the state to legislate and regulate gambling activities
because there is no constitutional right to run a gambling business.
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Current approach to law and
regulation
The federal legal framework for Canadian
gambling is set out in part VII of  the Criminal
Code, a part otherwise preoccupied with
prostitution, bawdy houses, and acts of
indecency. This criminalises those found
gambling and betting, alongside those who offer
gambling, promote or advertise gambling, or
supply gambling devices. Penalties are up to two
years imprisonment.
Bingo is considered a game of  mixed chance
and skill in Canadian law, meaning that it must fit
within specified exemptions from gambling
prohibitions to be conducted legally. The key
exemptions are as follows:
s.207 (1) Notwithstanding any of  the
provisions of  this Part relating to gaming and
betting, it is lawful
(a) for the government of  a province, either
alone or in conjunction with the government
of  another province, to conduct and manage
a lottery scheme in that province, or in that
and the other province, in accordance with
any law enacted by the legislature of  that
province;
(b) for a charitable or religious organisation,
pursuant to a licence issued by the
Lieutenant Governor in Council of  a province
or by such other person or authority in the
province as may be specified by the
Lieutenant Governor in Council thereof, to
conduct and manage a lottery scheme in
that province if  the proceeds from the lottery
scheme are used for a charitable or religious
object or purpose.
Businesses can only assist the provincial
governments and charities allowed to conduct
and manage legal games: the latter groups must
retain the overall responsibility and control of  the
gaming. In an important further limitation on
charitable gambling activity, s. 207 (4) (c) of  the
Criminal Code reserves to provinces the authority
to run a game “operated on or through a
computer, video device or slot machine.” This
prohibits charities from conducting and managing
forms of  bingo that are computer-reliant (such as
electronic bingo, and many types of  linked
game). Such games have to be run by the
province, under s.207 (1) (a).
Some First Nations governments in Canada have
claimed a constitutional right to operate and
regulate gambling on their territory. The Supreme
Court of  Canada has held that there is no
Aboriginal right to operate or regulate gambling in
the Canadian constitution. Bingo was central to
the development of  case law in this area.1
Provincial jurisdiction over bingo operations
remains contested by many First Nations
governments and bingo operators, some of
whom continue to assert rights to operate and
regulate gambling for both economic
development and cultural reasons. 
Under s 207 (1) (a) of  the Criminal Code, the
provinces of  BC and Ontario conduct bingos
through hybrid, quasi-autonomous agencies. In
BC provincial gambling is conducted and
managed by the Crown Corporation2 charged
with managing gambling, the British Columbia
Lottery Corporation (BCLC). In Ontario, Ontario
Lottery and Gaming (OLG) operates gaming
services on behalf  of  the province.
In British Columbia charitable and provincial
bingo is regulated by the Gaming Policy and
Enforcement Branch of  the Ministry of  Finance.
This directs policies, legislation, standards, and
responsible gambling strategies, licenses
charitable bingo events, registers gambling
service providers, certifies supplies and
equipment, distributes the proceeds generated
from provincially-operated gaming in grants to
applicant organisations, and conducts audits and
compliance investigations. The BCLC sets
standards and policies for bingo facilities
operated under its brand. 
In Ontario bingo is regulated by the provincial-
level Alcohol and Gaming Commission of  Ontario
(AGCO), and by municipalities. The AGCO
licenses larger charitable bingo events (with a
prize board over $5500), and certain kinds of
higher prize games (eg jackpot games that allow
a prize to be accumulated). It also registers
gaming suppliers and gaming employees, and
approves rules for games conducted and
managed by OLG. Municipal actors issue
licences for organisations running charitable
bingos with a prize board of  under $5500. OLG
also sets standards and policies for facilities
operated under its brand.
Scale of play and bingo 
demographics
In Canada participation in bingo appears to vary
significantly by province, although participation
data has been collected at varying times so it is
not possible to get definitive national figures. As in
the UK, bingo is popular with older, working class
1 See for example R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] 2 SCR 821, 1996 CanLII 161 (SCC); 
2 Crown Corporations are wholly owned by the state but they operate at arm’s length from government. They have public policy goals, but operate as businesses. 
Revenue report used in BC by charitable, religious,
and non-profit organisations running bingos.
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churches to Buddhist temples. Children’s sports
and recreation clubs are a key sector in both
provinces. These rely heavily on the mobilisation
of family members (usually parents or
grandparents) as volunteers to run the bingo.
When bingo boomed in Canada in the 1980s 
and 1990s it was via charities and religious
organisations acting in alliance with private
businesses. Profit-making organisations (who
charged rent for facilities, and fees for support
services) often sought out charities as partners,
since they could not legally conduct bingos on
their own. Many non-profit organisations that had
run games in their own premises moved to
running bingos in privately-owned facilities,
involving associations of  licensed charities 
where the bingo ran full-time. 
Of the 61 bingo halls remaining in Ontario, 30 
are operated by associations of  charities (the rest
are operated by the province). In 2014/5 3723
licences were issued to charities and religious
organisations by the AGCO for bingo fundraising,
out of  a total of  4143 licences issued for all forms
of charitable gaming. In 2013-4 Ontario charities
raised $33 million from conducting bingo
operations. 
women. In 2001 Statistics Canada found that
while 9% of households participated in bingo
overall, participation was 13% for one person
households headed by women over 65. Bingo
participation was far higher among households
with an income of  less than CAN $20,000 after
tax (11%) than households with an income of
CAN $80,000 or more (5%). Bingo is also
especially popular with First Nations players, 
on and off-reserve.
Bingo has been in decline in both Ontario and
British Columbia, due largely to the effects of
smoking bans and competition from the
expansion of  other forms of  gaming (especially
casinos). Bingo revenue in British Columbia has
declined on average 13 per cent per year over the
past four years. Hall numbers and attendances
have also fallen significantly: for example in
Ontario there are now 61 bingo halls, down from
230 in 2000. Most operators we interviewed
predict further hollowing out of  the sector in the
next 5 years. 
Charitable operations
Bingo funds a wide-range of  charitable and
religious organisations, from violence against
women services to right to life groups, from
The Bingo Project
Diverse experiences of smoking bans
Ontario implemented a province-wide smoking bans in bingo. Based on a 32 hall sample, a 2008 report found an average reduction in profitability of
34% between 2006 and 2007, and a 25% reduction in profits for charities. 
One Ontario manager recalled that the provincial smoking ban “took about 45% of our business away overnight. “ (male, charitable bingo hall
manager, Ontario). A manager in BC (where a provincial smoking ban was implemented in 2008) estimated a 60% drop.
Some self-organised bingos on First Nations land, in BC and Ontario, allow smoking. Players can travel some distance to frequent such places.
However some First Nations health organisations and family service organisations in Ontario expressed concern about the health impacts on First
Nations workers and volunteers of  allowing smoking.
During fieldwork for the Bingo Project, in spring 2015, new smoking regulations were introduced in Vancouver Island (BC) increasing the distance that
smokers had to keep away from doorways from 3m to 7m (Clean Air Bylaw 3962). One popular bingo hall in a poor district of  a small city was facing
the prospect of  chivvying its mostly elderly customers away from the paved pedestrian area (where they currently clustered to smoke) into the busy car
park. The manager feared they would be run over. 
“They said, ‘oh no, you’ll grow and people will come. Non-bingo players will now come because it’s non-smoking.’ That hall was making almost 5 million
a year for charity….By July I had it down to four days a week, because we were losing money…Then by the fall it was down to three. Revenues for the
charities went from 5 million dollars to 946,000 dollars. But ‘non-smoking will not have an impact on you’ (snorts).” (male bingo operator, on his
experience of  a municipal smoking ban).
“See, I smoked. So being in that smoky bingo hall meant nothing to me. But when the by-law was coming, I had to quit smoking, because I don’t smoke
outside. I can’t, I never did. My mother always told me only hussies smoked outside. So I grew up thinking that was a bad thing to do.” (female,
charitable bingo hall manager, Ontario).
“When the smoking ban was brought into the province, when a lot of  consolidation happened, AGCO got together with the operators, implemented an
interim revenue model to allow us to survive and weather the storm.” (male, commercial bingo operator, recalling the origins of  a shift in revenue model
giving a higher share of  proceeds to businesses in Ontario).
“When non-smoking came in, the decision was made that the slots were being successful and bingo had just been decimated at that point. And so we
lost about three hundred (bingo) seats. And those three hundred seats were lost to slots.” (male, BC commercial operator).
10 CRG Consulting. 2008. Market Study for Proposed Bingo Facility: Rideau Carleton Raceway. Ottawa. 
Detail from an old slide bingo card, used in pub
games in BC. Card acquired by Kate Bedford
during fieldwork; image by Andrea Shieber.
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Table 1: Gambling participation rates (%) in various gambling forms across Canada
Source: Canadian Gambling Digest 2013/14
British Alberta Saskatchewan Manitoba Ontario Quebec New  Nova Prince Edward Newfoundland
Columbia Brunswick Scotia Island and Labrador
Year of survey 2014 2009 2001 2006 2011 2012 2009 2007 2005 2009
Bingo 5.7 4.8 8.4 12.9 4.6 4.2 7.5 11.6 6.9 8.7
Casino slots 28 15.4 20.3 23.9 20.5 13.5 7.6 15.5 6.1 4.8 
Casino table games 7.0 7.3 6.4 5.9 3.6 3.7
Online Gambling 3.7 3.1 0.2 1.5 1.9 1.5 0.9 0.2 0.7 0.4
Speculative investment 7.7 8.6 8.4 4.6 1.6 1.2
Table 3: Money raised by independent bingos in British Columbia
2001/02 to 2014/15
Source: Gaming Policy and Enforcement Branch reports
Table 4: Highest and Lowest Revenues from Independent Bingos,
BC (2014-5)












Table 2: Charity/religiously-operated and government operated bingo In Ontario (ON) and British Columbia (BC)
Source: Canadian Gambling Digest (2013-4)
Charitable Operations BC ON
Total charity-operated bingo revenue (CAN $) after prizes paid, before expenses deducted 3,313,000 115,658,000
Total charity-operated gambling revenue (CAN $) after prizes paid before expenses deducted 77,478,000 381,898,000
Distributions to charity from government-operated gambling (CAN $) 135,000,000 128,300,000
Net Gaming Revenue to charitable organisations from their gaming operations (CAN $) after prizes and expenses paid
Net revenue from bingo 1,989,000 32,962,000
Net revenue from all gambling forms 34,129,000 155,298,000
Government-operated gaming revenue after prizes paid before expenses deducted
Total Bingo revenue 249,735,000 53,738,000
Revenue from slots or VLTs at bingo facilities 236,127,000 0
Total government operated gambling revenue (CAN $) after prizes paid before expenses deducted 2,129,614,000 4,682,322,000
Net Gaming revenue (CAN $) after prizes and expenses paid 1,174,600,000 1,923,149,000
Top 5
City Organisation name Revenue from 
independent bingo (CAN $)
Burnaby St. Helens Parish $85,454.41
Vancouver Italian Cultural Centre Society $123,653.00
Vancouver United Croats of  Canada –
King Tomislav Branch $145,437.21
Vancouver St Mary’s Parish $157,975.48
Cumberland Royal Canadian Legion Branch 
#28 Cumberland $206,514.43
Bottom 5
City Organisation name Revenue from 
independent bingo (CAN $)
Coquitlam Eager Beaver Bingo Club –
Community Fundraising Group $48.05
North Vancouver Silver Harbour Centre Auxiliary $49.23
Victoria Cedar Hill New Horizons Seniors Club $198.00
Sayward Royal Canadian Legion #147 Sayward $231.16
Kaslo J V Humphries School PAC $252.02
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Table 5: Revenue and income from government operated gambling,
BC (millions $)
Source: BCLC 2014-5 Annual Service Plan Report.
Table 6: Revenue and profits from government- operated gambling, Ontario
Source: AGCO Annual Report 2014-5
Revenue by gambling type, Ontario 
Source: AGCO Annual Report 2014-5
Revenue (thousands of dollars) 2012-13 2013-14
Lottery 3,287,469 3,387,571
Bingo 39,876 73,817
Resort  casinos 1,297,145 1,244,946
OLG slots and casinos 2,008,081 1,964,044
Total 6,632,571 6,670,378
Provincial operations
In the 1990s, a scandal over misuse of  bingo
proceeds in BC encouraged the provincial
government in tighter control of  charitable
gaming. Some charities fought a long, bitter, 
and unsuccessful legal battle to retain their
independent role in conducting and managing
gaming in association bingo halls. In 2002
association bingo halls were taken over by the
crown corporation. Many were re-positioned as
community gaming centres (CGCs), which offer
slot machines alongside bingo. Currently the
BCLC operates 7 commercial bingo halls and 18
CGCs in the province. Charities can apply to the
province for grants from the money raised in
BCLC’s venues. However there is no link between
bingo facilities and local organisations, and
charities are not required to take any role in the
gaming to get the grants.
In Ontario, as bingo has declined in popularity
associations of  charities and commercial
operators have pressured the provincial
government for support. In 2005 the AGCO
launched a Modernization of  Charitable Gaming
initiative, part of  which involved piloting electronic
bingo (e-bingo) in 6 sites. To comply with the
Criminal Code, which prohibits charities from
running bingo games that require a computer, the
OLG assumed responsibility for conducting and
managing gambling in the e-bingo sites. In 2012
Charity-run association bingo halls have been
replaced by provincial operations in BC (see
below). However independent charitable bingo
operations continue. Independent bingos are
usually run weekly, in premises owned by a
charity, religious organisation, or service club
(such as a church, community centre, legion, 
or elderly care facility). In 2013/4 133 licensed
charities raised $2 million from such bingos in 
BC. This is a significant fall from the CAN$ 7
million raised by the 255 charities licensed for
independent bingos in 2001/2. However the
number of  licensees, and the amount raised, has
stabilised since 2010. In 2014/5 147 licences
were issued by BC’s Gaming Policy and
Enforcement branch for such independent bingos
and they raised CAN $ 2.1 million in revenue. 
Some of  these bingos are tiny in scale. One
community fundraising group in the lower
mainland raised CAN $48.05 through its licensed
bingo in 2014/5. However for some organisations,
in some places, independent bingo provides
significant funds. One game we attended in BC –
with an accumulated jackpot of  over CAN$50,000
– attracted over 300 players to a community hall
one sunny afternoon, requiring seats to be set 
up in the hallways to accommodate people.
Charities that run these bingos tend to have close
connections to players, and extensive expertise in
operating the game. 
Revenue 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Slot machines 1126.6 1140.7 1140.1 1135.3 1149.4
Table Games 357.1 380.9 390.2 452.1 555.1
Poker 22.5 22.1 21.3 20.7 21.1
Bingo 110.1 96.3 86.5 76.7 75.3
Total 1616.3 1640.0 1638.1 1684.8 1800.9
minus Awarded 
Prizes 70.8 61.1 55.4 49.9 49
Net revenue 1545.5 1578.9 1582.7 1634.9 1751.9
Lottery Bingo Resort casinos OLG slots and casinos
2012-13 2013-14
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severing the link between bingo operations and
local charities in the aftermath of  the provincial
bingo scandal. However others felt that facilities
were better run and easier to manage without the
reliance on charity volunteers.
In Ontario, the tripartite understanding of  bingo
interests has been somewhat overcome, since
charities, businesses, and government are
increasingly partnering up to promote c-gaming
halls. Unlike in BC, charities retain a role in
provincially-operated bingo in Ontario. For
example member charities retain a share of
proceeds in return for sending volunteers to help
at the c-gaming facility. The Ontario Charitable
Gambling Association has also taken a leading
role in drafting standards that apply to the
charities fundraising in the c-gaming centres. 
Ontario’s experience of  partnership suggests a
need to think beyond a presumed clash between
charities, provinces, and private businesses, by
considering other stakeholders with interests in
charitable bingo. Key here is the question of  how
well volunteer interests are represented in
debates about bingo regulation. Licensed
charitable bingo in much of  Canada (and much
the pilot was approved for a province-wide rollout,
whereby bingo facilities would be turned into c-
gaming sites (the ‘c’ stands for charitable). 31 of
Ontario’s 61 bingo halls are now run as c-gaming
sites. 
Provincial revenue generation is a key priority of
both the BCLC and OLG. In 2014-5, BCLC
achieved its highest net income for the province
to date, of  $1.25 billion. Since 1985 it has raised
over $18 billion. In 2014-5 the OLG generated $2
billion, making gambling the greatest source of
non-tax revenue for the province. Since 1975 it
has generated nearly $40 billion. However in both
cases casinos and lotteries provide most of  this
income. In BC in 2014/5 bingo provided $62
million of  the £1.8 billion in total revenue
generated by casino and community gaming
operations. In Ontario OLG made $74,000 in total
revenue from its bingo operations, but after prizes,
expenses, and payments to charities it made a
net loss of  $46,000.
Key themes 
1 The shifting debate about the charitable
role in bingo
The limited law and policy attention that has been
given to bingo in Canada has focused mainly on
a tripartite relationship of  stakeholders (see fig 1),
and in particular on the perceived clash between
provincial governments and charities. Provinces
have been accused by some observers of
cannibalising charity fundraising, by expanding
their own gambling operations and reducing the
charitable role in bingo.3
Our research suggests that the tripartite model 
of  stakeholder relations remains helpful in
understanding disputes about bingo regulation,
especially in BC. Some BC interviewees,
representing both charities and gaming service
providers, remained critical of  the government for
Ontario Charitable Gambling Association,
Private Sector and Government Work
Together to Deliver Technology
Opportunities for Charitable Bingo.
This is the most exciting news that the




Figure 1: Stakerholders in Canada bingo: The usual suspects
Charities (as licensed
operators or partners with
Crown Corporations)
Provincial government 
(as regulator and, via
Crown Corporations, as
operator)
3 See for example Campbell, Colin, Timothy Hartnagel, and Garry Smith. 2005. The Legalization of  Gambling in Canada. Ottawa. 
4 MJF v. JMF, [2006] ABQB 189. See also R. v. Weitzel, 2005 CanLII 378 (ABPC), involving prosecution of  a charitable bingo coordinator for paying bingo volunteers.
of the USA) rests on volunteer labour. To receive 
a licence for bingo fundraising in most provinces
charities must use their own volunteers to conduct
and manage the gaming. Volunteers in bingo are
often beneficiaries or users of  a charity, working
bingos in part to get access to its services. This is
especially true of  parents and grandparents who
are volunteering for children’s sports clubs. In one
example raised in a divorce case4 a father in
Alberta was ‘volunteering’16 bingos a year, of  5-7
hours each, to keep his daughter in a swimming
club. If  he missed one of  those bingos, he was
fined $100. Parents of  children in sports clubs in
Ontario spoke to us of  fines of  $200 if  they
missed working a bingo. Low-income parents
found such conditions especially onerous.
“Everyone is a volunteer. Every worker on
the floor. And, volunteer is a dicey word for
some of  them.…If  they don’t show up for
what they’ve been assigned they do get
fined. Seventy five bucks and hundred and
fifty bucks in the summer” (male organiser
of  an independent charity bingo in BC in
which most of  the bingo volunteers were
Filipina mothers).
Gaming service providers 
(as partners with charities or 
governments)
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2 Coping with decline: Regulating diverse
game innovations 
In the face of  declining attendance, many
attempts have been made to refresh or revitalise
bingo in Canada. Four types of  product
innovation have been particularly significant. 
Firstly, games were introduced that ran alongside
main stage play rather than in the breaks, in part
so that additional revenue could be extracted
from side games while allowing players to go
outside to smoke. Key here were ‘balls tickets’, 
a form of  pull tab (an early form of  scratch card)
with guaranteed winners in every box. Some 
pull tabs reveal numbered bingo balls which 
the player then has to cross off  in a live game 
to win an additional prize, sometimes of  several
thousand dollars. They are fun to sell: many balls
tickets have ribald names, called out with a smile
by floor workers (‘Hot balls! Great balls!’). They
were a low-tech add-on to the existing product
offering, requiring authorisation from the
provincial gambling regulator and a set of  rules
about how to play (especially around the fact that
all tickets in a box had to be sold once it was
opened) but no shift in conduct and management
authority. They became the survival route for
association halls faced with declining attendance
in Alberta, and then in Ontario. An agreement to
introduce them in BC is being negotiated now. 
“In all honesty, if we wouldn’t have brought the
balls in, we probably wouldn’t have a hall. In this
area, people are crazy for the ball cards.” (female,
charitable bingo hall manager, Alberta).
Secondly, some providers have tried to
reinvigorate bingo’s appeal by introducing more
entertainment via innovations such as disco
bingo, late night bingo, drag bingo, naughty
bingo, and dirty bingo. These can require
extensive regulatory negotiations, including
around whether guest entertainers can call out
bingo numbers and whether rude prizes such as
vibrators can be given away in provincially-run
facilities. Spontaneity can be difficult to
accommodate. For example when a guest caller –
Santa – generously added to the prize board in a
Newfoundland hall in 2004, the hall initially had its
licence suspended because it had exceeded the
prize board regulations.5
Thirdly, electronic bingo has been embraced by
some providers as the solution to declining
revenues, in part because it allows existing bingo
players to play more tickets and in part because –
it is hoped – it will attract younger people. Tickets
are auto-dabbed. In accordance with the Criminal
Code electronic bingo requires provincial
involvement, since the play is run through a
computer. It also requires new rules on equipment
standards and authorised providers, the
procedure for winning (especially whether a
physical shout is required after a machine notifies
a player of  a win), and the maximum number of
tickets that may be loaded onto a device. The
latter is required both for responsible gambling
concerns, and to reassure paper players that they
still have a chance to win. 
Finally, slot or slot-variant machines are regarded
by some operators as the way forward for bingo
facilities. In BC the decline in the industry – in part
caused by the provincial smoking ban –
prompted changes in the floor space devoted to
bingo versus slot machine play. One community
gaming centre (CGC) that is notable for its
determination to retain and promote bingo went
from 800 bingo seats to under 400. The number
of slots – originally 50 – grew to over 300. In
2014-5 there were 2508 slot machines in CGCs 
in BC (up from 1850 in 2010-11). 
Although OLG is constrained by provincial
regulation from introducing slot machines in its 
c-gaming facilities, it has introduced electronic
break open ticket machines. These were originally
designed in the US for those Native American
gaming facilities that are not permitted to have
slot machines. Technically they are not slot
machines because they do not rely on random
number generation for their outcomes. However,
as several interviewees noted, the machines
appear to many players to be slot machines. Their
introduction in Ontario has raised concerns from
Flashboards in an electronic age: Out of date
technology or player engagement tool? 
In line with its move to electronic bingo the
BCLC has taken away display flashboards
that show the numbers called. These are
unnecessary with e-bingo and expensive to
maintain, in part because the light bulbs are
constantly blowing. One regulator
described them as “old technology that we
can’t support anymore, it’s analogue in a
digital world.” (male regulator, BC) Another,
however, felt that the boards had
successfully engaged players: “if  we could
put those damn boards back we would
have some happy people.” (female
regulator, BC
5 Community Fundraising Corp. v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Department of  Government Services and Lands), [2004] NLTD 236.




organised bingos can also be used to help
individuals, such as via assisting a family afflicted
by an illness or accident, or providing resources
for a young person going away to college. The
use of  proceeds in self-organised bingos is
reliant on strong links to players as donors, in
keeping with the mutual-aid style nature of  the
activity. 
Provincial involvement with licensing bingos on
reserve territory varies, although in both BC and
Ontario provincial jurisdiction over bingo remains
contested by many First Nations governments. In
BC First Nations with provincially-recognised
jurisdiction over land use planning can become 
a host local government to a gaming facility
conducted and managed by BCLC, receiving a
portion of  gaming revenue in this capacity. Two
First Nations host community gaming facilities on
their land. Ontario’s provincial government has
pursued some gaming partnerships with First
Nations governments. For example the Rama First
Nation runs a casino and a c-gaming facility. The
First Nations lottery licensing framework
delegates authority comparable to that of
municipalities to some First Nations, providing
them with the authority to issue licences to eligible
religious and charitable organisations to conduct
lottery schemes. 39 First Nations communities
have been designated this authority (AGCO
Annual Report 2014-5, p. 66). Otherwise, the
AGCO is the licensing authority for lottery
schemes in ‘unorganised’ territories. 
some local government officials and responsible
gambling advocates about harder gambling
forms being introduced to bingo environments.6
3 Role of other governments
Although the provincial government role in bingo
regulation is central to the Canadian case study,
our research has also illuminated the role of  other
governments. 
First Nations governments
Self-organised bingos, run without a licence from
the province as mutual aid activities on reserve
territory, have long existed in Canada. In fact
some of  the key legal cases on the Aboriginal
right to operate and regulate gambling included
testimony from First Nations leaders about the
historical regulatory role of  First Nations
governments and communities in bingo.7Many
organisers of  on-reserve bingos have been
prosecuted, typically for keeping a common
gaming house. In two Ontario cases, decided 
in 2004, the prosecution relied on the local and
regional police having conducted extensive
surveillance of  on-reserve bingo play.8 The
women who had key organising roles were both
convicted of  keeping a common gaming house.
Self-organised bingos are often run in community
facilities, and part of  the proceeds are typically
used for good causes. Many causes are similar to
those off-reserve, such as supporting a local
school sports team, and sometimes the
individuals who are raising money for the activity
will volunteer to help run the game. However self-
Table 7: Slots and slot- variant machines in bingo facilities, British Columbia (BC) and Ontario (ON)
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Electronic Gaming Machines (EGMs)
Slots or VLTs at Bingo Facilities 2803 2508 0
Slots at casinos 9907 9797 11974
Slots or VLTs at Racetracks 0 10224
VLTs at bars/lounges etc. 0 0
Total 12710 12305 22198
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VLTs at bars/lounges etc. 0 0
Total 12710 12305 22198
6 See, for example, Harrigan, Kevin, Vance MacLaren, and Ryan Huckle. 2013. The Modernization of  Bingo in Ontario: Recommendations for Responsible Gambling. Report to
the Ontario Problem Gambling Research Centre.
7 See for example R. v. Bear Claw Casino Ltd et al., 1994 CanLII 4710 (SKPC); R. v. Victor Jim, 1995 CanLII 1522 (BCCA); [1996] 3 WWR 30
8 See R. v. Gardner, 2004 CarswellOnt 2308, 2004 ONCJ 69, 62 W.C.B. (2d) 232; and R. v. Shabaquay, 2004 CanLII 68 (ONCJ).
Local governmentrole
There is no local government role in licensing
bingo in BC. The provincial gambling regulator
(the Gaming Policy and Enforcement Branch)
determines eligibility, monitors use of  proceeds,
approves rule changes to games, etc. However
host local governments must approve the location
of a community gaming facility. On several
occasions local councils have refused to do so,
out of  concern about the proliferation of  slot
machines.
In Ontario, the AGCO and municipalities share
roles and responsibilities in licensing charitable
bingos. Municipal actors issue licences for
organisations running lower prize games.
Municipalities can attach terms and conditions 
on licensees: the most common are that the
organisation has to deliver services within the
municipality. 
Municipalities have taken diverse approaches 
to their licensing role. Some simply respond to
applications from charities and religious
organisations. Others are more heavily involved 
in charitable bingo, scheduling charities for their
slots in an association hall for example, or
creating arms-length bodies make decisions
about eligibility in order to maximise local
interests.
This variation notwithstanding, municipalities often
understand themselves as having a key role in
protecting charity interests in association bingo
halls (eg by enforcing prize board limits so that
Standardisation of rules using a risk-based regulation model derived from casinos: BC’s experience with ‘Dusting Off’
‘Dusting off’ rules originated in casinos, to regulate how gambling employees touched cash and chips. Employees are forbidden from accepting cash
or chips hand to hand from a customer, and they are required to open their hands, and/or wipe them together, and show their palms to a camera, to
demonstrate that they are not hiding money or chips. 'Dusting off' is so familiar to casino employees that some apparently do it automatically outside of
work, ‘dusting off’ after touching cash while shopping at the supermarket for example. As one BC interviewee noted, “You get casino employees that
will go shopping and (taps hands together, in a gesture of  dusting off). [Laughs]. It’s just become so natural, right.”
When BCLC took over bingos in BC, they essentially cut and pasted the regulatory framework used for casinos. Hence dusting off  was applied to
bingo staff.
“You can’t do hand to hand contact for any cash. It must be laid on the counter and then we take it and count it out on the counter and then put it in the
till and then we have to dust off  to show that we don’t have any cash in our hands. And we also have to dust off  to show nothing is in our hands when
we leave the cash area as well. It was a bit of  a struggle when I first started working here, everyone would do hand to hand.” (female, BC bingo hall
manager).
When asked what the provincial regulator would be looking for when they inspected, one bingo hall manager said first:
“cash handling, they’ll literally, going in and view random days on our CCTV to make sure all the staff  are following proper cash handling. 
Kate: I saw you rub your hands there?
Dust off, yeah. Literally. That’s one of  the things they check.” (female, BC bingo hall manager).
“They say ‘Why do we have to do it like this?’ I walked in one time for an audit and the cashier looked at me and went like this (loud, obvious dusting off
with hands). Coz he thought, ‘I am going to show you!’(Laughs)” (male, BC bingo auditor).
“We have so many regulations about how we touch cash. We can’t cup cash. It has to be very visible and it’s under camera. What it did do from our
point of  view as operators, it cost us more money, because you have got to install cameras. So systems cost money. But at the end of  the day, it also
brought a tremendous amount of  credibility and peace of  mind to owners and to government in the fact that at least the cash was being handled
properly. With the owner group here, they were very happy about a lot of  the controls, because they said, any time we can have something that shows
clearly that our staff  are doing proper procedures and at the end of  the day, this is a legitimate business, the stronger we all get.” (female, BC bingo
manager)
One hall manager stated that although employees had now learned to comply with dusting off  rules, customers still tried to initiate hand to hand
contact when using cash, and they had to be reminded. I did the same the first time I purchased tickets in a BC bingo facility, trying to place money in
the cashier’s hand. He backed away and told me to put it on the counter. I felt rather affronted, since close physical contact with staff, and trust, are key
features of  bingo. Over the subsequent weeks of  fieldwork I saw the same thing happen again and again with other customers, in other locations.
Employees backed away from the player’s hands, glanced up at the camera, and told the player to place their cash on the counter. The customer did
so, but often left looking affronted. These interactions took place over 10 years after the ‘dusting off’ rules had first been imposed on bingo facilities. 
charities receive a fair portion of  funds). However
they tend to balance this with an eye on the
charities themselves. They are especially focused
on monitoring eligibility of  the organisation, and
use of  proceeds. 
Local licensing officers in Ontario reported that
they had been pressured, on occasion, by local
elected representatives to accept organisations or
uses of  proceeds that did not, in their view, meet
eligibility criteria. This was most likely to happen
with service clubs whose interests are especially
well-represented on local councils (and in
courts9). Licensing officers were usually able to
resist such pressure, acting – as they saw it – to
uphold the rules fairly in the broader public
interest.
The municipal role, including as a regulator of
charities, has been significantly changed under
Ontario’s move to c-gaming. Municipalities issue
permits (not licences) for charities to get a place
at an OLG-run c-gaming facility, and they have a
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reduced enforcement role. Some licensing
officers advised local councils against signing the
contract to convert the halls, in part because they
were concerned about the products that may be
introduced (including slots-variant machines),
and in part because municipalities might lose
links to local charities. Those links were seen by
some municipal regulators as about offering
support and guidance, and by others as about
providing oversight. 
4 Standardisation of bingo using risk-
based regulation approaches from 
casinos
The AGCO is continuing its ongoing
transition towards risk-based, outcomes-
based, and compliance-focused regulation.
The AGCO will develop a framework to
guide the consistent use of  risk-based
methodologies and approaches across all 
Finally, provincially-run bingo is impacted by the
rollout of  standardised responsible gambling
policies initially designed with casinos in mind.
These policies include self-exclusion in BC (where
players who consider themselves to have a
gambling problem can ask to be excluded from
lines of  business. Under the Standards-
Based Approach, the regulatory focus shifts
from requiring gaming registrants to comply
with a prescriptive set of  rules and
regulations – a “command and control”
regulatory approach – to providing
standards that must be achieved. This is 
a fundamental change that delivers a
modernized approach to gaming regulation
and allows the AGCO to focus its resources
on key risks and maintaining game integrity,
while providing a degree of  business
flexibility and efficiencies for the industry.
(AGCO Annual Report 2014-5, p. 18)








the facility for a period of  time); special
educational weeks giving information about game
odds and resources on problem gambling in both
provinces; posters about gambling treatment
services being displayed in toilets; and so on. The
OLG requires responsible gambling training for all
staff  in c-gaming sites. Many clinicians and
counsellors who work in the field of  responsible
gaming – and who in the past have typically
worked in casinos – are being exposed to bingos
for the first time. Plans are also underway to
extend self-exclusion to the c-gaming facilities. 
In Ontario in 2013/4 self-service interactive
responsible gambling terminals (giving
automated information about gambling myths,
game odds, etc) and on-site support centres
(offering leaflet information and occasionally
frequented by responsible gambling staff) were in
place in 12 c-gaming facilities. In BC they were
available in 19 bingo facilities.
Some respondents – representing both charitable
and commercial interests – felt that a greater
emphasis on responsible gambling was required
once slot machines or electronic break open
ticket machines had been introduced into bingo
facilities. However in Ontario the roll out of  these
responsible gambling measures into c-gaming
has been resisted by those who do not see bingo
as a significant site for problem gambling, or who
regarded the initiatives as a top-down, casino-
based imposition, reflecting a lack of
understanding of  the bingo sector and a lack of
interest in its own dynamics. Self-service
terminals giving automated information about
responsible gambling have on occasion been
mysteriously unplugged, and responsible
gambling staff  have had to travel to c-gaming
facilities to plug them back in. 
Recommendations specific to the
Canada case study
1 Notwithstanding the importance of  charities,
provinces, and commercial operators, the
views of  other stakeholders – especially
volunteers, local governments, and First
Nations bingo regulators and operators – need
to be included in policy debates. An expanded
model of  stakeholder interests should be
considered (fig 2). 
2 The association model of  full time charitable
bingo halls is becoming harder to sustain, but
charity-run bingo may be viable on a smaller,
more occasional scale. Hence regulators
concerned with charitable bingo, especially in
BC, might consider how independently
licensed charitable bingos could be better
supported. Support could involve ‘how to’
workshops where successful charities are
Figure 2: Revised stakeholders in Canadian bingo: Some additional suspects
invited to share their expertise with other
groups; funding for inter-organisational
learning; or a designated section on
independent bingos in annual regulator
reports, with targets for action to be discussed
with existing operators. Interviewees from the
Gaming Policy and Enforcement Branch (BC),
the Alcohol and Gambling Commission of
Ontario, and local municipalities in Ontario all
spoke of  their commitment to helping small
organisations operate within charitable gaming
rules, so in our view there is a strong desire
from staff  on the ground to provide such
support. 
3 While provincial governments have taken
measures to share expertise on gambling
regulation amongst themselves, and via
international collaborations with other gaming
regulators, jurisdictional collaboration is weaker
at other levels of  government in Canada.
Opportunities for provincial government
regulators to learn from the bingo-related
expertise of  First Nations regulators seem
especially constrained, in the absence of  a
broader shift in federal and provincial approach
to First Nations jurisdiction over mutual aid
gambling activity. Attention could, however, be
fruitfully devoted to improving collaboration at
the local government level, within and across
provinces. A first step could be to invite local
gambling licensing experts to present at events
such as those organised by the Federation of
Canadian Municipalities; the Association of
Municipalities (Ontario); and the Association of
Municipal Managers, Clerks and Treasurers of
Ontario. 
4 Local and provincial level regulators could
explore options for better supporting low-tech
and entertainment-focused game innovations,
such as drag bingo, disco bingo, dirty bingo,
and so on. These often enjoy more local
support than the expansion of  automated
gaming, and they do not require control of  the
gaming (and distribution of  proceeds) to be
transferred to the province. To support
innovative live game formats greater flexibility
may be required around rules on non-cash
prizes; guest callers; and prize board limits.
5 As a result of  a recent amendment to s. 207 (4)
of  the Criminal Code, passed in late 2014,
provinces may now authorise charities and
religious organisations to directly run
computerised raffles. Ontario’s AGCO is
working with large charities (who wish to run
such raffles during major sports events) to
explore new regulations. Our research has
shown that bingo operators are still subject to
strict constraints on games involving a
computer derived from s. 207 (4) of  the
Criminal Code; indeed these constraints have
in part driven the creation of  the province's 
c-gaming strategy, where electronic bingo is
operated by the OLG. Hence in fairness bingo
operators should be included in provincial
discussions of  whether and how to relax rules
on raffles, in order that any concessions
granted to large charities running electronic
raffles are assessed for their impact on other
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Case Brief summary
R v. McGee, [1942] 2
W.W.R. 206, 50 Man. R.
152, 77 C.C.C. 302
A dance hall owner in Manitoba let out the hall 5 evenings and 2 afternoons a week for charitable organisations running bingo; was paid a flat
rental fee plus a fee per person admitted if  admissions exceeded 400 (which they frequently did). Was charged with keeping common gaming
house. Claims that bingo is not a game (relying on an Irish case, Barrett v. Flynn [1916] 2 Ir. 1, that had held ‘housey’ – a synonymous with bingo –
to be a lottery involving no skill), and hence that the charge of  running a common gaming house does not apply. Manitoba Court of  Appeal held
that bingo is a game of  chance; the dance hall was a common gaming house; the accused was liable as a keeper thereof. The exemption granted
to charitable or religious organisations allowing premises to be used “occasionally” for the playing of  games for charitable or religious objects did
not apply: “instead of  permitting his hall to be used occasionally for the playing of  games for such objects without any gain or profit to himself, he
made the keeping of  his premises for the playing of  games of  chance a regular revenue-producing business for his own benefit”. Convicted.
R. v. Cosmopolitan Club,
1948 CarswellAlta 10,
[1948] 1 W.W.R. 290, 5
C.R. 100, 90 C.C.C. 358
Prize bingo played at a carnival in Edmonton (Alberta) to raise money for charity; club charged with keeping a common gaming house and
conducting a lottery. Alberta Supreme Court hold bingo not to be a lottery, and can benefit from exemptions applied to raffles and games played at
bazaars and premises where the proceeds are used for charitable or religious objects. Court directed an acquittal.
R. v. Kerim, [1962] CanLII
32 (ONCA)
Bingo played in premises in Ontario four nights a week for religious or charitable purposes. Religious or charitable organisations supplied
equipment and bingo staff, and paid a rental fee (not dependent on the number of  people playing) to the Kerim brothers as president and
manager of  the facility. Whether brothers are keeping a common gaming house – an offence liable for up to 2 years imprisonment – or knowingly
permitting a place to be used for the purposes of  a common gaming house (a lesser offence). Court allows appeal against the charge of  keeping
a common gaming house. ‘Keeping’ involves “some act of  participation in the wrongful use” (Laidlaw at para. 6). Crown appeal dismissed in R. v.
Kerim, [1963] SCR 124




Club organisers, who ran a newspaper bingo in Windsor (Ontario), charged with keeping a common gaming house and conducting or managing a
lottery scheme. Identical schemes, running since 1959, had raised over $81,000 for local charities. Ontario magistrate holds that they can’t be
convicted of  keeping a common gaming house because there was no place for gaming. But newspaper bingo is a lottery, not a game. Although
the club believed it was operating within the law, and consisted of  “reputable and public-minded people motivated by a high ideal of  public
service” (Jasperson at para. 37), the Court must draw the line since “there is considerable public opinion inclined to the view that all things done in
the name of  Bingo are legal if  the object of  the game is for charitable or religious purposes. This, of  course, as a broad statement of  the law is not
correct.” (at para. 38)
R. v. MacDonald and
Mount Pleasant (British
Columbia No. 177)
Branch of  the Royal
Canadian Legion, [1966]
SCR 3
Mount Pleasant War Memorial Community Cooperative Association, a branch of  the Canadian Legion, was operating bingo games afternoons and
evenings 6 days a week, with daily attendance estimated at 1800 people. Bingo was open to the public on payment of  an entrance fee. Legion
claims exemption from gambling prohibitions on the grounds that a place is not a common gaming house if  used by a bona fide social club. Court
rules that the premises were not being used as a bona fide social club; convictions for illegal gaming restored. “It was a place open to the public
without discrimination and in daily use as a centre of  public gambling…The use of  these premises for bingo on such a widespread scale
contradicts any possible inference of  the use as a bona fide social club” (Judson at page 6). Note that the facility – in Vancouver – is still in use
today as a bingo hall.
Keystone Bingo Centre
Inc. v. Manitoba Lotteries
Foundation, [1990]
Carswell Man. 243 (C.A.)
Association of  charities (with licences to conduct and manage bingos) agree with business owner to conduct games at his premises. Association
pays rent plus a cut of  the proceeds plus most of  the concessions income. Government changes its lottery policy, requiring charities to conduct
bingos on their own premises, on publically owned premises, or facilities owned by other charities, due to concern over role of  private businesses
in bingo operations. Keystone demand compensation from provincial government and Lotteries Foundation. Dismissed, on grounds that the
business was illegal in the first place; the business owner was conducting and managing lottery scheme and using proceeds for other-than
charitable or religious purposes.
R. v. Furtney, [1991] 3
SCR 89
Operators of  a bingo business in Ontario charged after repeatedly counselling charitable bingo licensees to violate terms and conditions of  their
licences by breaking rules set by regulators on maximum percentages of  the revenues that can go to management costs. Business claims that
Parliament exceeded its powers of  delegation in permitting exemptions from criminality for provincially-licensed charitable or religious
organisations operating lotteries, since criminal law is reserved for the federal government. Held that there is no improper delegation, and that
provinces can act to regulate gaming activities under the Canadian constitution. Provincial licensing and regulation of  gaming activities is not per
se legislation in relation to criminal law: it can also relate to provincial powers to maintain charitable institutions. 
Tumaitis v. Tumaitis, 1992
CanLII 689 (BCSC)
Husband claims wife wasted significant assets during their marriage through regular bingo playing (3-5 times a week, playing up to 14 cards at a
time) and occasional trips to Vegas. Judge holds “there is not sufficient evidence to justify the drawing of  an inference that she was somehow a
compulsive gambler and even less to suggest that she somehow suffered substantial losses in her activities.” 
R. v. Bear Claw Casino
Ltd et al., 1994 CanLII
4710 (SKPC)
Claim of  Aboriginal right to operate and regulate gambling as part of  constitutional right to engage in cultural and economic activities. Case is
triggered by Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) action against a casino on the White Bear First Nation reserve in Saskatchewan, but bingo is
referred to prominently in testimony on customary law. eg Edward Harvey Lloyd Littlechief  – a councilor at White Bear First Nation – claimed that
on-reserve bingos were well-known by the RCMP, which had never – in at least 25 years – acted against bingo; and that the bingo had been
regulated (including via a licence) through the Chief  and Band Council until regulation moved to the newly-established White Bear First Nation
Gaming Commission. This evidence was key to the court’s decision that the accused’s belief  that the Criminal Code’s gaming provisions did not
apply to their on-reserve gaming activities was reasonable, and hence that there was sufficient doubt of  guilty intention to convict. (NB: appeal
occurs in Bear Claw Casino Ltd and others v. R. ,1995 CanLII 3914 (SKCA), but case is adjourned after enactment of  an operating agreement
between the Province and the Federation of  Saskatchewan Indian Nations which results in the opening of  the casino. It does not offer bingo).
33www.kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject
Case Brief summary
Mount Pearl (City) v. Local
Board of  Appeal (Mount
Pearl), 1995 CanLII 9858
(NL CA).
Newfoundland and Labrador Court of  Appeal upholds City council’s discretion to refuse a permit for a new bingo hall on the grounds of
concerns from non-profit organisations that the new bingo could harm existing bingos run for the purpose of  community fund raising.
R. v. Victor Jim, 1995
CanLII 1522 (BCCA);
[1996] 3 WWR 30
Victor Jim and Jack Sebastian assert an Aboriginal right to engage in and organise gaming activities subject only to regulation by Gitksan and
Wet’suwet’en law. Charged in 1988 in connection with organising an on-reserve bingo in BC without a provincial licence. Argue that the Criminal
Code’s gaming provisions are not applicable as a result of  ss.35(1) and ss.52 of  the Constitution Act 1982, on Aboriginal rights to engage in
cultural and economic activities. Evidence given by two elders (both Wet’suwet’en Chiefs, one estimated at 100 years old) that bingo was widely
played and a crucial source of  funds for community and charitable purposes. But bingo found to be not of  profound Aboriginal cultural
significance. Held that there is no Aboriginal right in the constitution to operate or regulate gaming.
R. v. Bragdon, 1996
CanLII 4706 (NBCA); 183
NBR (2d) 329
Charges brought against 6 people for keeping a common gaming house after police investigation of  a bingo hall on Tobique Indian Reserve in
New Brunswick. All 6 were employed in the hall. Held that the premises were controlled by the Tobique Indian Band (which was not charged),
and that the 6 lacked sufficient control over/management of  the bingo hall to be deemed keepers.
R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] 2
SCR 821, 1996 CanLII
161 (SCC)
Members of  the Shawanaga First Nation and Eagle Lake First Nation convicted of  keeping a common gaming house and conducting a lottery
scheme for their role in organising bingos and other gambling on reserve land.
The Shawanaga First Nation asserted an inherent right to self-government. The Eagle Lake First Nation asserted the right to be
self-regulating in its economic activities.
Court holds that evidence presented did not demonstrate that gambling, or the regulation thereof, was an integral part of  the distinctive cultures
of the Shawanaga or Eagle Lake First Nations at the time of  contact; nor that gambling played an important role in the cultures of  the Shawanaga
and Eagle Lake First Nations. 
Nanaimo Community





B.C.L.R. (3d) 284, [1999]
2 W.W.R. 428
As part of  its introduction of  electronic bingo, the BC government introduced a regulation dividing bingo proceeds between charities, for-profit
bingo providers, and the province. Judge rules that BC’s Gaming Act did not authorise this regulation diverting charitable funds to the
government, and that the Criminal Code prevents the government diverting the proceeds of  charitable gaming authorised under s. 207 (1) (b) of
the Criminal Code to for-profit management companies. Declares the regulation invalid, and declares “that the Province of  British Columbia
cannot receive, or authorise or require “for-profit” companies to receive, the proceeds of  gaming that is managed and conducted by charitable
and religious organisations in British Columbia” (Owen-Flood at para 3). The government successfully appeal against the latter declaration (see





A group of  charitable and religious organisations seek a declaration that the licensing fees they paid to operate bingos in BC were invalid. 1987
changes to the gaming fees, and the expansion in gaming, meant that the revenues grew such that the share going to government far exceeded
the costs of  the regulatory scheme. Charities wanted the fees repaid (with interest) on the basis of  unjust enrichment, including on the grounds
that the fees were illegal taxes imposed by regulation (any bill imposing a tax must originate in Parliament or the provincial legislature). Decisions
culminate in a ruling that the fees were legal taxes. 
R. v. Gardner, 2004
CarswellOnt 2308, 2004
ONCJ 69, 62 W.C.B. (2d)
232
AND
R. v. Shabaquay, 2004
CanLII 68 (ONCJ)
Nancy Gardner and Harriet Shabaquay charged with unlawfully keeping a common gaming house and participating in a lottery scheme by
means of  a game of  bingo at the First Nations Territory of  Eagle Lake (Gardner) and First Nations Territory of  Wabigoon Lake (Shabaquay).
Evidence of  6 witnesses detailing extensive surveillance of  both First Nations bingos by provincial and regional police, including via plain clothes
police observations and participation in bingos. Court confirms that bingo is a game of  mixed skill and chance (not a lottery), but that the two
women “had some degree of  control over the premises” (at para 37). They gave out prize money and sold tickets, were identified by others as in






and Lands), [2004] NLTD
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Lottery regulations in Newfoundland and Labrador permit a maximum $3,000 prize board to be won in any given bingo event. In Dec. 2003 Santa
Claus called two games of  bingo – attended by c275 players – and spontaneously increased the prizes of  two games (by $100, and $75), hereby
exceeding the maximum. Provincial regulator concluded that the excess payout breached the regulations and was likely to reflect unfavourably
upon the integrity of  the lotteries program. The Corporation’s bingo licence was suspended for one week, leading to a loss of  gross revenue in
excess of  $60,000. Judge holds that regulation wasn’t intended to apply to isolated breaches involving a small excess of  prize money
precipitated by a guest rogue caller. It was unreasonable for the regulator to believe that the violation triggered an application of  the rule. Appeal
allowed.
Bingo City Games Inc. et
al v. B.C. Lottery Corp. et
al, [2005] BCSC 25. 
Final case in a set of  proceedings begun in 2003 by a company that owned a bingo facility used by a charitable association in Prince George
(BC). Business fails, in part because BCLC take over running the bingo in January 2002. The business is offered worse terms by the BCLC than
the charity association had agreed to and a rival hall (also run by the BCLC) is allowed to extend its hours, increasing competition. Damages
claimed against both the provincial government and the BCLC. Court rejects all claims. Once it took over bingos BCLC owed no duty of  care to
keep them open. Its new policy was to increase revenues, which entailed that it “weed out failing halls and inefficient bingo operators” (Rogers at
para. 223).
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CHAPTER 2: BINGO REGULATION IN CANADA
(ONTARIO AND BRITISH COLUMBIA)
The Bingo Project
Case Brief summary
R. v. Weitzel, 2005 CanLII
378 (ABPC)
Lewis Weitzel (President of  ALS Society of  Alberta) convicted of  paying bingo workers on behalf  of  the Society (contrary to the rules of  Alberta’s
Gaming and Liquor Commission), by forging invoices showing inflated expenses for equipment used by the charity’s beneficiaries. The excess
was used to pay members of  sports teams to work the ALS’ bingo slots. Testified that “there were always problems finding volunteers… the
efforts and resources of  the family members of  someone diagnosed with ALS were more preoccupied with the health of  that family member, than
working a bingo” (para 32). The idea of  paying for volunteers came from hockey and baseball teams also raising money via bingo. Practice was
widespread and others in the society knew of  the scheme. Conditional sentence imposed
MJF v. JMF, [2006] ABQB
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(City), 2009 CanLII 463
(BCSC)
City of  Abbotsford (BC) pass zoning amendment bylaw in 2007 allowing a bingo hall to operate 125 slot machines and 192 personal play bingo
machines. Challenged by a not-for-profit cooperation (with 1 member) established to defend and promote family values. Claims non-disclosure of
key information. The public debate about the zoning amendment was premised on an assumption that the hall owner would close the hall if  slots
were not allowed, causing a loss of  revenue to the city and local charities. City failed to disclosure letters from Solicitor General and his Assistant
Deputy Minister that there was no longer any direct relationship between the revenue that government earnt, via BCLC, at a bingo hall and the
grants given to hall affiliates. Held that City’s failure to disclose the letters did not constitute failure in its duty of  procedural fairness: the petitioner
did not ask for them specifically, and the city is not obliged to disclose all information it receives.
2031012 Ontario Ltd. v.
Canada, 2010 CanLII
2834 (ONSC)
Corporation with exclusive rights to import and distribute a US-produced electronic game intends to install machines in bingo halls across
Canada; seeks a declaration that the game is legal in Ontario as a game of  skill). If  the game involves an element of  chance it falls within the
gambling prohibitions of  the Criminal Code and would be illegal. Application is held to be premature and speculative; “this court should not be
placed in the position of  determining in advance whether the game ‘Match em up’ would be legal in every conceivable circumstance” (at para.
12). But evidence suggests it is a game of  mixed chance and skill.
Dow v. Dow, [2013]
NBQB 106, FDSJ-635-
2012
New Brunswick case. Distribution of  assets of  a 9 year marriage; wife gambled throughout, on Video Lottery Terminals and bingo. She says it was
recreational. Husband says it was an addiction which wasted the family resources and was the eventual cause of  the marriage breakup. Court
finds that the wife “dissipated” (wasted, involving an element of  bad faith or neglect) the family’s resources because of  gambling addiction, to
such an extent that there should be an unequal division of  the home. 
Amyotrophic Lateral
Sclerosis Society of
Essex v. Windsor (City),
[2015] ONCA 572
Proceedings initiated in 2008 by a group of  charities (including a minor hockey association and a country dance troupe) against cities of  Windsor
and Tecumseh, in Ontario, to get a certification of  class action claiming that charitable lottery licensing and administration fees collected by the
municipalities were direct taxes and therefore outside the powers of  the city because the revenues far exceeded the costs of  administration. In
this specific case, the cities objected to the time scale of  the class action (going back to 1990). Judges amend the class action certification to
use a 15 year ultimate limitation period. Proceedings are on-going.
Merpaw v. Hyde, [2015]
ONSC 1053
Significance of  bingo play to a claim regarding a woman who alleges inability to work, and seeks damages, following a fall. Ontario court orders
the disclosure of  the contents of  her casino card for the Akwesasne Mohawk Casino (located in a First Nations reservation in New York state,
USA), where she says she plays mainly bingo, and authorises the Akwesasne Casino to disclose all records of  her visits, and money spent and
won, between 2004 and 2014. Ability to stay focused during play “may indicate workplace capacity in the form of  focus, concentration, reason
and ability to stay on task” (Leroy at para. 59).
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CHAPTER 3: REGULATION OF LAND-
BASED BINGO IN ENGLAND AND WALES
Part 1: Current regulation
Gambling regulation in Great Britain is driven by
the Gambling Act 2005 (the Act). This aimed to
modernise gambling regulation, reflecting a New
Labour desire to encourage the leisure sector as
a crucial part of  the UK economy. It replaced a
law and policy approach characterised by a
reluctant tolerance of  gambling. The 1968 Betting
and Gaming Act, which reflected that earlier
approach, employed a prescriptive, ‘command
and control’-style of  regulation in which operators
had little flexibility in interpreting rules and
procedures. The 2005 Gambling Act aimed to
move to a more self-regulatory approach, where
Kate: What was bingo like when you first
started working in it?
Interviewee: Amazing. Absolutely amazing.
I would have worked for nothing. I
absolutely loved it. It just opened your eyes
to a whole new life. (male, commercial
bingo hall manager, Wales)
operators had more freedom to decide how they
could best comply with standards laid down by
the new national regulator, the Gambling
Commission. 
The licensing principles of  the Act are threefold: 
1 preventing gambling from being a source of
crime or disorder, being associated with crime
or disorder, or being used to support crime, 
2 ensuring that gambling is conducted in a fair
and open way, and 
3 protecting children and other vulnerable
persons from being harmed or exploited by
gambling. 
The Act covers both commercial and non-
commercial bingo operations.
Commercial bingo operators include traditional
bingo halls, seaside bingo arcades, holiday
parks, commercial sports and social clubs, and
adult gaming centres. These require an operating
licence for the company and a personal licence
for key staff, both issued by the Gambling
Commission. They also require a premises
licence from the relevant local authority. 
www.kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject
Non-profit making bingo operators include ex-
services clubs, miners’ welfare institutes,
politically-affiliated clubs; working men’s clubs;
non-profit making sports and social clubs; village
halls; community centres; and churches.
Proceeds are donated or used for the benefit of
members. When bingo was first legally enabled in
Great Britain, in 1934 via the Betting and Gaming
Act and then more explicitly in 1956 via the Small
Lotteries and Gaming Act, legislators intended to
support these sorts of  activities.
Bingo can be run – without a licence – to raise
money for a good cause, so long as the players
are informed where the money is going and all
the money raised is donated to the good cause
(minus reasonable costs for organising the event).
If  played for cash prizes (to a maximum of £600
in any event), participation fees of  up to £8 can
be charged. They must be donated.
Teresa, Pauline, and Mary, regular bingo players in a Kent bingo hall. Photograph taken by Andrea Shieber.
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Bingo stakes and participation fees
Under the 2005 Act, all operators (commercial
and non-commercial) offering bingo with
aggregate stakes or prizes of  over £2,000 in any
seven day period must hold an operating licence
from the Gambling Commission. Bingo games
are allowed in pubs, members’ clubs, miners’
welfare institutes and commercial clubs (where
proceeds can be taken as profit) without an
operating licence, so long as they do not exceed
the £2000 threshold or involve links with other
premises. Members’ clubs (commercial and non-
commercial) and miners’ welfare institutes can
charge limited participation fees of  £1 per person
per day. Pubs can not charge participation fees.
To charge higher participation fees, of  up to £3
per person per day, members’ clubs and miners’
welfare institutes require a local authority permit.
To qualify for a club gaming permit, members’
clubs must be genuine members’ clubs, with
participation in gaming restricted to members
and their bona fide guests but open to them all.
The rules around this are extensive. The Act lays
out minimum numbers of  members required to
establish a members’ club and waiting periods to
play, and the Gambling Commission has offered
guidance to local authorities on determining
whether a club is a genuine members’ club, and
whether there is ‘’substantial evidence of
activities other than gaming.” 1 Clubs can only be
established for gaming if  established for whist or
bridge, a long-standing class-based distinction
that continues to impact bingo.  
Scale of play and bingo 
demographics 
Land-based bingo in England and Wales is
especially popular with older, working class
women. The 2001 Budd report on gambling, a
consultation that laid the groundwork for the legal
reforms in the 2005 Act, found that “of  all the
gambling types surveyed, playing bingo was
most closely related to social class, ranging from
3% in Social Class I to 20% in Social Class V.”2
According to the most recent comprehensive
Gambling Prevalence Survey, in 2010: 
• 9% of people played bingo in the past 12
months, 12% of women and 6% of men.
Although this includes bingo played ‘in club’
(land-based) and online, the prevalence for
playing bingo online was then very low, at
under 1%.
• Participation was highest in Scotland (12%),
the North East of  England, and Wales (both
10%), and lowest in London (5%).
• The percentage of  people who had played in-
club bingo in the last 12 months has remained
steady over the last 3 gambling prevalence
surveys (7% in 1999 and 2007, and 8% in
2010). But the percentage of  people who had
played in the last week was down: 4% in 1999;
3% in 2007; 2% in 2010. In 2010 54% of bingo
players played once a month or more.
• Prevalence was highest among the oldest
(75+) (11%) and youngest age groups (16-24)
(10%).
• “Bingo was the only activity where participation
was highest among those who were widowed.
13% of those who were widowed had played
bingo in the past year compared with 8% of
those who were single.” [Prevalence Survey
2010, 39]
“The one thing I would dispel is the idea that
it is a dead product: there are still 2.5 million
regular bingo players in the UK and they
deserve our support.” (Neil Goulden, Gala
Bingo, testifying to the Parliamentary
committee investigating the impact of  the
Gambling Act (2005), 25 Oct 2011).
“The foundations of  the Legion is bingo, no
matter where you go” (male bingo organiser,
North of  England).
The Bingo Project
By law all the stakes in cash bingo must be
returned to players as prizes, since as an
equal chance game bingo cannot involve
staking against the house. Players’
payments must be divided transparently
between stakes (all of  which are returned in
prizes), or participation fees. Prize bingo
(involving goods such as kitchen utensils,
toys, or vouchers) involves no stakes, since
the prize is not determined by the number
of people playing or the amount paid for the
game.
1 Gambling Commission. 2012. Guidance to Licensing Authorities, 138.
2 The Gambling Review report. 2001, 41.
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Table 1: Number of licensed bingo premises



















































































































































Table 2: Money staked on licensed bingo (amount in £million)
Source: Gaming Board and HMRC reports
Table 3: Bingo duty paid











































































































































































the main stage bingo game ticket price, or from
sides games and machines played in intervals.
From October 2014 to September 2015 gaming
machine revenue accounted for 46% of gross
gaming yield in licensed bingo facilities.
There is poor data on the scale of  non-
commercial bingo in the UK. Most bingo
fundraising does not require a licence, and most
providers of  bingo in members’ clubs require
neither an operating licence nor a local authority
permit. However our research shows that non-
commercial bingo is in decline, with falling
attendance and loss of  institutional memory
about how to organise games. The number of
new club gaming permits issued by local
authorities – required for higher participation fees
to be charged for bingo games – is at a 5 year
low. In one part of  South Wales visited for
fieldwork there had been 400 working men’s
clubs attached to the regional branch in the
1980s. Most of  those were thought by local
experts to have offered bingo. In May 2014 there
were 116 clubs left, and many of  those were in
danger of  closing. Most still offered bingo.
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The Bingo Project
A 2014 report, using 2012 health survey data,
confirmed that land-based bingo remains
distinctive in its popularity among working class
women: “Men tended to be more likely than
women to take part in most activities and to have
a larger gambling activity repertoire than women.
The exceptions to this are bingo, with men being
less likely to participate than women (3% and
7% respectively); and scratchcards and other
lotteries, with men and women being equally likely
to participate.”3 2% of those whose highest
educational qualification was a degree or higher
played land-based bingo compared with 8% of
those with no qualifications.4
There are currently 615 licensed bingo premises
in the UK, the overwhelming majority of  which are
profit-making businesses. However commercial
bingo has been in decline in Great Britain when
measured by the number of  licensed clubs, the
duty paid to government, and the money staked.
The smoking ban, implemented in 2007, had a
particularly significant impact on attendance.
Given that all stakes in cash bingo have to be
returned to players as prizes, commercial bingo
halls make money from participation fees built into
3 Wardle et al. 2014. Gambling Behavior in England and Scotland, (Gambling Commission), p 2, emphasis added.
4 Ibid. p 23.
52 non-commercial operators (out of  200
operators in total) hold an active operating
licence from the Gambling Commission, enabling
them to offer bingo with aggregate stakes or
prizes over £2,000 in any seven day period. They
include groups such as the Boldon Colliery and
North Road Social Club and Institute; Skegness
Working Men’s Club & Institute, Leicester
Railwaymen’s Club; Morfa Social & Athletic Club,
Yardley Ex Servicemen’s Club, Nottingham
Imperial Order Of Oddfellows Club & Institute,
and the Pennywell Comrades Social Club &
Institute.
Although participation fees can be charged to
play, money is rarely made from bingo in
members’ clubs like these. Sometimes operators
benefit in additional food or drink sales, or
separate admission fees to see a performer in 
the interval between games. But frequently the
surplus generated is described in non-monetary
terms. As one male volunteer in an ex-services
club in the North West of  England put it: 
‘we’re just having a laugh, really. It’s a bit of fun.
It’s providing a service. It is not like big bingo
halls. It’s about meeting friends, comradeship,
friendship.’ 
Control panel used by bingo callers, Kent. Image taken by Andrea Shieber.
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Table 5: Number of new club gaming permits
issued by local authorities, 2010-15.
Source: Licensing Authority Statistics 2010-15, Gambling
Commission.
Table 6: Average number of gaming permits/notices issued by local licensing authorities submitting returns.
Source: Licensing Authority Statistics 2010-15, Gambling Commission.







Table 4: Gross Gaming Yield (GGY) for bingo games and gaming machines in licensed bingo premises
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When bingo was first mentioned in parliament in
1936, it was by an MP seeking to liberalise hours
for working men’s clubs. In the 1950s, when
concentrated attention was paid in parliament to
bingo for the first time, lawmakers regarded the
game positively due to its connection to the
military (where it was widely played by soldiers
and sailors), political parties (where it was used
to fundraise), and working men’s clubs (where it
supported member activities and good works
within the community, such as taking children on
holiday). Lawmakers from both parties were keen
to show their support for working men’s clubs in
particular, since the club movement had links to
many MPs.
Commercial operators at that time included
showmen who offered bingo in travelling fairs,
and the holiday camp pioneer Billy Butlin. They
appear in the parliamentary record mostly as part
of  complaints by advocates of  working men’s
clubs about the unfairness of  police toleration for
commercial play when contrasted with occasional
raids on members’ club spaces.
Commercial bingo subsequently exploded in
Great Britain under a loophole in the 1960 Betting
and Gaming Act allowing profit-making clubs to
conduct equal chance gaming and to charge for
entry. It provoked a backlash. Commercial bingo
survived the subsequent crackdown on gambling
enshrined in the 1968 Betting and Gaming Act
Key themes
Theme 1: The shifting attitudes of
lawmakers and the declining visibility of
the non-commercial sector
Bingo has always had great cross party support,
which is partly why I think the duty change was
successful. (male commecial bingo operator,
England)
The Bingo Project
Changing atitudes to bingo (1936-1995): Extracts from the Hansard Record
NB: in these examples housey is a synonym for bingo.
Commander Bower, speaking in favour of  a
measure to amend licensing hours for working
men’s clubs: “The bona fide clubs… are a very
great asset in the social life of  the country. (An
MP opposed to the reform) could come to my
constituency and visit one or two of  the
working men’s clubs in which I spend a good
deal of  my time. He could have a game of
billiards or darts, or backgammon, listen to the
wireless or read the newspapers, or he might
even indulge in a surreptitious game of
“Housey-Housey”. The drinking is moderate
and quite ancillary to the ordinary activities of
the club …(Clubs) are a great boon to the
unemployed man... There are many of  these
men in my constituency, and it is pathetic to
see the shifts they will employ in order to be
able to pay their club subscription, and be able
to go along to these social centres and feel
themselves on terms of  equality with their more
fortunate brethren who are working.” (HC Deb
6 March 1936, vol 309, col. 1710.).
Mr Boardman asked how many people had
been prosecuted in Lancashire during 1955 for
playing housey-housey in social clubs. The
answer was 115.
“Is the Home Secretary aware that the game is
a traditional pastime of  the British Army, that
under the name of  tombola it is played in
certain seaside holiday camps whose
brochures advertise it..., and that under the
name of  either tombola or bingo it is played in
the most fashionable London clubs? Why
should there be discrimination against
Lancashire clubs? Is it not time the law was
amended to legalise this innocent pastime?
(HC Deb 14 July 1955, vol 543, col. 2101-1). 
“We have all broken the law. For example,
“housey-housey” is played on every troopship
leaving this country and coming back. It is
played in my constituency at fetes organised
by ex-Service men who probably learnt the
game while in the Army.” (Major H Legge-
Bourke HC Deb 25th Nov 1955, vol 546, col.
1858).
“Bingo, in its modern form, is a highly
commercialised and greatly exploited type of
gaming….It is becoming another form of  drug
addiction… In one form or another bingo is
being played all the time. One cannot have a
sandwich or drink without some form of  bingo
being on top of  one. If  one goes for a tour in
the country, bingo is played on the train. It is all
a commercial operation run to make profit” (Mr
Blenkinsop HC Deb 11 June 1968, vol 766, col.
63). 
“By limiting the amount of  the prize to such an
absurdly low sum the Home Secretary is taking
the “go” out of  bingo. He is taking a lot of
excitement and zip out of  it….When the linked
game comes up there is an intensification of  the
atmosphere, an excitement which I do not
consider harmful…. I have seen old people
enjoying themselves, and I wonder what they
would be doing if  they were not in a bingo hall
with other people. They would probably be at
home before their television sets, perhaps fast
asleep and utterly lonely…They are enjoying
themselves there in a social atmosphere and I do
not see that that is a great evil.” (Mr Buck HC Deb
11 June 1968, vol 766, col. 138-9).
“Bingo is – or should be – a relatively harmless
form of  gaming of  a sociable and neighbourly
kind…Provided it is kept within proper bounds we
have no wish to harass it unduly” (Lord Stonham
HL Deb 29 June 1968, vol 293, col. 854-5).
“(Linked bingo) is the negation of  what bingo was
originally conceived to be, which is a friendly,
modest, intimate neighbourly game. You cannot
call it a game when there are perhaps 5 million
people up and down the country just drawing a
number. That is not a game.” (Lord Stonham HL
Deb 29 June 1968, vol 293, col. 901-902).
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(unlike most casinos), but only within strict limits.
For example there were to be no linked games,
and almost no advertising. 
Whereas commercial bingo survived in the 1960s
on the grounds that it was seen by most
lawmakers to be a social, family game, offering
harmless fun and entertainment, in the 1980s the
perceived benefits of  commercial bingo became
also economic: tax revenue; employment; well-run
businesses; and sites that attract tourists in
seaside towns. By the mid 1990s, commercial
bingo was seen positively by politicians of  all
parties, both for economic and social reasons,
and it was regarded as a favourable site for
deregulation.
The sense that bingo provides a safe, respectable
outlet for elderly working class women’s leisure –
a framing seen since bingo was first explicitly
debated in the 1950s – remains. Now bingo halls
are contrasted with betting shops, pay day
lenders, and pawn shops as sites of  sociality,
community, and harmless fun. The Mary Portas
review on high street regeneration actively
promotes them. In 2014 the Chancellor
announced a 10% duty cut on commercial bingo
– double what the industry had requested. 
www.kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject
“It always amazes me when I hear people talking
about spending family allowances on beer and
bingo, because it is a lot of  nonsense. It may be
true that a father and mother will have a drink of
beer and may even play bingo. But is it
suggested that the father and mother of  a family
in receipt of  family allowances should not be
entitled to have a drink of  beer or play bingo? It
really is a nonsense” (Mr Loughlin HC Dec 2 April
1968, vol. 762, col. 147).
“Are we acting wisely in encouraging a kind of
Bingo, lounge bar society—the kind of  society in
which people feel that they can get things without
making substantial contributions?” (Lord Taylor of
Gryfe HL Deb 18 February 1970, vol. 307, cc
1221).
“Many people would rather spend their hard-
earned money on subscriptions to BUPA18 so that
they are given medical care when they require it
rather than spend that money on drink or bingo. In
a free country why should they not have this
choice?” (Mrs Knight HC Deb 27 April 1976, vol.
910, col. 287).
“If  it were not for bingo our elderly people would
have no social life.” (Mr Roberts HC Deb 29 Oct
1979, vol 915, col 840).
“We are not interested in the extension of  bingo
halls and ferris wheels. We are interested in the
creation of  proper jobs and opportunities for
employing our young people and renewing a
dying industrial situation.” (Mrs Dynwoody HC
Deb 21 April 1980, vol. 983, col. 87).
“People who go to bingo halls are working-
class men and women and old-age
pensioners. One does not have to hire a top
hat or tails to go to bingo halls, or wear
floppy hats as women do at some of  the
racecourses, such as Ascot. Those who
play bingo are miners’ wives, not
millionaires’ wives; shipbuilders’ wives, not
shipowners’ wives.” (Mr Dixon speaking
against an increase in bingo duty, HC Deb
6 July 1981, vol. 8, col. 187-8).
“Unless the changed circumstances of  today,
compared with 1968, are taken into account the
survival of  this form of  recreation is truly in peril.
The word “peril” may seem an emotional and
dramatic one to use in connection with the
game of  bingo, which we sometimes laugh at
and pass off  but it is a form of  recreation which
means a great deal to many people…This is not
an inconsiderable industry. It provides 52 million
a year to the Exchequer; it provides jobs and a
living for tens of  thousands of  staff; and it
provides recreation for 13.5 per cent. of  the
adult population of  Britain.” (Lord Harmar-
Nicholls HL Deb 4 May 1983, vol. 442, cc.148). 
“Some of  my constituents enjoy bingo. What
about subsidising bingo for ordinary people? It
is an art form for them in the same way that
watching and listening to a fat Italian singing in
his own language, dressed like a woman, is an
art form. As far as I am concerned, there is no
difference.” (Mr Dicks HC Deb 20 May 1988,
vol. 133, col. 1236).
“The bingo industry is declining. There is no
cause or call for the Government to support it.
However, by the same token there is no reason
for its survival to be impeded by unnecessary
restrictions” (Viscount Montgomery of
Alamein HL Deb 25 March 1991, vol. 527, col.
918).
John Whittingdale, then a new MP, speaking
of his visit to a new-build bingo club: 
“A bingo club now is not only a gambling hall;
it is a leisure centre where people can meet,
talk, enjoy a drink, have a meal and generally
have a fun and sociable afternoon or evening
of activity. In addition, clubs often fulfil a more
general social role as places where elderly
people can go during the day to enjoy a
cheap meal, have a bit of  fun and chat with
friends in a warm, safe environment…The
industry is falling into decline, which can be
halted only by deregulation that will allow it to
compete on a basis equal to that of  its main
competitors while it is still in good enough
shape to take advantage of  a level playing
field. The Government have rightly
championed competition and deregulation.
No industry is more deserving of  the chance
to enjoy the benefits of  those policies than the
bingo industry” (HC Deb 11 May 1995, vol.
259, col. 965).
“Bingo is a brilliant way to bring people together
for a bit of old fashioned community fun. Why
can’t we encourage more bingo nights on our high
streets?” (Mary Portas, The Portas Review: An
independent review into the future of our high
streets p.46)
The positive attitudes held by lawmakers towards
commercial bingo are in part the result of
effective lobbying. Industry involvement in
debates about land-based regulation is well-
institutionalised. The Bingo Association, the trade
association for land-based commercial operations
in Great Britain, takes a proactive role in lobbying
around taxation, and regulatory reform. 
18 The British United Provident Association, a company providing private medical insurance. 
Changing atitudes to bingo (1936-1995): Extracts from the Hansard Record (continued)
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In 2009 the Gambling Commission issued a
document on ‘key characteristics of  bingo’,
intended to help clarify the game’s boundaries.7
This focused on stakes and participation fees in
bingo machines. Most recently, in 2014 the
Commission published a guidance note on What
constitutes bingo.8 This guidance is intended “to
help bingo operators avoid creating and offering
products that we consider to be casino games,
lotteries or fixed odds betting” (s.1.1). It identifies
3 fundamental principles of  bingo: that the game
is an equal chance game; that it must involve a
degree of  participation, and that it must have a
clearly defined end point (s. 3.3). 
Most commercial operators we interviewed
welcomed this guidance, with some seeing profit
potential in more automated forms of  the game
that resemble electronic lotteries. However one
industry insider contended that any game
definition could be reversed by the Commission in
the absence of  a statutory definition, leading to
uncertainty in product development. 
Our research suggests that a definition of  the
game focused solely on its mechanics will not
resolve the regulatory challenges facing the
sector, because it ignores the key issue of  place.
‘Going to the bingo’ refers both to a premises,
and to a game played in that premises. Bingo
premises licensing is largely a matter for local
Membership and gambling in pubs
Historically membership differentiated the
illegality of  gambling in pubs, to which the
public has access, from the legality of  some
gambling in some members’ clubs, seen as
private spaces. In the 1968 Betting and
Gaming Act the rules governing commercial
bingo halls were modelled on those for
clubs, and so membership was crucial.
Under the 2005 Act membership was
scrapped as a statutory requirement for
commercial bingo halls (even though the
industry wanted to keep it). Membership still
matters for non-commercial clubs, though.
From that point – when membership was no
longer a key part of  the definition of  bingo
in both commercial and non-commercial
sectors – the issue of  gambling in pubs was
destined to re-emerge, because
membership had been such a key part of
what had stopped higher-stakes bingo from
being in pubs in the first place. 
By contrast, non-commercial bingo is now barely
mentioned by lawmakers in debates about the
sector. Club associations did not give oral
evidence to the 2013 parliamentary committee
investigating whether the Gambling Act 2005 was
‘a bet worth taking,’ for example. This is in part
because working class associations have far
weaker links to lawmakers than in the past. 
Theme 2: The challenge of defining 
the game: The importance of game
mechanics and environment 
In a key sign of  its perceived nature as an
‘everyday’ gambling form, the Gambling
Commission describes bingo as “the only form of
gambling recognised in the Gambling Act 2005
that does not have a specific statutory definition,
the Act providing simply that ‘bingo’ means ‘any
version of  that game, irrespective of  by what
name it is described.’5 In contrast the legislation
provides definitions for betting, casino, draw,
horse race pool betting, lottery ticket, lottery, prize
gaming, football pools, gaming, and gambling. 
As our table of  key bingo cases shows, the
definition of  the game has long been contested.6
In fact the issue of  whether bingo should have a
statutory definition was debated by the 1977
Rothschild commission on gambling. This was in
response to what the Gaming Board (the then
national regulator of  bingo) considered
objectionable game innovations where high
participation fees were being charged to players.
However the issue of  the game’s boundaries is
especially significant now. In part because bingo
premises licences offer access to lucrative
games machines entitlements – including up to
20% of the total gaming machines being B3
machines (with a £2 stake and £500 prize) – and
in part because bingo machines are explicitly
defined by the 2005 Act as not gaming machines
(meaning that they do not count towards the
quota of  total machines allowed on a premises)
there has been an attempted expansion in the
type of  operators and premises offering bingo.
Some operators have developed new, variant
forms of  bingo, often called electronically, and not
requiring players to stop the game by shouting
out. Membership has also been removed as a
criteria for commercial bingo operators, meaning
that bingo has expanded into non-member
environments such as adult gaming centres. 
As a result there has been a growing need for
regulators to rule on boundary disputes between
bingo and other forms of  gaming. 
The Bingo Project
5 Gambling Commission. (2014). What constitutes bingo? (London: Statioeary Office), s.1.1; quoting s. 363 of  the Gambling Act 2005.
6 See for example Rogers v Cowley [1962] 1 WLR 770 (HL); Adcock v Wilson [1968] 2 WLR 914 (HL); and Walker v Leeds, Greenwich and Lewisham [1976] 3 WLR 736 (HL).
7 Gambling Commission. (2009). Key characteristics of  bingo. (London: Stationery Office).
8 Gambling Commission. (2014). What constitutes bingo? (London: Stationery Office).
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authorities, with the national-level Gambling
Commission focusing on operator suitability. The
2005 Act gives little discretion to local authorities
on gambling premises licensing (other than for
casinos). The expectation is that they will grant a
licence if  the core licensing objectives are
fulfilled. Unlike with alcohol licensing (under the
2003 Licensing Act) there is no authority to
restrict based on concerns about clustering or
proliferation. This inability to restrict has been
criticised by some MPs and anti-gambling
organisations, but in relation to the perceived
growth in betting shops rather than bingo halls.
The Gambling Commission have sought to shape
local authority decision making about premises
licensing, especially through the concept of
‘primary gambling activity.’ This intends to
address two concerns: keeping gambling largely
within establishments focused on gambling (a key
concern of  lawmakers in debates leading up to
the 2005 Act), and ensuring that a premises
seeking a licence for one form of  gambling in fact
intends to focus its operations on that form, rather
than using the licence as a ‘flag of  convenience’
to offer other, harder gambling forms.
The regulatory concern with the suitability of
operators, and the suitability of  the premises
within which they plan to offer bingo, is key to the
current debate over whether licensed bingo
should be allowed in pubs. Pubs can already run
low-stakes bingo, subject to conditions: there are
no participation fees allowed, and stakes are
limited to £5 per person per game. But if  able to
offer licensed bingo pubs could run games with
higher stakes and prizes, with links, and –
crucially – with the entitlement to higher stakes
gaming machines. In a recent legal case, the
Gambling Commission had its authority to deny
an operator licence to a pub chain upheld based
on concerns about the environment within which
it sought to offer the game.9
Theme 3: Risky play and the
increasing formalisation of harm
prevention
Much has been written on the growing centrality
of  medical models of  risk and harm to gambling
law and policy.10 In the UK, regulatory attention is
increasingly focused on problem gambling
www.kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject
9 Gambling Commission v Greene King [2016] UKUT 0050 (AAC)
10 See, especially, G. Reith. 2007. Gambling and the Contradictions of  Consumption: A Genealogy of  the ‘Pathological’ Subject. American Behavioral Scientist
51(1): 33–55; F. Nicoll. 2012. Bad habits: Discourses of  addiction and the racial politics of  intervention. Griffith Law Review 21(1): 164–189; R. Cassidy, C
Loussouarn and A Pisac. 2013. Fair Game: Producing Gambling Research (The Goldsmith report). London: Goldsmiths.
11 Wardle et al. 2014. Gambling Behaviour in England and Scotland, p 101.
12 Wardle et al. 2014. Gambling Behaviour in England and Scotland, p 97.
(defined as “gambling to a degree that
compromises, disrupts or damages family,
personal or recreational pursuits”11) and on 
‘at-risk’ gambling behavior.12 The latter includes
people who could be considered ‘at-risk’ of
experiencing negative consequences from
gambling, and/or who may be at risk of
developing problems in the future, but who are
below the threshold for problem gambling.
A key operational challenge in law and policy
around harm prevention in gambling is over
where to the strike the balance between a
standardised approach across all gambling
sectors, versus distinctive approaches to
distinctive sectors which may have varying harm
potential. For example, according to 2012 health
survey data the highest overall prevalence of  ‘at-
risk’ gambling was observed among those who
participated in spread-betting, gambling on
machines in bookmakers, and betting exchanges.
The challenge for bingo specifically is that while 
it has comparatively low levels of  problem
gambling they almost always relate to the
ancillary product (gambling machines) rather
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That said, most hall managers had encountered
customers who, in their view, gambled too much.
There had long been mechanisms for dealing
with this, including ‘having a chat;’ calling up
family members; telling someone to go home or 
to only come in with a group of  family or friends;
barring someone from the premises as a whole,
or from the machine section; refusing to serve
alcohol to someone with a gambling problem;
and ‘letting someone know you are keeping an
eye.’
These mechanisms are being eclipsed by more
formalised measures laid out in the Gambling
Commission’s Licensing Conditions and Codes of
Practice (LCCP), to which all licensed operators
must adhere. There are two types of  code
provision in the LCCP. Ordinary codes set out
good practice. Social responsibility codes relate
to ensuring that gambling is conducted in a fair
and open way; protecting children and other
vulnerable persons from being harmed or
exploited by gambling; and making assistance
available to persons who are or may be affected
by problems related to gambling. Compliance
with these codes is a condition of  operator
licences. A breach may result in a review of  the
licence (and suspension or revocation),
imposition of  a fine, and/or prosecution. 
At first preventing under-age gambling was the
key concern of  the social responsibility codes.
However in 2015 a revision was undertaken that
made problem gambling far more central to the
regulations.14 For example the new social
responsibility codes require licensed bingo
operators to put in place measures for sector-
wide self-exclusion (where individuals who
request to be excluded from a licensed bingo
premises are subsequently excluded from
licensed bingo facilities run by other operators),
and for ‘customer interaction.’ This requires staff
to identify and intervene effectively “where they
have concerns that a customer’s behaviour may
indicate harm (or risk of  harm) as a result of  their
gambling behavior” (3.4.1). Customers exhibiting
agitation, distress, or aggression are mentioned
as targets for customer interaction, but the
Commission also note that: 
“behaviour that is normal for one individual (eg
behaviour that might reflect a well-controlled
leisure experience) might, in another individual,
be indicative of  gambling related harm… For
these reasons, the Commission considers that it
is important to include a code provision that
requires operators to put in place provisions to
identify those customers potentially at risk of
gambling-related harm, whether or not they are
displaying obvious signs of, or overt, behaviour
associated with problem gambling.”15
In the light of  such guidance, some staff  we
interviewed were anxious about being held
responsible for identifying problematic gambling
behaviour. 
than the core offering (main stage bingo). Side
products – including gambling machines and
games played in intervals between traditional
bingo games – are central to revenue in the
commercial sector. Almost unanimously, when 
we asked interviewees from the licensed sector
about problem gambling in bingo they said that 
it was rare, and that it was normally relevant to
machines. That is supported by the latest data on
problem gambling rates across different sectors
from the 2010 Gambling Prevalence Study.
Some commercial operators felt that there were
several features of  bingo’s distinctiveness that
made it relatively low risk. These included the fact
that the game is popular with older women
(younger people, and men, are more likely to be
at-risk gamblers according to the 2012 health
surveys13); the social nature of  the game and the
fact that groups of  friends or family often came
together; the close bond between players and
staff  in traditional hall environments (leading,
some argue, to better monitoring of  potential
gambling problems); the nature of  the traditional,
paper-based main stage game itself  (involving
time-bound, sessional play and built-in breaks,
and where stakes are limited by the physical
capacity of  the player to mark off  tickets); and the
fact that not all players regard the game as a form
of gambling. 
The Bingo Project
Table 7: Prevalence of problem gambling among those who reported that they
took part in different gambling activities on a regular (at least monthly) basis. 
Source: 2010 Gambling Prevalence Survey p95-96.
Table 8: Total number of gambling machines in licensed bingo clubs 
Source: Gaming Board and Gambling Commission Annual Reports.
13 Wardle et al. 2014. Gambling Behaviour in England and Scotland, p 2-3.
14 Gambling Commission. 2015. Strengthening social responsibility: Amendments to the social responsibility provisions in the licence conditions and codes of
practice (LCCP) for all operators. (London: Stationery Office).
15 Gambling Commission. 2015. Strengthening social responsibility: Amendments to the social responsibility provisions in the licence conditions and codes of
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Recommendations specific to the
England and Wales case study 
1 Involve non-commercial bingo operators
more systematically into debates about
gambling regulation
Non-commercial bingo remains a significant part
of  the sector, and operators have accumulated
considerable expertise, over a lengthy period.
Since non-commercial bingo is largely self-
regulated, with most operators exempt from
licensing and permits, it is rarely on the radar 
for local licensing authorities or the Gambling
Commission. While it is not a concern in terms of
compliance, we suggest that more systematic
involvement of  representatives from the non-
commercial sector will be of  benefit. 
On a general level, better consultation with the
non-commercial sector will serve as a reminder –
to regulators and all of  us who are interested in
gambling – that a lot of  gambling is, and always
has been, run on a not for profit, or mutual aid
basis, as an ancillary activity in places primarily
used for other purposes. 
On a more specific level, some rule changes
suggested by our interviewees could be
accommodated without endangering the
principles of  the Gambling Act. For example,
participation in gaming in members’ clubs is
restricted to members and their bona fide guests,
but it must be open to them all. If  a portion of  the
stakes of  regular players are rolled over, into
accumulating jackpots (‘snowballs’) clubs are
supposed to allow a guest – often someone
signed in just for the evening – to play for the
prize. It seemed unfair to some for an outsider to
have the chance to win a large, equal chance
prize made up of  regular members’ contributions.
Likewise in the light of  recent debates about
bingo in pubs it is especially important to consult
with representatives of  members’ clubs who have
long offered gambling as an ancillary product in
environments licensed for alcohol. If  membership
requirements are, in their experience, a key factor
in ensuring that gambling is conducted
responsibly within such environments, it may be
helpful to consider once again its role within
commercial facilities that are primarily designed
around alcohol.
2 Consider testing partial self-exclusion
with willing operators
Some interviewees from the commercial sector
wondered whether partial self-exclusion might be
a way forward for bingo halls seeking to respond
to the new policy emphasis on responsible
gambling. In their experience, some players had
been reluctant to request self-exclusion from a
bingo facility, even if  they had experienced
problems with their gambling, since typically they
understood their problem to involve gaming
machines. Excluding from the bingo club as a
whole would cut them off  from a key social outlet,
where they tended to see friends and family and
experience community. Partial self-exclusion
would enable them to exclude from a specific
product (usually gaming machines). 
The Gambling Commission consulted on partial
self-exclusion by product in 2015, but decided
against introducing it due to lack of  evidence.
There were also objections raised by gambling
treatment providers on the grounds that it would
not address the root cause of  the harms being
experienced by problem gamblers, and that “self-
exclusion should be about the total cessation from
all forms of  gambling.”16 However the
Commission committed to continue monitoring
the evidence on the matter.
In our view commercial bingo clubs are an
excellent site on which to develop such evidence.
They are primarily social gambling spaces, with
low levels of  problem gambling associated with
specific products. Those products tend to be
separated off  from the main stage bingo floor,
allowing partial self-exclusion to be more easily
monitored than in other gaming venues. If  – as 
we were told – some customers had requested
partial self-exclusion, and some operators are
willing to explore the option, resources could be
diverted to researching whether it would be
useful.  
3 Consider formalising social responsibility
training and staff accreditation alongside
the requirement to intervene, across the
gambling sector
Among individuals with long histories in the
commercial bingo industry there is a common
thread of  nostalgia for ‘command and control’
regulation and clarity about the rules, especially
www.kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject
16 Gambling Commission. 2015. Strengthening social responsibility: Amendments to the social responsibility provisions in the licence conditions and codes of  
practice (LCCP) for all operators p 57 (London: Stationery Office).
17 Gambling Commission. 2015. Strengthening social responsibility: Amendments to the social responsibility provisions in the licence conditions and codes of
practice (LCCP) for all operators p 76, rec. 7.34. (London: Stationery Office). 
for the ‘pink card’ and the police-style model of
regulation it represented (see text box overleaf). It
has been a challenge for some – especially
smaller companies without large compliance
departments – to resource to self-regulation, and
to keep up with frequent consultations on
proposed rule changes. 
One recent manifestation of  this challenge
concerns the growing emphasis on social
responsibility in the licensing codes. There is
some anxiety among staff  about making mistakes
that will result in serious consequences (fears
range from losing their jobs to being prosecuted). 
Bingo is widely recognised, across our interviews,
to be a compliant sector, enjoying generally
positive attitudes from lawmakers and generally
positive relationships with regulators. If  these
anxieties are being raised by bingo staff, we
suspect that they are relevant more widely. 
In turn the Gambling Commission has increased
its emphasis on effective training as part of  a
company’s responsibility. 
In the 2015 consultation on the new LCCP, one
operator suggested that the Commission could
create a staff  training accreditation scheme in
order to instil good practice in the area of  training
for self-exclusion.17 This was rejected as out of
step with the emphasis on self-regulation.
If  key elements of  social responsibility are to be
downloaded onto staff  who work in gambling
facilities then we suggest independent verification
of the quality of  training, and sector-specific
compliance knowledge. We recommend that
regulators consider attaching a mechanism to
test expertise to the grant of  a personal licence.
This need not replicate the hazing ritual ‘horrors’
of  the old ‘pink card’ exam, but it needs to go
beyond self-verification by the company in order
to maintain a sense of  trust in the professionalism
and integrity of  the gambling sector as a whole.
This may also help to ensure that staff  are
properly protected, and that their anxieties about
their new roles in protecting players from harm
are allayed. 
The pink card process also enhanced respect for,
and sometimes fear of, the Gaming Board. 
In them days you could get a good relationship
with the Gaming Board as long as they trusted
you and respected you and knew that you were
legal, kosher and everything else. (male, bingo
hall manager, England)
Respondent 1  
I used to fear them, as a manager. 
Respondent 2   
They could take away your pink card. Having
given you this thing which was so aspirational
you have worked so bloody hard to get that you
didn’t want it to be messed about. If anything
went wrong, you were the one that they were
going to come after.
Respondent 1 
You wouldn’t want to risk a breach that could
potentially lose you your pink card, because any
breach could have lost you it. It wasn’t just the
work. This was in my social life as well. If I went
out and got drunk with my friends and got myself
into any sort of trouble… or driving offences or
anything like that, I could have my pink card
revoked. It was a big thing back then in terms of
your behaviour inside work and outside of work.
(male and female, commercial bingo operations,
England)
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The Gaming Board – which regulated bingo in
Great Britain until 2007 – thoroughly
investigated the trustworthiness and expertise
of people working in licensed bingo. A police
background check was conducted, and
commercial bingo club managers were issued
certificates of  consent, known as pink cards,
from the Board. To obtain a pink card you had
a pass an interview with a panel of  Gaming
Board inspectors, many of  whom were ex-
police officers. This interview focused on the
law and its practical application to the running
of a bingo club. 
In all 27 people, across 22 interviews, spoke 
to us about pink cards when sharing their
experiences of  bingo regulation. 
Generally people spoke of  the pink card
process in similar terms: as intimidating,
stressful, an interrogation, a trauma, awful,
‘difficult and nerve wracking,’ tough, daunting,
intense, horrendous, ‘like your A-levels or
driving test.’ As one manager put it 
My hands were sweating and the heart was
thumping. It was the most intimidating exam
I’ve ever had in my life—and I’ve had a few
(laughs). They fired a load of questions at
you… I just felt there was a spotlight missing
from me. … I went with another manager and
he come up crying and I thought, oh my god,
oh my god, I am never going to pass this.
(male, bingo hall manager, Wales).19
The stakes were personally high for people, since
a pink card was necessary to progress as a
bingo manager. Without one you could not be 
left in charge of  the premises alone. 
You were a little bit of a care bear manager… not
quite there. You couldn’t really make a decision.
(female commercial bingo operator, Wales)
It was very important to make sure that I got that
otherwise basically my livelihood would be shot.
Survival is a great instinct. (male, bingo hall
manager, England).
The pink card process relied heavily on company-
level training and support. Bingo operators
prepared staff  for the interviews, often by
involving ex-Board inspectors. Larger operators
also did mock interviews. However the external
validation of  expertise involved in the pink card
system also bolstered managerial authority, and
wages.
The licence protected my job. You couldn’t come
and do my job, because you had to go through
hoops to get it… Over the years they have had to
pay me a lot of money, because there wasn’t a
great surplus of people with the knowledge and
experience or whatever. So this was probably quite
cynical of me, but to get rid of that process has
enabled a company to open up the amount of
managers who they can employ which, in essence
has allowed them to reduce the salaries, the
wages, they reduced their pensions and that.
(male, bingo hall manager, England)
You felt that you’d joined an elite club… I am
highly fetted and a right and proper person and
all that. I can now operate in quite a lucrative
career. (male, commercial bingo operations,
England).
Pink card narratives and the shift from command and control regulation: experiences in bingo
The Bingo Project
19 We distinguish between those who were – at the time of  the interview – working as bingo hall managers, and those who were working in other roles within
commercial bingo operations. 
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Under the current system for personal
management licences individuals are required by
the Gambling Commission to fill in forms focusing
on criminal records, and on financial background.
Testing of  gambling knowledge is handled by the
company, which provides training and certifies
the person as appropriately qualified. Licence
holders described this system as faster, and
much less onerous:
Nothing really, it was just more of a tick box
exercise… I just had to fill in a form. (female,
commercial bingo operations, England). 
Obviously because I am not a criminal it went
through quite easy (female, commercial bingo
operations, England).
If the company is happy then you fulfil all the
legal requirements (male, bingo hall manager,
England).
Three of  those who had been through both
systems felt that the new system was better. As
one explained “The onus is on the company to
self  police so the onus is on the company to
make sure that I know, that I understand, that I’m
trained, that I’m a fit and proper person to run a
bingo club. And if  that’s not the case the onus is
on the company to deal with me appropriately
either taking me out of  the job or giving me the
knowledge that I require… There are checks with
the police and such like, criminal records and all
that kind of  stuff  which is entirely correct
because there are some people out there who
may not be entirely the right people getting to
bingo.” (male, bingo hall manager, England)
www.kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject
Pink card narratives and the shift from command and control regulation: experiences in bingo (continued)
However most of  those who had been through
both systems felt that the older one had been
better at ensuring high levels of  expertise. 
The way we used to do it was much better…
Nowadays, this is my personal prejudice, anybody
can now get a gaming licence in a bingo hall. I
spoke to some of the new people the other day and
I was quite shocked.…They came from (a previous
job in a shop) and they told me that they applied
for their Gaming Licence on the second day that
they were in the business, because they were on a
training course with our company... That’s all
they had to do. Filled the application form in.
(male, bingo hall manager, England).
You had to know the law, you would revise six
months prior, they would question you on
everything. Then you were given a licence to say
yes, you know your stuff. And the 2005 Act came
along and just that went out of the window. So I
just tick a couple of boxes, write a couple of
things... Nobody’s ever come to see me. (male,
commercial bingo operations, England).
It checks finance doesn’t it and it checks criminal
record, which obviously it is beneficial. You
wouldn’t want someone with any fraudulent past
or any kind of criminal conviction. It’s slightly
different because there is no actual gambling
knowledge needed to hold a PML (personal
management licence). Whereas, previously we
held a licence which was actually based on your
knowledge of gambling. Now we are regulated
almost by our personal behaviour rather than our
actual industry knowledge, I guess. There is no
Gambling Commission involvement in that,
almost you just send it away. (female, bingo hall
manager, England).
I was lucky, because I was probably one of the last
lots of people to hold a pink card. (male, bingo
hall manager, Wales)
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Top 25 bingo cases
Full citation Brief summary
Bow v Heatly [1960] JC
114
Edinburgh miners’ welfare institute running a tombola/housey housey game for charitable purposes; convicted of  illegal gaming on grounds that no
entertainment other than the tombola/housey housey was provided. Held that a game of  chance, or of  chance and skill combined, was in itself  an
“entertainment” within the meaning of  the Small Lotteries and Gaming Act, 1956, sec. 4 (1), and conviction quashed.
Payne v Bradley [1961] 2
All ER 882 (HL)
Whether Huddersfield Friendly and Trade Societies Club was rightly prosecuted for unlawful gambling. Tombola was played; proceeds put into
general funds of  the club and used to meet general expenses. Held that proceeds were a ‘private gain’ and hence that gaming was unlawful.
Dissenting judgements by Denning and Morris disagree that benefits to club members constitute a private gain. This case is raised several times
by MPs calling on the government to introduce legislation to amend the 1956 Small Lotteries and Gaming Act so as to explicitly allow such clubs to
apply the proceeds from gaming events to activities benefiting club members. In 1962 a private member’s bill is introduced in the House of
Commons by an MP to reverse the ruling by allowing non-proprietary members’ clubs and sports and athletic and cultural societies to apply
gaming proceeds to club funds. It passes, with government support. 
Rogers v Cowley [1962] 1
WLR 770 (QB)
Undercover police operation reveals bingo being offered to non-members in a seaside club. Charging them to participate was unlawful. However
allowing legitimate players (members) to buy different numbers of  tickets did not violate the equal chance provision since all individual chances
had an equal chance to win.
DPP v Regional Pool
Promotions Ltd [1964] 2
QB 244 
The Spastics League Club, with 6 million members, was convicted of  running multiple lotteries (described as bingos) out of  the headquarters.
Numbers were assigned to members on the basis of  their membership card, and winners were notified after Club officials had drawn the numbers.
In closing, Lord Parker noted the reluctance with which he made the decision “because it is the undoubted fact that a great deal of  the proceeds
of these activities goes, as one would expect from the name, to a most worthy cause” (at para. 256).
Armstrong v DPP [1965]
2 All ER 745 (HL)
Upheld the conviction of  the proprietor of  a postal bingo club for running an illegal lottery, on the grounds that buying a ticket in this form of  bingo
was not participation in a game. The postal bingo involved 300,000 players. Results were announced in a dedicated bingo programme on the
pirate radio station Radio Luxembourg and published in the cult magazine Tit Bits. Again winners were contacted and notified without having to
claim; again the court held that there was no gaming, since there was no participation in a game and no assembly of  players. 
DPP v Essoldo Circuit
(Control) [1966] 1 QB 799
Unlawful nature of  a roulette-style interval game (‘super legalite’) played in a bingo club, involving a players’ pool. 
DPP v Bradfute and
Associates Ltd [1967] 1
All ER 112 (QB)
Bingo prize competition, with tickets included on tins of  cat food. Held that this is advertising an illegal lottery.
Mecca Ltd v Edinburgh
Corporation [1967] SLT
(Sh. Ct) 43
Local authority had refused a permit for amusement with prizes machines in an unlicensed club on the grounds that the police had no entry power
without a warrant to supervise. Held that local authority had not validly exercised its discretion; application for permit should be granted.
Adcock v Wilson [1968] 2
WLR 914 (HL)
An early version of  a linked national game (National Golden Scoop Game, involving c 500 clubs and up to 200,00 players nightly) was not a legal
game under the 1963 Betting and Gaming Act. Held that players were taking part in various separate games of  bingo. Held that it would be
possible to have a national game, if  played at the same time everywhere and if  there was instanteous communication.
Douglas v Valente [1968]
SLT (Sh. Ct) 85
Overturned the conviction of  a shopowner who had run a gaming club. He charged a membership fee to play machines, and offered free bingo
games with prizes of  shop goods. Had been charged with conducting and promoting an illegal lottery, but acquitted on appeal on the grounds that
members had not contributed to the prize fund via the membership fee. Lotteries must involve some form of  paying into the prize fund as a way of
participation. Using free bingo to attract people into the premises, to buy drinks or use machines, does not establish a contribution by them to the
prize fund (see also Mccollom v Wrightson [1968] 2 W.L.R. 578).
Plaza Bingo and Social
Club LTD. v Port Glasgow
Burgh Council [1968] SLT
(Sh. Ct) 3
Bingo club applied for a permit for amusement with prizes machines; granted but local authority attached conditions that didn’t fall within the list
specified in s 49(3) of  the 1963 Betting Gaming and Lotteries Act. The conditions were not within the powers of  the local authority; the discretion
bestowed is either to grant or renew. Permit is granted.
Metropolitan Police
Commissioner v I. & N.
Weston Ltd [1969] 1 WLR
847 (QB)
Confirmed the illegality of  a roulette-variant game played in a bingo club that did not offer equal chance to all the players, and where the club kept
part of  the stakes. 
Rogers v Home Secretary
[1972] 3 WLR 279 (HL)
Upheld the denial of  a bingo operator’s licence on the basis of  information contained in confidential documents, from which the Gaming Board
concluded that the applicant was of  “dubious character and reputation.” Held that Gaming Board had the right to use these documents to
determine operator suitability, and to withhold them.
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Full citation Brief summary
Wheeler v Gibbins [1970]
1 WLR 268 (QB)
Undercover police operation against a telephone link game involving 23 members’ clubs. Undercover police officers pay the entrance fee and play:
there is no check on membership. Held that persons not members or bona fide guests of  members were participating in games with the intention




SLT (Sh. Ct) 39
Upheld refusal to grant a licence for a bingo hall, on the grounds that the demand for bingo was met by existing facilities. The applicants
unsuccessfully argued that the existing premises were not providing the type and range of  facilities that they intended to offer. 
Granada Theatres Ltd v
Secretary of  State for the
Environment [1976] JPL
96 (QB)
Overturns a refusal by the licensing authority to grant an application for the conversion of  cinema into a bingo hall. The refusal was made on the
grounds that preserving the use of  those premises for a cinema was more desirable.
Walker v Leeds, Greenwich and Lewisham [1976] 3 WLR 736 (HL)




The cases focus on prize bingo, the definition of  a pleasure fair, and permits for amusements with prize machines. Ultimately held that local
authorities can not make ‘blanket resolutions’ not to grant permits for premises used for amusements with prizes (whether with or without gaming
machines). 
Tynewydd Labour WMC
and Institute Ltd v The
Commissioners [1980]
VATTR 165
HMRC claimed VAT due on admission fees charged to members in a working men’s club. The club argued that those charges were for tax-exempt
bingo sessions. HMRC argued that the admission charges had been made on days where live entertainment was also provided in the premises.
Held that members who paid the entry fees on the entertainment evenings did so to get live entertainment and bingo. Therefore, those members
considered that a part of  each entry free was for the supply of  the live entertainment. VAT was due on that money. 




Upheld local authority discretionary powers to decide on a renewal of  a bingo licence involving an inter-linked increase in amusement with prize
machine entitlements. Plausibile for authority to believe that allowing 25 gaming machines in one bingo venue would undermine the social
character of  the bingo club.
Robertson v Anderson
[2003] SLT 235 (IH)
An agreement between two women to share the national game bingo prize would be enforced by the courts, and was not subject to the rules
relating to the unenforceability of  gaming contracts.
Wilson v Burnett [2007]
EWCA Civ 1170, [2007]
All ER (D) 372
Woman who won the national game in a bingo club is sued by two acquaintances who claimed that, some days prior, the three had agreed to
share any bingo winnings over £10 pounds. Winner denies the existance of  the agreement. Appeal court uphold the lower court decison that there






In 2005 Mecca is granted a casino licence (under the 1968 Betting and Gaming Act) for a premises already licensed as a bingo premises; in 2008
it converts both licences into ones held under the 2005 Gambling Act. It subsequently applies to move the casino licence to apply to a new
premises. A rival company applies to the licensing authority to review and revoke the casino licence, on the grounds that it has not been used since
granted, and that “the continued existence of  the (casino) licence is legally incompatible with the bingo licence that exists in respect of  part of  the
same premises” (at para. 7). Appeal court agrees there was an error in law that should have been taken into account in the licensing authority’s
decision about reviewing the licence; decision sent back to the licensing authority for reconsideration.




HMRC claim a bingo company (operating 13 clubs in the UK) is liable to bingo duty on charges made for the hire of  electronic hand held devices
(“Bingo Bees”) between 2009 and 2012. Company claim that payments to use the devices are exempt, since they are not “payments … in respect
of  entitlement to participate in bingo” (at para. 3) within the relevant section of  the Betting and Gaming Duties Act 1981. Rather they are simply a
payment to use the devices. Company claim that the fees are analogous to the price paid to purchase a bingo dabber, used to cross off  numbers
on a paper ticket. Court distinguishes electronic devices from dabbers/pens since dabbers and pens are an option when playing; the electronic
device is a necessity to read the tickets loaded thereon. “The reality is that when playing electronically the electronic handheld device is physically
the “ticket”. Payment for the ticket undoubtedly falls within the ambit of  bingo duty (whilst the charges for dabbers and items such as pens that fulfil
that function do not)” (para 41). 
Cavenbridge Ltd v HMRC
[2015] UKFTT 0536 (TC)
(Appeal number:
TC/2013/7359)
Cavenbridge claim that the duty paid on bingo dabbers was wrongly applied, since they are required to participate in bingo, and optimised for
bingo, and fall within the exempt supply of  the provision of  facilities to play bingo. HMRC claim that the purchase of  a dabber/marker pen is




Gambling Commission successfully appeal against an earlier ruling that quashed their refusal to grant a bingo operator licence for Greene King
(operating c1,000 pubs). Case rests in large part on the powers of  the Commission to act as national ‘gatekeeper’ under the Gambling Act 2005
Act, by considering operating environment as part of  operator suitability. Commission’s concern was mostly with the availablility of  high stakes
gambling machines (to which licensed bingo premises are entitled) in pubs, especially re: the potential for vulnerable people to be harmed or
exploited by gambling due to the centrality of  alcohol to the environment, and the fact that gambling would be “an ancillary attraction in alcohol-led
non-bespoke gambling premises” (at para. 39). Judge holds that the 2005 Act gives the Commission power to consider matters relating to the
operating environment. The counter-argument that the Gambling Commission should limit its role to considering suitability for an operators licence
and then object individually to premises applications if  necessary, engaging with local licensing authorities on a case by case basis, is rejected:
this would require the Commission to pursue national policy objectives via “some kind of  guerilla warfare in each separate locality” (para 55). 
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If it’s a country where they have never really done
bingo, it [online bingo] is a hard sell. It’s such a
crowded marketplace with the games people are
familiar with. … For some it is, for some it’s a
huge commercial sector of course…. Generalising
it, when we reach further east in Europe, it drops
off the map. (Male, Trade Association)
The stereotypical image of  bingo players –
female, elderly and working class – was
recognised throughout our research. Many
interviewees pointed out that there is more female
participation in online bingo than in other forms of
online gambling. 
Retail (land-based bingo) is still very much an
older clientele and (we) find it very difficult to
make its proposition attractive to a younger
audience. Whereas, certainly within (our) online
bingo offering or digital bingo offering, we have 
a much younger demographic….I think there’s a
marked difference there between the two. I also
think that’s technology driven as well from a
mobile perspective, and I think it’s also heritage
driven, that a lot of young people are slightly put
off from retail bingo.…there’s a lot of stigmas
around retail bingo…. But I think when it comes
to digital bingo, it’s much more accessible to a
younger audience. (Male, Commercial Online
Bingo Operator)
Part 1: The scale of play
Bingo was sort of last to the [online] market.
(Male, Affiliate Marketer)
The International Lottery in Liechtenstein allowed
the general public to purchase lottery tickets over
the internet in 1995.1 This is reported to be the
first time the general public was able to purchase
the chance to win a prize, using real money, over
the internet. The first internet bingo website,
www.ibingo.com, opened in 1998.2 Interviewees
for this case study said that the initial online bingo
sites were North American focused; it was not
until the early 2000s that the first UK facing online
bingo sites such as www.uk-bingo.net began to
appear. By 2013 it was estimated that the Global
Gambling Revenue for online gambling in the 28
European Union (EU) Member States was €10.9
Billion.3 Of this, just over €926 Million was
attributed to online bingo.4
Online bingo is not equally popular across all 28
EU Member States. A number of  Member States
were mentioned repeatedly in relation to online
bingo during our research, including the UK,
Spain, Italy, Denmark, Portugal and Sweden.
Despite the popularity of  online bingo in these
countries it remains less important to overall
gambling revenues than other online gambling
forms, such as sports betting, casino games and
slot machines. 
You combine online and gambling, two
concepts that scare politicians everywhere,
because they are nervous about gambling
traditionally, scared about the Internet
because having control about it and all this
sort of  thing. The government is there to
control things and some things you can’t
control, [it] just touches all the wrong
buttons for them. (Male, Trade Association)
The Bingo Project
1 Robert J. Williams, Robert T. Wood and Jonathan Parke, ‘History, Current Worldwide Situation, and Concerns with Internet Gambling’ in Robert J. Williams, Robert T. Wood and
Jonathan Parke (eds) Routledge International Handbook on Internet Gambling Routledge 2012) 3.
2 Robert J. Williams, Robert T. Wood and Jonathan Parke, ‘History, Current Worldwide Situation, and Concerns with Internet Gambling’ in Robert J. Williams, Robert T. Wood and
Jonathan Parke (eds) Routledge International Handbook on Internet Gambling (Routledge 2012) 4. See https://web.archive.org/web/19981205231204/http://www.ibingo.com/ 
3 European Gaming and Betting Association, ‘Factsheet: Market Reality’ available at http://www.egba.eu/facts-and-figures/market-reality/ accessed 13 May 2016. Citing H2
Gambling Capital. 







EU Member States mentioned most frequently by our interviewees in relation to online bingo.
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The UK operators we spoke to mentioned that
roughly 60% of online bingo players were female
and that the average age was around 40. A
number of  operators spoke of  the player base 
in terms of  the UK National Readership Survey
Social Grades, with players within the C1 (lower
middle class), C2 (skilled working class), D
(working class) and E (not working) groups. 
UK operators generally positioned online bingo
players as younger than land-based players, and
noted that online players were getting younger
with the introduction of  mobile gaming. 
Looking beyond the UK, high participation rates
of female players were also observed in other
Member States. A person familiar with the Danish
online bingo market noted that the demographic
of online bingo players in Denmark was “more or
less the same” as the UK. There were around
60% female players that were “40 plus” and it was
“not a high status game.” The interviewee
emphasised, however, that 40% of the players
were male. Interestingly, a recent report from the
Spanish online gambling regulator found that over
65% of online bingo players in the jurisdiction
were male.5 A similar player demographic was
identified by someone with knowledge of  the
Swedish online bingo market. They stated that
roughly 60% of online bingo players in Sweden
were male and the average age of  players was
around 38 years old. Italy also appeared to be a
market where there were more male online bingo
players than female. 
Part 2: The law and regulation of
online bingo
Memories of pre-regulation and the Wild
West
I think that perhaps in the early days…. it
was a bit wild west. Whereas it’s got a lot
more serious. It’s got a lot more suited and
booted and leaner for me now. It’s kind of  a
lot more, serious players in the market now,
whereas back in 2000, early, early
noughties, it was kind of, there wasn’t
really…. it felt pretty maverick, a bit of
Delboy. ‘Cause now, it’s actually quite
serious. (Male, Software Provider).6
European regulation of online bingo 
The European Commission decided in 1992 
that it would not seek to submit proposals for
harmonised gambling rules. The European
Commission’s decision took into account the
principle of  subsidiarity, which stipulates that 
the EU should only regulate if  it would be more
effective than national or local level regulation.
Since then, there has been no sector-wide
harmonisation of  online gambling regulation in
the EU. There have, however, been a number of
pieces of  EU legislation that have or will impact
upon online bingo operators, players, and
regulators. For operators and players, the Unfair
Commercial Practices Directive harmonises the
regulation of  misleading and aggressive
marketing practices and thus provides important
rules for one of  the core activities of  online bingo
operators. Indeed, regulations relating to
marketing were identified as key concerns for
both operators and regulators. In addition, EU
legislation regulates in the areas of  anti-money
laundering, online dispute resolution, the fairness
of consumer contracts, and data protection, all 
of  which are applicable to the online gambling
sector. Finally, the EU legislation also requires
Member States to send notification of  changes to
online gambling regulation prior to them entering
into force. As such, EU legislation provides the
European Commission and Member States with
an important oversight role in relation to other
Member States’ online gambling regulation. 
In 2011, the European Commission published its
Online Gambling Green Paper. The Green Paper
provided a framework for debate on the
development of  online gambling in the EU and
sought responses from stakeholders. In 2012,
following the consultation on the Green Paper, 
the European Commission published its online
gambling action plan. This action plan concluded
that: 
In view of the type of challenges posed by the
development of online gambling and their
implications for each Member State it is not
possible for Member States to effectively address
these challenges alone and to provide individually
a properly regulated and sufficiently safe offer of
online gambling services.7
The Commission’s action plan proposed the
creation of  an expert group on online gambling,
increased cooperation between regulators, and a
www.kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject
5 Directorate General for the Regulation of  Gambling, ‘Report: Analysis of  the Online Player Profile’ (The Ministry of  Finance and Public Administration 2014) available at
http://www.dgojuego.minhap.gob.es/es/informe-jugador-online accessed 13 May 2016.
6 'Delboy' was a working class TV character on British television renowned for his rule-bending, can-do entrepreneurial attitude.
7 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the
Regions towards a comprehensive European framework for online gambling’ COM(2012) 596 final, 5.
focus on ensuring that Member States comply
with their obligations under EU law. Importantly,
the Commission has also sought to engage in a
‘soft’ form of  harmonisation through the
development and publication of  a non-binding
Recommendation on Consumer Protection in
Online Gambling and has proposed the
development of  common technical standards 
for online gambling equipment. 
The provision of  online gambling services falls
within the scope of  the EU’s Treaty rules relating
to the free movement of  services and the freedom
of establishment. The freedoms aim to allow
operators to freely provide services on a
temporary basis from their country of  origin to
another Member State (services) or to move on a
permanent basis to another Member State to
provide services (establishment). The Court of
Justice of  the European Union has stated that
gambling may entail certain moral, religious and
cultural aspects, involve a high risk of  crime or
fraud, and have damaging individual and social
consequences. As a result, Member States are in
principle free to regulate online gambling to
achieve certain public interest objectives such as
consumer protection, the mitigation of  problem
gambling, the prevention of  gambling becoming
a source of  private profit, and the prevention of
fraud and crime. It important to note that the use
of gambling as a means of  revenue generation
for the state or for good causes cannot be the
primary objective of  a Member State’s gambling
regulation. Furthermore, Member States must
demonstrate that their regulatory approach is
proportionate, necessary, and suitable to
achieving such aims, and that the public interest
objectives are being pursued in a consistent and
systematic manner.
National approaches to the regulation of
online bingo 
With no sector-wide harmonisation and a wide
margin of  discretion afforded to Member States in
how to regulate online gambling, the regulation of
online bingo in the EU is a patchwork of  national
regulatory regimes and approaches. The
emergence of  online gambling has challenged
not only traditional approaches taken by Member
States to gambling regulation, but also the ability
of  Member States to control the provision and
consumption of  gambling services. It also altered
regulatory assessments of  risks posed to
consumers. 
28 shades of grey
Back then [2000] it was very grey.… The
product was ahead of  the legal system. So,
back then it was only two or three places
like Curacao, Costa Rica, places like that
that had actually proactively said: “yes, we
will license online gaming”. The rest of  the
world hadn’t said: “no, you can’t” but at the
same time hadn’t said: “yes, you can. (Male,
Affiliate Marketer)
Sweden is a good market and it’s still grey,
so you can put your dot com solution into
Sweden. (Male, Software Provider)
We feel comfortable operating in Sweden.
(Male, Commercial Online Bingo Operator) 
We are very white in terms of  the country
we approach. We don’t take, if  it’s slightly
grey then we won’t touch it. (Male,
Commercial Online Bingo Operator)
Finland is meant to be closed off  to
Veikkaus [State Lottery Monopoly] but a lot
of  people still operate there. They are
obviously not marketing through TV and
radio, etc. But they are still getting online
traffic through other means. (Male, Software
Provider)
The position in relation to other jurisdictions
is they may not have, or their legislation may
not allow you to apply for a licence or the
law is really outdated and it doesn’t really
deal with it. In those instances, we adopt
what’s called a ‘country of  origin’ approach.
Obviously our main hub is in Gibraltar and
we are legal and licensed in that
jurisdiction. There’s obviously European
Union rules about the supply of  services
between Member States and having taken
legal advice and (becoming) clear on the
position in each country, we supply into a
number of  European countries from our
Gibraltar hub, into jurisdictions that don’t
have those licensed regimes and where the
law allows us to rely on EU arguments to do
so. (Male, Commercial Online Bingo
Operator)
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The last ten years has seen a number of  Member
States move to a local licence regime for online
bingo as part of  their online gambling regulation.
Such a regime requires online bingo operators to
obtain a national licence before they can offer
gambling to customers from that jurisdiction. Italy
was the first jurisdiction to move to such a regime
in 2007, with Spain, Romania, Portugal and the
United Kingdom later embracing this approach.
In contrast to the local licence regimes such as
Italy, Spain and the UK, Belgium operates what
has been called a “licence + model” where
authorisation to offer online gambling services is
dependent upon possession of  a land-based
gambling licence. 
A number of  jurisdictions have established a local
licence regime for certain categories of  online
gambling products but have reserved the
provision of  online bingo to national lottery
operators. For example, both Denmark and
France define bingo as a lottery product that 
can only be offered online by Danske Spil and
Française des Jeux (the state monopoly
providers) respectively. In Germany, too, bingo 
is characterised as a lottery game and reserved
for the state lotteries. While online gambling is
currently prohibited in the Netherlands, an
exception exists for lottery operators and charity
lotteries. Such operators are permitted to offer
lottery products online, with bingo being one such
product. Ireland currently only explicitly regulates
online betting. However, Ireland’s land-based
gambling and lotteries regulation technically also
applies to the online provision of  such services
with the practical result that online bingo can only
be offered by, or on behalf  of, charity lotteries.
Both the Netherlands and Ireland are currently in
the process of  regulating online gambling. Ireland
has proposed to allow commercial online bingo
while the Netherlands has sought to reserve
online bingo to lottery operators. 
While state monopolies for online gambling are in
decline in the EU and the European Economic
Area, a number of  jurisdictions such as Norway
and Finland still retain a state gambling monopoly
that has extended to online gambling. In Sweden,
the prevention of  gambling becoming a source of
private profit is a cornerstone of  the regulatory
regime. The result of  such an approach is that
only the state operator, Svenska Spel, and a small
number of  charity operators are permitted to offer
online bingo. 
Any discussion of  online gambling regulation in
the EU must recognise the existence of  a “grey
market” where the distinction between what is
legal and illegal is unclear, blurred or obscured. 
In Sweden, for example, the offer of  online bingo
to customers within its territory is not explicitly
prohibited, but commercial operators cannot be
licensed to offer such services. Sweden and
Ireland emerged as key “grey markets” within 
the EU while an online bingo software provider
joked that the entire EU was a “grey market”.
Operators respond differently to this lack of  clarity
depending on their own interpretations of  EU law,
and their differing appetite for regulatory and
reputational risk. 
The Bingo Project
Extract from a certification document issued by a testing house that tests the integrity of  random number
generators in online bingo. Image taken by Donal Casey. 
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Part 3: Key themes
1 The social nature of the game 
You can argue that online bingo isn’t bingo
anyway (Male Commercial Bingo Operator,
England). 
Companies that have specialised in bingo I think
have a more fundamental understanding of their
bingo customers…. I think companies that are
generic online gambling companies and have
embraced bingo as part of their suite of products
don’t have the same, how can I put it? They don’t
have the same sense of community as perhaps you
know, a mainstream bingo company would have,
because they understand the culture, the history of
bingo as a game. (Male National Regulator)
The questions of  what happens to bingo when it
moves to the online environment, and how law
and regulation deal with this transition, coloured
much of  our research. These challenges have
even made their way to the UK’s House of  Lords
during domestic debates on gambling regulation.
In March 2016, Lord Collins of  Highbury noted
that: 
One issue which concerns me, but has not been
mentioned so far, is bingo. It is a community
activity and, conducted communally, it is a very
positive thing. But online gambling has taken the
word “bingo”, adapted it and changed it out of all
recognition. It has now become a gambling
activity done in isolation, not a community one.
How do we catch up with these things? (HL Deb.
11 March 2016, col547).
The social interaction between players, the
resultant sense of  community that flows from
these interactions, and participation through
daubing and calling out to win are central
features of  land-based bingo. While there is an
assumption that online bingo is a solitary activity,
our research indicated that the chat forums and
the social interaction that they allow are crucial for
many players. Both non-profit and commercial
operators providing online bingo, across a
number of  jurisdictions, highlighted the social
nature of  online bingo as a distinctive feature
setting the game apart from other forms of  online
gambling. Many interviewees we spoke to
pointed out that the automation of  online bingo –
players’ cards are automatically daubed and
players do not need to call to win – provides more
opportunity for social interaction than land-based
bingo. Indeed it was the importance of  the social
element of  online bingo that drove its automation. 
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Chatting about community and participation in online bingo
So if  you think about desktop, the real innovation in desktop was chat, because you can’t talk
while you are playing bingo. You would be thrown out of  the bingo club if  you talk while you are
playing bingo. Obviously, chat allowed people to create a sense of  community and we spent a bit
of  time explaining the benefits of  that. But in order to chat, there was a real drive to make the play
automatic. (Male, Commercial Online Bingo Operator)
To be fair, I mean, I’ve worked, I’ve done some experience in retail bingo clubs as well, and we
spoke about community and community elements for retail and online bingo and multi-channel
elements in my past as well. And I could put an argument that online bingo is actually more
community focused. And from the community I mean that people are sharing the experience of
the game. People are talking about different things. Talking about television, talking about what’s
happening in their lives. Friendships are built online. (Male, Commercial Online Bingo Operator)
If  they have to mark their tickets, online, in the same manner (as in-hall) then there would be a lot
less chat going on…. But then again, you lose that element of  danger that if  you miss your
number or you don’t call in time and lose the prize. (Male, Commercial Online Bingo Operator) 
The chat room, I think it’s the most distinctive feature of  the game. The bingo is a very social
game, compared to all the other online games. (Female, National Lottery Operator)
I guess it’s different in the sense that no-one really dabs numbers in online, so you are really only
interested in the bit where you are getting close to the win. Whereas, land based there is more
concentration and you can’t really multi task so your focus is on the game whereas online you
can do a bit of  chat and you can play mini game slots, etc or look at Facebook and then the
bingo is just a small proportion of  your attention and just keeping an eye on it or not even
watching it. You can play and not just—it’s like the lottery, you come back and see if  you’ve won,
later on. How many people actually watch the draw compared to those that buy tickets. (Male,
Software Provider) 
I made the bingo initially. It’s many years ago, almost ten years ago. Somebody said, let’s make a
bingo without chat. And then I said, we can’t launch bingo without chat, because the chat is
everything. Bingo is just bingo. (Female, National Lottery Operator) 
I think that’s [chat] very very important. I think many of  the bingo players, they are not only
playing bingo to win a lot of  money. They are playing bingo for having one hour of  fun and chat
with other customers. Have a nice time. I think the social aspect of  bingo is very very important. I
also think that is one other reason why there’s a little bit more of  women in bingo than other
products. (Male, National Lottery Operator)
Diverse game definitions
In the early days of  online
gambling…product definition wasn’t at the
forefront of  what they were controlling
people on. So it’s much more about
payments and security and RNG (random
number generation) and telling the truth and
all of  this, rather than focusing on product. I
think to some extent that’s still in place….
There is still less emphasis on product
definition than there is perhaps in the land
based market. (Male, Commercial Online
Bingo Operator)
There [UK] is no limitation as to the number
of balls in a game and the way the tickets
need to be displayed and the total RTP
(return to player) that needs to be offered to
the player and total maximum ticket price,
minimum ticket price, minimum number of
players. It was like the world is your oyster.
(Male, Software Provider)
In some ways we didn’t significantly
distinguish between online bingo and online
casino products, because most of  the
characteristics are the same, so there’s a
random number generator. The rules of  that,
parts of  that, fairness, social responsibility
measures and so on are all very similar.
(Male, Regulator)
Bingo is considered as a casino game….
That way it’s still a concern. It’s not being
considered as an innocent game. That’s the
difference from the land based game where
everybody knows that elderly people like to
play bingo at hotels and so on. (Male,
Regulator) 
It has to be born in mind that, for us, the
core element in the bingo regulation has to
be, or the core feature of  bingo has to be,
the pari-mutuel element and the fact that the
game of  bingo is a mutual game, where
players make a deposit or participate
economically and this funds the prize. If  you
departed too much from this, you would end
up with a different animal. (Male, Regulator) 
So online bingo could be offered by pure
online operators, but online bingo as a
product was a simple transposition of  the
retail product…. [W]e had to use the same
rule for online bingo. (Male, Regulator)
3 Slots, casino and other side games
[O]nline bingo is just a portal and a gateway into
harder forms of gambling online. (Male,
Commercial Bingo Operator). 
Slots, casino games and other side games are 
a significant revenue stream for online bingo
operators. Operators reported that in some
cases bingo was run as a ‘loss leader’ and that
around 50% of  their revenues were generated
through slots, casino and side games. Most
commercial, and some non-profit, online bingo
operators offer such games. Many of  the online
operators interviewed spoke candidly about the
importance of  these games for the online bingo
business model and drew comparisons with the
use of  slot machines in the retail bingo sector in
the UK. Moreover, a number of  the regulators
interviewed drew attention to the use of  side
games by online bingo operators.
Spain provides an interesting example of  how
the importance of  side games for revenue, and
the mingling of  games, can impact regulation.
When Spain initially introduced a local licensing
regime for online gambling it did not allow online
slot machines. However, in the last year Spain
has introduced regulations for the provision of
online slot machines. An interviewee stated that
the reason for this change was a realisation that
online gambling operators needed “a robust and
synergic portfolio of  products”. Indeed, a
software supplier noted that the Spanish online
bingo market hadn’t taken off  because it was
only recently that operators could legally offer
online slots. Furthermore, a recent study
undertaken by the Spanish regulator showed that
a high proportion of  online bingo players were
also playing casino games such as roulette and
blackjack.9 An interviewee indicated that the
relationship between online bingo and casino
games, and recognition that such games are
available on online bingo sites, drove the
reconsideration of  how the advertising of  online
bingo should be regulated. While the advertising
of  bingo had previously been regulated in the
same way as lottery products, proposed
regulations will treat online bingo in a similar
manner to casino games. Thus, the relationship
between casino games and online bingo, and the
mingling of  games on online bingo sites, led to
the rethinking of  a “bingo exception” in Spain’s
gambling advertising regulation. 
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2 Defining the game 
The move to the online environment not only
complicates the distinctiveness of  the game; it
also challenges how regulators seek to regulate
play. In particular, the move to the online
environment raises the question of  how to
regulate a game that, at its core, is just a
randomly generated set of  online numbers
paying out winners automatically, but which may
have a long land-based tradition and approach 
to regulation. While some Member States have
drawn upon their understanding of  land-based
bingo in regulating its online mechanics, others
have allowed a more flexible approach to how the
game can be run. In the UK, for example, the
Gambling Commission’s 2014 guidance on What
constitutes bingo8 incorporates components of
online play, such as the ability to win without
calling out to stop play. By contrast, both Spain
and Italy drew directly from their land-based
regulation when developing their online bingo
regulation. In Italy, only 90 ball bingo is allowed
and prizes can only be awarded for the first line
and full card. Spain only allowed for 90, 80 and
75 ball bingo and requires online bingo to be
strictly pari-mutuel (where prizes come directly
from the common pool of  money wagered in a
particular bingo game only).
Despite the role that land-based regulations play
in defining online bingo in certain jurisdictions, 
a number of  interviewees highlighted how, as
markets open, pressure increases to relax rules
on game definition. As jurisdictions that license
online bingo seek to both attract players away
from unregulated operators, and create an
attractive regulatory environment for online bingo
operators, there is a trend away from prescriptive
rules relating to game mechanics. In 2013, Spain
relaxed its regulations on the variations of  the
game that can be offered, and Italy has proposed
amended regulations that offer a broader
definition of  bingo, not restricted to 90 ball play. 
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9 Directorate General for the Regulation of  Gambling, ‘Report: Analysis of  the Online Player Profile’ (The Ministry of  Finance and Public Administration
2014) 32. Available at http://www.dgojuego.minhap.gob.es/es/informe-jugador-online accessed 13 May 2016.
8 Gambling Commission. (2014). What constitutes bingo? (London: Stationary Office), s.1.1; quoting s. 363 of  the Gambling Act 2005.
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The use of  online bingo as a ‘gateway’ to offering
slots, casino games, and side games, and the
mingling of  these forms of  gambling on some
sites, challenges how we perceive online bingo.
The potential for bingo to be an ‘alibi’ or
camouflage for other forms of  gambling leads
some to challenge the perception that bingo is a
gentler, less risky form of  online play. 
Online bingo and slot machines: views from
interviewees
Quite a lot of  people play bingo and slots
and casino games, but if  you are just
playing bingo it’s actually probably quite
hard to spend too much money too quickly,
because it’s only one game every six
minutes or five minutes. (Male, Commercial
Online Bingo Operator) 
People say they are only offering bingo but
they are also offering roulette. There is 1p
cards at bingo, but people are staking £10
on roulette games and games of  black jack
and slots. Bingo operators often can’t say,
we are just a bingo operator and this is a
less harmful form of  gambling, because
they are offering repetitive RNG [random
number generator] based games alongside
this that don’t have any of  the
characteristics that make bingo more social
and slow and less likely to cause significant
harm. (Male, Regulator)
It’s [slot machines] critical in most
instances. I think it’s where the money is
made. Customers will come in and play
bingo. Most companies actually – and we
are included – operate bingo pretty much at
a loss. So bingo itself  does not make
money. It just sits there and it draws
customers in to play bingo and it’s
community-led and it’s experiential and then
they go and they play slots around the
bingo and that’s where the money is made.
(Male, Software Provider)
Whilst there are many many thousands of
bingo players, the bingo, the online bingo
model is remarkably similar to the offline
bingo model in that the bingo game can be
a loss leader or making a modest profit, but
because the gaps in the game and the
distractions of  slots and other games and
the cross selling of  other products, it’s
essentially used as a marketing vehicle.
(Male, Commercial Online Bingo Operator) 
4 Lotteries, charities and online bingo
One of  the key themes that emerged from our
research is the use of  online bingo as a means 
of  revenue generation by states and by the third
sector. Member states have taken varied
regulatory approaches to this issue. As a result of
bingo’s importance for some state lotteries and
charitable organisations, in some places within
the EU online bingo has been a focal point of
contestation in the process of  liberalisation and
commercialisation of  online gambling. 
Many interviewees noted the similarity between
bingo and lotteries, and some claimed that online
bingo was “just” a type of  lottery. A number of
Member States have categorised bingo as a
lottery product that may only be offered by either
state or charitable lottery operators. Denmark was
one of  the first EU Member States to liberalise its
online gambling market. In so doing, however,
Denmark defined bingo as a lottery product. The
provision of  lottery products is reserved to the
national lottery operator Danske Spil. An
interviewee indicated that although industry
actors wanted, and indeed still do want, online
bingo to be commercialised in Denmark,
decision-making about the law and policy
framework was driven by non-profit interests.
Similarly, although France liberalised some forms
of online gambling, bingo is characterised as a
lottery product and can only be offered by the
national lottery operator, Française des Jeux.
Denmark and France provide important examples
of how regulation can be used by Member States
to cement a relationship between lotteries and
bingo, including in order that online bingo
provides direct revenue to states. 
Online bingo and slot machines (continued)
I think definitely the ability for someone to
lose a lot of  money on bingo has increased
because of  slots. So when I started, you
couldn’t spend a lot of  money on bingo,
really. It was a slow game. The tickets were
quite cheap and that kind of  stuff, whereas
now, you can play a lot of  slot machines.
You can spend a lot of  money very quickly. I
think that’s something we are very
conscious of. We have to be very nervous
about that. (Male, Commercial Online Bingo
Operator) 
In addition to national lottery operators, many
charities also offer online bingo. For example,
Marie Curie (a cancer charity) offered online
bingo in the UK up until this year; Folkspel (a
group of  charities including the National Sports
Association and the Breast Cancer Association)
offer online bingo in Sweden; and Rehab Lottery
(helping people with disabilities) offers online
bingo in Ireland. The People’s Post Code Lottery
(whose beneficiaries include groups such as the
Dogs Trust and the World Wildlife Fund) operates
online bingo in the UK, Sweden, and the
Netherlands. 
Interestingly, both Ireland and the Netherlands are
in the process of  regulating online gambling. One
key issue that has emerged during these
processes is whether the online bingo market
should be opened to commercial operators in a
similar way to other forms of  online gambling.
Both jurisdictions currently class bingo as a
lottery product, which can only be provided by
certain charities and non-commercial operators.
Ireland’s proposed Gambling Control Bill
indicates that the government intends to move
away from the current situation and
commercialise the online bingo sector. By
contrast, proposed regulations in the Netherlands
will not liberalise the lottery market and will treat
bingo as a lottery product. 
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CHAPTER 4: REGULATION ON ONLINE
BINGO IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Part 5: Policy recommendations
Representation of bingo at the European
level 
Our research shows the absence of  bingo from
discussions of  online gambling at the EU level.
Bingo is largely subsumed within discussions of
online gambling, lotteries, or games of  chance in
general. With limited exception, the Court of
Justice of  the EU has tended to speak about
online gambling as a singular form of  gambling,
and has mentioned bingo only in passing when
discussing games of  chance. A similar approach
is evident in the political debates, and policy
documents, of  the European Commission, the
European Parliament, and the Council of  the
European Union. When different forms of
gambling are distinguished by European
institutions, it is largely with reference to lotteries
and sports betting. 
Online bingo is less economically significant than
other forms of  commercial gambling (such as
sports betting), and state operated gambling
(such as lotteries). State lotteries are particularly
well represented at the EU level, and constitute a
powerful lobbying force. Furthermore bingo is not
universally popular in all Member States, unlike
more widely available forms of  gambling such 
as sports betting and lotteries. These factors
contribute to the absence of  bingo from EU 
level discussions about gambling. 
However, if  there is something distinctive about
online bingo that sets it apart from other forms of
online gambling – and this research suggests that
there is – in our view policy makers and regulators
need to consider how the game could be better
represented in policy debates at the EU level.
More comprehensive outreach with stakeholders,
ranging from large commercial operators that use
proprietary software to small charities, would help
improve the depth of  debate about the
distinctiveness of  the game and the effectiveness
of supranational regulations currently impacting
operators and players. 
Recognising the importance of bingo for
charities
The importance of  gambling in fund raising for
good causes and broader welfare objectives has
been recognised at the EU level, albeit in a limited
way. This recognition has occurred in EU case
law, political debates, and policy documents 
from EU institutions such as the European
Commission, the European Parliament and the
Council of  the European Union. 
However, despite frequent references to “other
games of  chance” within these fora, lotteries and
sports betting dominate such debates. In turn, at
the Member State level, discussions around the
role that online gambling plays in fundraising are
dominated by lotteries, and are largely framed
around the “either/or” choice of  opening or
Online bingo and lotteries: views from
interviewees
The perception of  bingo is obviously that it’s a
softer, more acceptable form of  gambling and
maybe there isn’t the same societal taboo that
there might be about casino or table games.
So the lotteries think well, if  we are going to
enter this market we don’t want to cannibalise
or piss off  customers we’ve already got or
create a perception that we are some sort of
hard gaming companies. So actually, the way
we could do that is going to enter through
bingo. (Male, Software Provider)
Everybody knows in the Netherlands that
lobbying from current incumbents and
lobbying from the good causes has played a
significant role, because they see a threat that
online gambling is expected to be regulated
…. For some games it’s clear that it will be
regulated [licensed]: sport betting, poker,
casino games. For some games it’s clear that
it will still remain illegal online like the lottery.
But for bingo it’s not clear. (Female, Regulator)
I mean, frankly in my experience, most
companies have the same sort of  mindset,
including lottery companies who I’m
particularly critical of, because they try and
dress up their activities in a way that you
know, makes them look as if  they are just
doing something for the public good. But in
fact [they] are increasingly, through their
lobbying activities, being enabled to provide a
range, a whole range of  mainstream, really
mainstream gambling activities under the
banner of  lottery. So I don’t buy the argument
that lotteries are more benign. (Male,
Responsible Gambling Consultant)
[The] Danish government wanted to channel
unlicensed gambling into (a) licensed
regulators framework. It decided to go ahead
and open a multi-licensing regime, but only for
online betting, for online casinos and online
poker, and there were discussions about
online bingo. Obviously the industry wanted
online bingo to be part of  the online reform
and to be privatised, but other stakeholders
thought that bingo should be kept in the
monopoly with the lottery games and that was
the outcome. (Male, Trade Association)
When the negotiations take place if  there’s
any sort of  give, often it’s the bingo that is not
allowed to be licensable to private companies
first. But that’s where the lotteries would see
themselves moving to next if  they moved
anywhere. (Male, Commercial Online Bingo
Operator) 
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Charitable donations are a key feature of  some commercial online bingo companies, as in this example of  a
UK-based site raising money for veterans. Image taken by Donal Casey.
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closing markets for particular gambling services
to competition. The cases of  Ireland and the
Netherlands discussed above provide
contemporary examples of  such discussions. 
In our view policymakers and regulators should
consider giving greater consideration – at the EU
and Member State level – to the fundraising role
that online bingo does and could play for third
sector organisations, and to exploring how such
organisations could be supported in offering
services. In particular, as Member States move
towards liberalisation of  online gambling,
stakeholders should consider how licensing
requirements can be used to better harness
market gatekeepers, such as software and
network providers, for use by non-profit
organisations, in order to open up more space for
the third sector within newly-competitive online
markets.
At the EU level, this could involve the creation of
more space for discussions around the important
role that gambling plays as a means of  revenue
generation for third sector organisations, and
more explicit inclusion of  bingo in such
discussions. At the Member State level,
stakeholders should consider how third sector
organisations that wish to use online bingo as a
means of  fundraising could be better supported
in so doing. Perhaps policymakers could consider
incentivising software providers to work more
effectively with small non-profit organisations
wishing to offer online bingo but lacking the
technical expertise, for example. 
Expanding the concept of fairness within
online gambling regulation
The focus of  EU level discussions on consumer
protection in online gambling has been on issues
such as problem gambling, underage gambling,
and responsible gambling. Greater attention
could be paid to fairness. 
Along with ensuring a minimum level of  safety in
consumer markets, fairness has emerged as a
central principle of  the EU’s consumer protection
regulation. Both the Unfair Contract Terms
Directive and the Unfair Commercial Practices
Directive seek to embed fairness in Member
States’ consumer regulation. Despite this, fairness
is rarely mentioned in discussions at the EU level
in relation to online gambling. For example, the
European Commission’s Green Paper and its
Action Plan on online gambling are largely silent
on the issue of  fairness and mention it only in
relation to sports betting. The absence of  fairness
from such discussions is in stark contrast to the
prominent role that problem gambling plays in EU
debates and policy discussions, and in “soft” (not
legally binding) forms of  harmonisation such as
the European Commission’s recommendation on
principles for the protection of  consumers and
players of  online gambling services. 
The requirement that online gambling services,
including online bingos, are offered in a fair and
transparent manner was mentioned by most
regulators and operators as an important
component of  current approaches to gambling
regulation in Member States. It is also a key
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concern of  players. However, in many cases
fairness appears in regulations only in relation 
to the integrity of  the random number generator,
and transparency obligations. 
Nevertheless, some interviewees spoke about
fairness in broader terms and in ways not
mandated by regulation. They mentioned issues
such as ensuring a high return of  money
wagered back to players, monitoring average
player loss, fair wagering requirements, and
ensuring quick and easy withdrawal of  winnings.
These stakeholders talked about substantive
fairness in online bingo in ways that shifted focus
away from the responsibility of  the player to be
aware of  the terms under which the game was
offered, to the responsibility of  the gambling
service provider.
In line with this approach, stakeholders should
consider whether, and to what extent, a minimum
level of  substantive fairness should be embedded
in Member States’ online gambling regulation,
and whether the EU can and should play a role in
such a process. Existing EU consumer protection
legislation, such as that mentioned above,
outlines broad concepts of  fairness and may
provide a spring board for such discussions.
Furthermore, existing fora such as the European
Commission’s Expert Group on Gambling
Services could provide space for discussions of
how the concepts of  substantive fairness could
have concrete application in the online gambling
sector. 
A screenshot from an internet search engine, suggesting player concern with the fairness of  online bingo.
Image taken by Donal Casey.
58
CHAPTER 4: REGULATION ON ONLINE
BINGO IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Top 22 European Union-level cases on the regulation of online bingo
Unlike with the other three case studies in our research, there is no clear line of  legal cases on online bingo regulation at the European level. However there
are many cases dealing with on-line gambling that impact online bingo.
NB: CJEU = the Court of  Justice of  the European Union. The CJEU “interprets EU law to make sure it is applied in the same way in all EU countries, and
settles legal disputes between national governments and EU institutions. It can also, in certain circumstances, be used by individuals, companies or
organisations to take action against an EU institution, if  they feel it has somehow infringed their rights.” (http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-
justice/index_en.htm, original emphasis).1
EFTA court = the Court of  Justice of  the European Free Trade Association. This has jurisdiction over the three states (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway)
that are signatories to the European Free Trade Agreement and parties to the European Economic Area Agreement, which guarantees the free movement of
people, services and capital. These three states are not members of  the European Union. 
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UK legislation prohibited the importation of  lottery tickets and promotional material relating to lotteries. Held by the CJEU that lotteries were a
service for the purpose of  the EU Treaty and the prohibition on the importation of  tickets and promotional material from other Member States
constituted an obstacle to the free movement of  services. However, given the peculiar nature of  lotteries, Member States could restrict the provision
of lottery services from other Member States given the concerns of  social policy and the prevention of  fraud. 
Case C-124-97 Läärä
1999
Finnish legislation granted monopoly rights for the operation of  slot machines. Held by the CJEU that the provisions relating to freedom to provide
services did not preclude national legislation that granted exclusive rights for the operation of  slot machines given that such regulation sought to
achieve public interest objectives such as the protection of  consumers, the mitigation of  problem gambling and the prevention of  crime and fraud. 
Case C-67-98 Zenatti
1999
Italian legislation restricted betting on sports events to events supervised by the National Olympic Committee and the National Union for the
Improvement of  Horse Breeds. Held by the CJEU that Member States may restrict the free provision of  sports services by granting special or




The case concerned the regulation of  the Italian sports betting market (see Zenatti above). Held by the CJEU that while Member States are free to
set the objectives of  their gambling regulation, they must seek to achieve those objectives in a consistent and systematic way. In this case, although
the Italian legislation had the stated objective of  reducing gambling opportunities, the Italian state had encouraged participation in gambling and
engaged in the expansion of  the national sports betting market in order increase tax revenues. 
Case C-42-02 Lindman
2003
Under Finnish law, winnings from games of  chance conducted in Finland were exempt from Finnish income tax while winnings from games of
chance conducted in other Members States were subject to Finnish income tax. Held by the CJEU that such a scheme directly discriminated
based upon the nationality of  the service provider and is prohibited by the Treaty. The Finnish government had failed to provide evidence as to the
appropriateness and proportionality of  the discriminatory tax regime. 
Case C-338-04 Placanica
2007
Italian sports betting legislation had the effect of  prohibiting gambling operators that were quoted on regulated markets such as the London Stock
exchange from becoming licensed or authorised to offer services in Italy. Held by the CJEU that it was for the Italian courts to determine whether
the licensing system genuinely contributed to the objective of  preventing fraud or crime. Member States are prohibited from excluding as operators
companies whose shares are quoted on the regulated markets, and Member States may not impose criminal penalties on operators that offer
gambling services without a licence or authorisation where those operators are unable to obtain a licence or authorisation because of  national law
that is in breach of  EU law.
Case E-3-06 Ladbrokes
2007
Ladbrokes challenged three decisions to reject its application to offer online and offline gambling services in Norway. In Norway certain forms of
gambling could only be offered by the State monopoly while other forms of  gambling, such as betting on horse races, could be offered by non-
profit organisations. The EFTA court held that Member States could grant exclusive rights to offer gambling services in order to achieve social




Norway amended its regulations with the aim of  reducing the number of  gaming machines. It created a state monopoly for operating the machines.
The EFTA Court held that the exclusive rights system that was introduced in Norway was a more effective means of  achieving the social protection




Portuguese regulation granted Santa Casa, a non-profit organisation, the exclusive right to offer lottery and sports betting services, including via
electronic means. Held by the CJEU that Member States may extend exclusive rights to offer gambling services to online gambling. Furthermore,
Member States may prohibit online gambling operators licensed in another Member State from offering games of  chance over the internet within
their territory. 
1 Last accessed 10 May 2016.
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German regulation granted monopoly rights to provide lotteries and sports betting. The German courts asked the CJEU whether national gambling
regulation that was in breach of  European Union law could still be applied during the transitional period, before being amended. The CJEU held




German regulation granted monopoly rights to provide lotteries and sports betting. Held by the CJEU that Member States may opt for a system of
monopoly rights to ensure a high level of  consumer protection. However, Member States must ensure that the monopoly does in fact pursue this
objective in a consistent and systematic manner. In this regard, the monopoly could not engage in advertising that sought to encourage or
stimulate participation in gambling or expand into offering “riskier” games in order to maximise its profits. 
Case C-447-08 Sjöberg &
Gerdin
2010
Swedish legislation prohibited the advertising of  unlicensed gambling offered by operators based in Sweden, as well as gambling that was
operated from other Member States. The CJEU held that Member States could restrict the advertising of  commercial gambling in order to prevent
gambling becoming a source of  private profit. However Member States could not have stricter penalties for unlawfully advertising gambling offered
from another Member State than for unlawfully advertising unlicensed gambling offered from that territory. 
Case C-203-08 Betfair
2010
The Netherlands provided monopoly rights to offer and promote games of  chance to customers in the Netherlands, including games offered over




German regulation granted monopoly rights to provide lotteries and sports betting. The CJEU was asked whether Germany was required to allow
an operator licensed in Gibraltar to offer betting services in Germany. The CJEU held that Member States are not required to recognise
authorisations to offer gambling services issued by another Member State. 
Case C-64-08 Engelmann
2010
Austrian legislation required that only public limited companies established in Austria could apply for a casino licence. The CJEU held that such a
requirement constituted discrimination based upon the nationality of  a company. Such a restriction on where companies could be established








Austrian legislation reserved to the Austrian state the right to offer gambling services. The Austrian state granted only one concession to offer
casino games over the internet. The CJEU held that a system of monopoly rights can be justified in order to ensure a high level of  consumer
protection, but the monopoly operator must operate in a way that is consistent with such an objective. Furthermore, the CJEU held that Member
States are not required to recognise authorisations granted by another Member State. 
Case C-212-08 Zeturf
2011
France granted monopoly rights to offer betting services for horseracing in France. The CJEU held that a system of monopoly rights can only be
justified where Member States seek a particularly high level of  consumer protection owing to the restrictive effect of  such a system on the provision




Greece granted monopoly rights to OPAP to operate games of  chance and certain forms of  betting. The stated object of  the monopoly system was
to restrict the supply of  gambling and to combat criminality in the operation of  games of  chance. The CJEU held that Member States may not grant
exclusive rights to operate games of  chance where the legislation does not genuinely seek to limit gambling opportunities in a consistent or
systematic manner and where the public authorities do not have strict control over the monopoly operator’s expansion. At the time, OPAP had
expanded to offer games of  chance in Cyprus. 
Case C-156-13 Digibet
2014
The case concerned the legality of  an operator licensed in Gibraltar offering games of  chance and sports betting over the internet to customers in
Germany. The provision of  games of  chance via the internet was prohibited in all but one of  Germany’s states. Held by the CJEU that the Treaty did
not preclude such a situation provided the legislation was proportionate.
Case T 721-14 Belgium v
Commission
2015
Belgium sought to annul a European Commission Recommendation on principles for the protection of  consumers and players of  online gambling
services and for the prevention of  underage gambling online. Belgium argued that the Commission did not have the power to adopt a legally
binding instrument that sought to harmonise Member States’ online gambling regulation. The CJEU held that the Recommendation was not legally




Germany introduced a licensing system for sports betting, having previously had a system of monopoly rights. Germany’s previous monopoly
system had been held to be contrary to European Union law (see Case C-409-06 Winner Wetten;Case C-316-07 Markus Stoß and Case C-46-08
Carmen Media Group). No licences had been granted and the German court observed that the previous monopoly system was, in practice, still in
effect. Held by the CJEU that Member States may not criminally prosecute an operator, licensed in another Member State, for unlawfully offering
gambling services if  the existing monopoly rights system is ruled contrary to European Union law by the national courts.
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2 The need for context-specific
consideration of whether non-
commercial actors should be
privileged as bingo operators by
regulators, taking into account how
such actors use proceeds, how they
are connected to players as donors,
and how they mobilise volunteers.  
Across all four case studies, bingo has benefited
from its association with fundraising for good
causes. This has occurred because it is linked,
variously, to charitable lotteries (online EU);
working class associational forms (England and
Wales); service clubs (Canada), and sports
associations (Brazil). Using Sytze Kingma’s notion
of the charitable alibi for gambling law reform,2
we can say that the charitable alibi has been
essential for bingo’s legalisation. Unlike with
lotteries that were often legalised to increase
revenues for states, non-profit groups are typically
involved in directly running games rather than
simply receiving a share of  profits, and they have
often taken very active roles in lobbying for law
reform and protecting their interests. 
Although non-commercial actors are central
stakeholders in bingo, their centrality to regulation
varies considerably, within and across case
studies. In Brazil non-profit third sector partners
did not play a visible role in policy debates 
during the legalised bingo era. In England and
Wales working men’s clubs have diminished 
in significance within debates about bingo
regulation: the commercial sector is the key voice
nowadays. In BC charities were eclipsed as the
actors conducting and managing games in
association bingo halls after the province took
over that role, making the survival of
independently licensed charitable bingos
conducted in a charity’s own premises especially
significant. In Ontario, in contrast, charities have
partnered with the province and commercial
gaming service providers within ‘c-gaming’
facilities, where the association of  bingo with
volunteering and local-level benefit to
communities is a key defining feature. In the EU,
online bingo is used by a number of  charitable
lotteries to raise funds. These relatively large
organisations have a strong lobbying presence at
the national level, especially in countries such as
the Netherlands and Ireland. They are also
represented at the European level by
organisations such as the Association of  Charity
Lotteries in the EU. By contrast, smaller charitable
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CHAPTER 5: SOME LESSONS FROM
THE COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
1 The value of expanding the concept
of ‘responsible gambling’ to better
reflect fairness for players and workers
As several researchers have argued1 problems
associated with gambling consumption are over-
whelmingly discussed in languages borrowed
from psychological literatures on addiction. This
has contributed to a policy and research
landscape that is heavily skewed towards
medicalised or therapeutic interventions. It 
also results in the privileging of  increasingly
formalised measures that enable individuals 
who are considered vulnerable to harm through
excessive consumption to voluntarily abstain from
play. 
Our analysis of  bingo confirms the need to
expand this addictions-focused approach.
Whether framed in terms of  problem or at risk
gambling (England and Wales), problem
gambling or gambling addiction (EU); or
responsible gambling (Canada), consumer
protection initiatives in legal bingo are
overwhelmingly focused on treatment services
and self-exclusion policies for the very small
minority of  people who identify as being unable 
to control their gambling (and who usually exhibit
this problem through excessive spending on
products other than bingo). In Brazil, where bingo
is illegal, we encountered frequent discussions
about the compulsivity of  its players. 
In the case studies where bingo is legal,
preventative measures intended to keep players
responsible are prioritised, for example via
information leaflets to overcome myths, posters in
toilets, or notifications about time spent playing.
Fairness is often only mentioned with reference to
equipment standards (such as those affecting the
generation of  bingo numbers), or transparency
procedures such as the public posting of  game
rules. More substantive concerns about the
fairness of  the game, and especially the rates of
return to players, are minimised in both the EU
and Canada. The assumption is that informed
players can choose whether or not to accept the
operator’s game terms. In England and Wales
(where all stakes have to be returned to players)
regulations focus on the need to display
participation fees, rather than on limiting what 
can be charged to participate as a proportion 
of  stakes. 
The predominant focus of  responsible gambling
policies on problem and at risk gamblers makes 
it more difficult to hear, and respond to, the
interests of  workers (paid and unpaid) in bingo. In
the law and policy debates of  many jurisdictions
psychologists are far more likely to be consulted
by gambling regulators than organisations
representing gambling workers. The under-
inclusive understanding of  who counts as an
expert creates a cycle whereby policy is more
and more driven by psychological literatures on
addiction (where bingo is rarely a focus), and less
and less reflective of  experiences on the ground.
In the England and Wales and Canadian case
studies, some employees expressed anxiety
about measures to prevent excessive play, and
worried that they would be held responsible in 
the event of  a problem. In Canada, some 
unpaid workers spoke of  feeling coerced into
volunteering in bingos as a condition of  receiving
services for their family members. It is necessary
to significantly expand debates about responsible
gambling to allow such concerns, and such
expert stakeholders, to feature more prominently
in policy debates. 
When we began the research for the Bingo Project, we obviously wanted to learn about bingo
regulation in our four case studies. But we also aimed to contribute some new perspectives to
debates about gambling regulation. In particular, we hoped that bingo could offer a distinctive
lens on some long-standing concerns within law, politics, and political economy, including around
the role of  the state; the role of  commercial and non-commercial actors; and the role of  gender
in regulating chance. In this chapter we highlight some of  the ways in which our findings, across
all the case studies, might add to those existing debates. 
1 See for example Reith, G. 2007. Gambling and the Contradictions of  Consumption: A Genealogy of  the ‘Pathological’ Subject. American Behavioral Scientist 51(1): 33–55;
Nicoll F. 2012. ‘Bad habits: Discourses of  addiction and the racial politics of  intervention.’ Griffith Law Review 21(1): 164–189. Cassidy, Loussouarn and Pisac. 2013. Fair Game:
Producing Gambling Research (The Goldsmith report). London: Goldsmiths. 
2 Kingma, S. 2008. ‘The liberalization and (re) regulation of  Dutch gambling markets: National consequences of  the changing European context.’ Regulation & Governance 2(4),
p.448.
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organisations do not appear to be key
stakeholders in discussions around online
gambling regulation. 
One response to that divergence – one we heard
from some interviewees and that was reflected in
an early report from Ontario on bingo regulation in
1990 – is to put charities ‘back in the driving
seat’3, via better support for their attempts to use
equal chance gaming for good causes. For
example, some Canadian interviewees favoured
rules to ensure that private gaming providers and
provincial governments were not capitalising on
the charitable connotations of  bingo without
giving a correspondingly high level of  control to
charities to determine the use of  proceeds. In
England, we interviewed one charitable
organisation that had found online bingo to 
be more successful than traditional raffles at
reaching women, and younger people, as donors.
However charity sector bodies did not have bingo
on their radar, and the national gambling regulator
primarily consulted with charities in relation to
lotteries. As a result it was challenging to
disseminate that organisation’s experiences within
the sector. Its online bingo site has since shut
down. 
Notwithstanding such examples, our case studies
of bingo regulation do not lead us to recommend
a blanket restoration, or bolstering, of  the
charitable role in gambling. A key lesson from our
research is that the non-commercial sector is
diverse, and that its privileged promotion should
be considered carefully. In particular charities
should not be assumed to represent ‘the
community’ or ‘the public’ interest in gambling,
without further exploration of  how they use
proceeds, how they are connected to players 
as donors, and how they mobilise volunteers. 
For example, some good causes funded using
bingo proceeds are closely linked to players as
donors. This is especially true of  members’ clubs,
many religious organisations, and First Nations
communities. In such instances bingo is a form 
of  mutual-aid style fundraising for a group with a
distinctive class-, gender-, nation-, and age–based
demographic. In our view there are good reasons
for regulators to extend privileged treatment and
The Bingo Project
support for gambling as a mutual aid form of
fundraising, including the fact that it has a long
history in many jurisdictions, is rarely a compliance
concern, and is run on such a small scale that
transparency is relatively straightforward to ensure.
Bingo players can intuitively judge the fairness of
the returns being made via prizes if  the scale of
play is limited – something that can not be said of
large scale lotteries. 
However in other instances charities may have
almost no connection to players. Under such
circumstances, the automatic privileging of  non-
commercial interests needs further exploration. For
example, players may not be particularly interested
in donating to charity: they may simply wish to play
bingo and socialise with their friends and family. In
some places they may be required to do so under
arrangements that offer low prize boards in order
that funds are set aside for organisations that are
very distant from their own communities, as when
gaming proceeds are extracted from players in
bingo halls located in poor neighbourhoods to fund
middle class sports clubs or school associations in
other areas. 
3 Charitable gaming: putting the charities back in the driver’s seat. Ministry of  Consumer and Commercial Relations. Toronto. 1990.
Older people playing card bingo in Brazil. Image credit: Senior week – bingo at the senior’s day centre. www.flickr.com/photos/prefvotuporanga/ ASCOM Prefeitura de Votuporanga 
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Relatedly, if  use of  volunteer labour is required for
organisations to access charitable exemptions
from gambling prohibitions (as in Canada, and
many parts of  the US), volunteers need to be
consulted as a separate group of  regulatory
stakeholders. Charities should not be assumed to
speak for them. 
A further example of  the importance of  exploring
charitable gaming in greater depth can be found
in the case of  online bingo. In general the very
large scale of  play involved in online bingo, and
the relative anonymity of  players, means that it not
generally used as a means of  mutual aid style
fundraising. However online bingo is offered by 
a number of  large scale charity lotteries in EU
Member States, and recent debates in Ireland
and the Netherlands shed light on the important
role bingo plays in charity fund raising activities.
The level of  transparency with regard to how
donations are used varies significantly, as does
the disclosure of  the profits made through
partnerships with commercial operators. 
3 The need for rules that reflect the
distinctiveness of bingo as a game,
and a playing environment
“Some of them look at bingo and there is this kind
of… it’s patronising. It’s slightly insulting and
disrespectful, because in their minds it’s a poor
person’s casino, which of course it’s nothing but. I
just wonder to what extent that influences some of
the regulators [3 second pause]. What I mean by
that is that they don’t spend enough time or they
don’t really get to know the product.” (male,
commercial bingo operator, England). 
Do players, operators, politicians, regulators,
judges, and the wider public see bingo as a
distinctive gambling sector? If  so, what impact
should this have on how bingo is regulated?
These were key, recurring questions from our
research, and they relate to broader debates
about the harmonisation of  regulation across
gambling sectors. 
There are many topics that came up in our case
studies under the theme of  standardisation,
including taxation rates on bingo in relation to
other sectors (England and Wales); differences in
regulation between online and land based bingo
(EU; England and Wales); and perceived
inequalities in the ability to offer the same range
of ancillary gaming products as can be offered
by operators of  casinos, or race tracks (Canada).
Bingo is typically seen as distinctive because of
the player demographic (in terms of  age, class,
gender, First Nations status, or sometimes all four)
and the key role of  the game in non-commercial
and religious spaces. However the game itself  is
also seen as distinctive due to its association with
soft, low-stakes social play: in fact some players
don’t regard bingo as a form of  gambling. 
Some stakeholders we interviewed wished
regulators to take more account of  bingo’s
distinctiveness. They tended to want regulators 
to get to know the game, and its distinctive
atmosphere, better. Others felt that bingo’s
survival depended on the enhanced ability 
of  operators to offer other forms of  gaming
(especially electronic bingo and gambling
machines). As a result those interviewees were
generally supportive of  standardised rules and
procedures across gambling sectors (eg to
prevent underage access to halls; to introduce
responsible gaming measures). 
It is possible – and we think valuable – for
regulators to avoid either/or decisions on this
question. Specifically, while it is true that bingo
operators in all four of  the case studies rely for
their profitability on ‘harder’ forms of  gambling, 
in three of  those case studies people can choose
to legally engage in those forms in other
environments. Bingo is thus not simply a soft and
social ‘mask’ for harder forms of  gambling; there
is something attractive about the bingo
environment (online or land-based), even if  some
customers subsequently play slot machines
there.
With this in mind, it would make sense to regulate
‘harder’ gaming products on offer in bingo
facilities as they are regulated in other gaming
environments, and to ensure the centrality of
bingo to a bingo facility (eg by looking carefully 
at the use of  space, the times in which bingo is
available, the prominence of  bingo versus
machines in advertisements for the facility, etc).
Furthermore, consideration should also be given
to whether and how such approaches to
regulation could be implemented in the online
environment. 
However our research suggests that the
imposition of  generic rules treating bingo
premises or websites as if  they were casinos is
unwise. As is clear from the example of  ‘dusting
off’ rules in BC, casinos are poor generic models
for risk-based regulatory standards across
gambling sectors. When such standards were
‘cut and pasted’ into provincially-run bingo
facilities they lead to inefficiencies; unnecessary
burdens on operators; and culture clashes. They
also harmed the distinctive appeal of  bingo, for
paid and unpaid workers and for players. 
www.kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject
4 See for example Cassidy, R., A. Pisac and C. Loussouarn (Eds.). 2012. Qualitative research in gambling. Exploring the production and consumption of  risk. London: Routledge;
Kingma, S. (Ed.). 2010. Global gambling: Cultural perspectives on gambling organizations. London: Routledge. 
We have encountered similar ‘culture clashes’
around policies that seek to move customers
away from cash and into account–based play
(evident in both BC and England and Wales).
These policies are motivated by concerns about
money laundering, and the impaired ability to
track the play of  cash users for responsible
gambling purposes. They have been designed
with high-spenders, and machine users, in mind.
However in bingo many customers have a strong
preference for cash, and some find it helps them
to limit their spending. 
Developing alternatives to such generic polices,
which are attentive to the risks that exist in the
sector and the environment that makes it
distinctive, requires that regulators have a deeper
understanding of  operational bingo expertise,
and the confidence to design bingo-specific
standards. Given that the bingo player
demographic is poorly represented in most
regulatory agencies, this will likely require
considerable training. 
4 A potential role for regulators in
supporting and preserving everyday,
vernacular forms of play like bingo
There is an ongoing discussion among gambling
researchers about the impact of  globalisation on
vernacular forms of  play.4 Our research has
repeatedly returned to the issue of  bingo’s
perceived distinctiveness as an everyday, local
form of  gambling, materially embedded in
ordinary life in a variety of  ways (the local church
or members’ club or elderly care facility offering
bingo every week; widespread advertisements for
online bingo on social media; the dabbers that
are available for purchase in budget shops; and
so on). As the game moves online, and as
technologies devised in one jurisdiction are
transplanted into another, in some places the
game is changing form quite rapidly. Automated
variants, and new formats of  numbers and
patterns (especially those derived from the North
American 75 number variant) are increasingly on
offer. 
In the light of  such developments, in our view it is
past time for policymakers to explicitly consider
whether national gambling regulation should aim
to support, and preserve, vernacular forms of
play. Support for vernacular sports, and other
manifestations of  everyday culture (such as
popular music), is taken for granted as a
legitimate part of  a state’s role in many
jurisdictions. Policy makers and regulators could
likewise consider the value of  preserving the
distinctiveness and key features of  vernacular
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forms of  gaming, such as those evident in bingo,
where they exist. 
There is of  course a risk that regulators may be
less likely to approve game innovations if  they
adopt an objective of  supporting and preserving
vernacular gaming forms. No doubt policymakers
would debate this issue. But in our view the risks
are worth it. In particular, explicit conversation
about whether to adopt this objective will help to
de-centre the Las Vegas casino as the imagined
reference point for national debates about
gambling. In many jurisdictions, US-style resort
casinos – and the foreign investors that seek to
profit from them – seize opportunities when
reform potential emerges in gambling law and
policy. Games like bingo, dog-racing, dominoes,
chase the ace, la Lotería (Mexicana); jogo de
bicho, etc. are at a distinct disadvantage. It may
be necessary to design a policy environment that
helps lawmakers and regulators remember that a
lot of  gambling is, and always has been, run on
an ‘everyday’ basis, as an ancillary activity in
places primarily used for other purposes. Bingo,
in particular, challenges assumptions that
gambling is a ‘destination’ or ‘resort’ activity;
instead, it shows that gambling is local, everyday,
and familiar (in both senses of  the word).
Debating whether such vernacular forms of
gambling should be supported, and preserved,
would be one way to open space for alternative,
non-casino centered regulatory conversations.
5 The need to better support
international collaborations across
local governments that license low-
level forms of gambling such as
bingos
In three of  our case studies (Brazil; England and
Wales; Canada), sub-national governments have
taken central roles in gambling regulation. We
expected to see lower levels of  government
taking a greater role in regulating gambling as 
we moved the spotlight away from casinos as
destination gambling resorts (often of  regional
importance, involving higher levels of
government) to the sort of  low level licensing 
and permits associated with everyday gambling
forms like bingos. However while national and
sometimes provincial or state governments have
taken measures to share expertise on gambling
regulation amongst themselves, jurisdictional
collaboration is substantially weaker at lower
levels of  government. In particular, information
sharing about best practices could be better
supported for local governments, within and
across case studies. For example, there are
opportunities to explore better collaboration on
effective regulation of  ‘everyday’ gambling forms
through international or regional bodies such as
the International Institute of  Municipal Clerks; the
Congress of  Local and Regional Authorities of  the
Council of  Europe; the Council of  European
Municipalities and Regions; United Cities and
Local Government, or the Commonwealth Local
Government Forum.
At the same time, however, our research shows
that ‘everyday’ gambling is increasingly affected
by transnational rules and standards-setting.
Effective oversight requires close cooperation
between national and supranational regulators.
This is especially evident as bingo has moved to
the online environment. For example the
European Commission has recommended
particular practices in relation to responsible
gambling regulation, proposed the creation of
common technical standards for online gambling
technology, and formalised cooperation and
information sharing between EU Member States.
In our view the emergence of  online gambling
makes collaboration on technical standards
especially important. Such measures can assist
countries (such as Brazil) that may choose to
liberalise their gambling markets in ways that
account, from the outset, for online play.
6 Is gender relevant to the regulation
of bingo? A diverse answer
A key question animating our research in the
Bingo Project was whether the female-dominated
nature of  the game effected its regulation.
Our answer to that question, across the case
studies, varied. In two of  our case studies
(England and Wales; Canada) the player-base is
unambiguously predominantly female; up to 80%
of attendees are women according to some
interviewees. This is not the case across the
board in the other two case studies (EU online;
Brazil) – but even then the game has a relatively
high percentage of  female participants, far higher
than for EU online poker sites, for example. 
One unexpected finding was that the gender of
the players seemed to matter less to the early
history of  regulation than the gender of  the
organisers and intended beneficiaries of  bingo
games. In England and Wales and Canada bingo
exemptions were carved out of  general gambling
prohibitions due to the lobbying pressure of  male-
dominated organisations that used, or wanted to
use, bingo to fundraise. In England and Wales
working men’s clubs (and political parties) were
key lobbyists; in Canada service clubs (the Elks,
Moose, Kiwanis etc.) played the same role.
Women were denied entry as full members to
some of  these key lobbying groups until relatively
late in the 20th Century. In Brazil, elite male football
The Bingo Project
Prize won at a seaside bingo arcade in North West
England, 2014. The prize is a wooden board that
holds paper bingo tickets in place for easier play.
Image taken by Andrea Shieber.
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clubs were the intended beneficiaries of  the
relevant reform, although there was little evidence
of them lobbying Brazil’s federal government for
bingo legalisation. Economic elites also secured
casino-like bingo environments in which to
socialise, network and conduct business. The
ability of  male-dominated associations to
influence law and policy was thus the key
explanatory factor in bingo’s sometimes generous
treatment from regulators. In England and Wales
those associations were rooted in working class
social, economic, and political life; in Canada and
Brazil they were rooted in middle class social,
economic and political life.
In England and Wales, the fact that women play
the game, and that it is associated with low-
stakes, family fun subsequently became crucial 
to the commercial sector’s ability to survive
restrictions on gambling imposed by the 1968
Gambling Act. However in Canada bingo’s
positive valence is far more associated with the
proceeds it generates for charities than the
female-dominated player demographic. In 
Brazil, the negative connotations of  bingo, and
especially its links to criminality, are typically
associated with the preferences of  male players
and owners for slot machines. Brazilian women
who played slot machines, sometimes
compulsively, are more commonly regarded as
vulnerable – as “sad” or “mad” rather than “bad”,
to use the distinctions common to literatures on
criminal justice.5 Such women were seen by
professionals to be particularly likely to benefit
from regulation aimed at responsibilisation or
treatment. For online bingo, although many
regulators discussed the fact that online bingo
attracted high rates of  female players, they did
not link this to regulation. Most did not distinguish
between different forms of  online gambling in
terms of  regulatory approaches, although 
some mentioned specific risks associated with
particular games, such as collusion in online
poker. In short there was no evidence that the
gender of  the players affected the game’s
regulation in a uniform way across the four 
case studies. 
For the two cases where gender was most
significant (England and Wales, and Canada),
bingo games were sometimes quite sexualised,
flirtatious environments. Female players regularly
engaged in suggestive banter with male bingo
callers (when they were not insulting them for
drawing the ‘wrong’ numbers), and groups of
players were often ‘naughty’ in between games,
making jokes about body parts, touching
bottoms, and so on. Drag bingo is also popular, in
gay and lesbian venues and sometimes in
mainstream halls. These dimensions of  the game
environment can be overlooked if  bingo is –
wrongly – assumed to involve a conservatively
traditional gendered atmosphere.
We found that politicians and the media, in both
Canada and England and Wales, have
sporadically raised fears that poor women are
wasting state welfare benefits on bingo. In
Canada, concerns focused on the bingo play of
mothers, and First Nations women. But in general
concern declines with age. As an amusement
associated with older women, licensed bingo
tends to be tolerated as harmless. We have found
no evidence of  political opposition to the elderly
wasting their pension money on bingo play,
although there was some concern expressed
about the vulnerability of  elderly female players
(especially in Brazil). 
This helped us realise that age, in its intersection
with gender, class, and indigenous identity, is far
more significant to land-based bingo regulation
that we had expected. In particular, the fact that
the game provides a space for inter-generational
socialising and play appears to be a key part of
its appeal in England and Wales, and Canada.
While many players enjoy bingo because it gives
them a break from caring for their family, and
provides a space where they can comfortably sit
alone, others considered it a family activity. Hence
strict enforcement of  restrictions on young
people’s presence proved jarring in both places,
www.kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject
5 Worrall, A. Offending women: Female lawbreakers and the criminal justice system. Routledge 2002.
since the game had a tradition of  being relatively
welcoming of  young people – and sometimes
children – if  they were playing with family
members. 
The intergenerational and familial transfer of  skill
and enthusiasm for bingo has been impacted by
under-age gambling restrictions. However, the
land-based game is still seen to be distinctive in
part because it is an unusually inclusive family
affair in age terms, spanning multiple generations.
Hence while many operators focus on combating
what they called the ‘blue-rinse stereotype,’
including by attracting young people through
investment in new technology, others see the
future of  bingo as in part reliant on maintaining
the intergenerational feel of  the game. This
requires it to be kept affordable for, and
welcoming to, different age groups. As one Welsh
interviewee put it when asked about the future of
the sector: 
“The next five years, we will still be dancing. We
will still be dancing. It’s all about the people and
looking after (them) and not taking too much from
them. Keeping them playing. Keeping them
dancing. Keeping them coming back... We have
got mothers, grandmothers, daughters, sisters,
they come in. I love to go to tables and say, there is
a young man, 22 year old young man and he’s got
his girlfriend. ‘That’s my girlfriend. I have come
in with my grandmother as well.’ I love it.”
(female, commercial bingo operator, Wales).
Mural painted on the side of  a bingo hall, England 2014. Image taken by Kate Bedford. .
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I think there are lots of women who enjoy bingo.
For example, I had a group of older ladies who
were dependent on bingo. Some were mildly
depressed women who stayed at home and had
nothing much to do. They weren’t heavily
depressed but life was kind of boring and
unhappy. They had gone to bingo and found it
really exciting. It was like a ‘wow’ moment. 
These women could become compulsive players 
so in those cases, where there was perhaps a
predisposition let’s say, bingo caused havoc.
(Female, treatment provider and researcher, 
São Paulo). 
One kind of bingo player is the grandma who,
instead of giving her pension to her grandson who
does not work to spend it all on himself… instead
she goes to the bingo to have fun with her friends.
She spends maybe 50 reais [ca. 10 pounds] per
day, which she can afford. She sees her friends
there, has a coffee break, drinks some tea. (Male,
industry expert, Rio de Janeiro).
Canada 
Bingo, in the ‘80s, it was a social. We had tables 
of bingo players; you know, ten or fifteen women,
kibitzing back and forth. They prided themselves
in how many cards they could play. Some of these
women can play twenty cards, right. I could
barely keep up with one little one. (male,
commercial bingo operator, Alberta)
The first (rule) that they started with was raising
the age to 18. That has affected bingo as well
because when the kids came and learnt and
played, they played with their grandmother, they
played with their mum or whatever, and now
they’re not getting that. (female, charity bingo 
hall manager, Alberta).
I have noticed lately we are starting to get some
younger people coming. But the majority of mine
are definitely seniors. All time miserable – believe
me. Absolutely hate women callers and are nasty
to them, they just are absolutely wicked to women
callers. (female, charity bingo hall manager,
Alberta) 
You’ve got people fighting over chairs. It’s four
o’clock and it’s just opened and ‘That bitch is in
my chair!’. There is 200 empty chairs. ‘Take
another one.’ ‘No I want mine!’ I’ve seen fist fights.
Little old ladies. They are zealots (laughs). (male,
volunteer organiser of an independent charity
bingo, BC) 
You will notice lots of men in bingo. Well a lot of
them come with their wives. But I see a lot of
younger men, especially gay men. Gay men love
bingo, I don’t know why. (female, charity bingo
hall manager, Ontario)
The new technology clashes with our typical bingo
customer. When Mabel comes to play bingo,
Mabel knows she can play thirty six bingo cards.
She’s done it for years and she knows how to play
the game. Someone new comes in and they can
only play nine bingo cards. Well, in Mabel’s mind
the new player has to pay their dues in order to be
able to play that many cards to compete against
Mabel, right? With the introduction of bingo
verifiers a layman can come in and with computer
assistance play the same amount of cards against
Mabel and Mabel doesn’t like that. There is a bit
of a clash that goes on. (male, commercial bingo
operator, Ontario)
England and Wales
If the wife went to the husband at seven o’clock at
night and said, can I have £30 to go to bingo he
would give it to her just like that. If she said, can I
have £30 to go to a nightclub with the girls
tonight, he would kick up a storm. It’s that safe,
clean environment to go to. You know what I
mean? (male, commercial bingo operator,
England)
When we opened our new build clubs through the
90s, we would invite the chairman and the
secretary of the local working men’s clubs to come
to the opening day, because I know that the wives
of the members are going to be coming to us.
Occasionally we would get the husbands with
them as well. (Male, commercial bingo operator,
Wales). 
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Brazil 
My 85-year-old mother liked to play bingo
when the halls were open. I often took her in
the car and would stay to watch. She really
liked it and used to say things like “when I’m
at the bingo, I’m out in the world …I forget all
about my problems. It makes me feel super
good.” One thing that I noticed a lot in the
bingos was that most of the players were people
of a certain age, say 30 or 40 and older. Young
people didn’t go. It was very difficult to find a
young person there. There were more older
people, more seniors.” (Male, former journalist,
Rio Grande do Sul).
The old man uses the bingo as a space of
socialising and independence. It lets him do
something that is independent of the family.
He goes to the bingo hall, maybe he takes a taxi
to get there. He plays there and meets other
people. He feels good, he feels connected to
other people; he feels cherished; he socialises.
He probably starts by playing card bingo at the
tables and then his play evolves into machine
bingo so that he can play ten, 20 or 100 cards
at the same time. Obviously the harm increases
with more intensive play... (Its) the same
mental mechanism as drug use. (Male,
problem gambling service provider, Rio
Grande do Sul).
The compulsion to play – well you never know
when it will develop. It can happen at any
time. There was a woman in our group – 
she’s dead now – whose gambling became
compulsive at 80 years-old. From age 80 to age
81 she lost four apartments. She had five, she
lost four. She did not lose the last one because
her son found out what was happening.
(Female, former player, Rio Grande do Sul).
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There’s always been a case of gran maybe
bringing her granddaughter to the bingo for the
first time and she’s 17 or 16 and somebody
points that out. As a manager you were always
very unpopular stopping one of your best
customers bringing her underage
granddaughter in to play bingo (male,
commercial bingo manager).
You look at some of the age group that we have
here and these people are quite dependent on
coming here. This is their life. You know that
might sound a bit dramatic—but I think that it
is that for a lot of people. My mum plays bingo.
And I don’t know what she would do if she
didn’t come here. This is it, all roads lead to
here. (female, commercial bingo operator, Wales)
Before I came here, I had always assumed that
it was pensioners. But there is a lot of single
mothers. Most of the people I would say are
below 50 – most of them haven’t retired yet.
There is quite a lot of youngsters come, like 18 to
25. They come all dressed up ready for town
after. You have quite a few, well, rich people who
like to play the machines. (male, commercial
bingo employee, Wales)
Respondent: I am quite a regular. I come up
here and then I got voted onto the women’s
section committee. 
Kate: Why do you think the women’s section
runs the bingo?
Respondent:  Because if it’s left to everyone else it
wouldn’t go on (laughs). They have been doing it
for years. I just think that it just took a couple of
people to get in there and start organising it and
just happened to be the women. I guess it’s
always the women that are more into bingo than
the men. I don’t know. They (the men) enjoy it
when they are here. I wouldn’t say that they
would be bothered to organise it. (woman, non-
commercial bingo organiser, England) 
We are looking to bring bingo kicking and
screaming into the 21st century and remove
the, what was always the wrong view of bingo
in the first place, the blue rinse brigade.
Remove the old lady syndrome from bingo.
Because it’s not that. (male, commercial bingo
operator, England).
EU
From the perspective of the profile of the player,
bingo is often said to be a specific game
consumed by, if you allow me and excuse me
please, mid aged to elderly ladies at mid hours
of the day. Well, this is common belief. (Male,
National Regulator). 
Most bingo sites skin themselves up in pink
and they’ve got ladies and ladies promotions,
because that’s the perceived notion, that only
women play bingo. That’s just not true. … A lot
of men play online bingo. A lot of men go to
bingo halls. My dad and my gramp used to go
to bingo halls, maybe not in such large
numbers, but there were always a good portion
of men every night. (Female, Commercial
Online Bingo Operator)
Often I think people assume that bingo is
something that only older people are
participating in and get involved in. The
traditional phrase I think is, Blue Rinse. It’s
sort of an indication of a nod to the fact that an
ageing lady would typically dye her hair and
therefore you are thinking, 65 plus. But online,
and particularly on the mobile you are seeing a
much younger audience demographic. The
most recent stuff that we’ve been running we
are seeing as young as 25 year old players
getting involved which is a substantial change
for the industry. It’s not something that’s been
seen before. (Male, Online Bingo Software
Provider).
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APPENDIX 1: RESEARCH METHODS
AND APPROACH TO ANALYSIS
In all we conducted 217 interviews, with 255
respondents. This is far in excess of  the 166
interviews we committed to conduct in our
original grant application. We are still being
approached by people who want to contribute
their experiences of  bingo to the research.
We uploaded the documents associated with
these research activities (cases, reports, interview
transcripts, fieldnotes, etc.) into a software
programme called NVIVO. As we analysed the
documents, the software helped us keep track of
key themes (both those that were already in our
questions, and those that emerged during the
course of  the research). For example we were
able to compare how the issue of  responsible
gambling appeared in court cases, versus in
political debates. Similarly we could compare
whether attitudes to bingo regulation were
different for men and women (they weren’t), or 
for interviewees associated with charities and
commercial operators (they were). Towards the
end of  the research we were also able to
compare the key themes across the case studies,
seeing how clusters of  themes emerged
differently. In total we created tags for 37 themes
(many with sub-themes). Some of  those themes
have been developed into academic publications.
For example Kate used material tagged under the
themes ‘smoking,’ ‘gender,’ ‘class,’ ‘Race/First
Nations’ and ‘technology’ in a recent conference
paper on how bodies are regulated in Canadian
bingo halls. Some themes will develop in the
coming months. For example material associated
with the theme of  ‘self-regulation’ is central to
Donal’s upcoming conference paper on risk and
welfare in online gambling regulation in the
European Union.
Our research for the Bingo Project involved a
range of  qualitative methods. It included
interviews with individuals involved in bingo, such
as operators (commercial and non-commercial),
regulators (at many levels, from the municipal to
the supra-national), politicians, specialist lawyers,
judges, employees, volunteers, software
designers, and bingo equipment manufacturers.
Interviews were semi-structured, so they ran more
like a guided conversation than a survey. Notes 
or a full transcript of  the interview (whichever the
interviewee preferred) were sent back to the
interviewee in case they wished to make any
changes. Once a final version had been agreed,
an anonymised version could be created for
analysis. 
We conducted observations of  legal bingo
games in three of  the four case studies. (We were
unable to find legal games in Brazil, and as a
condition of  our research ethics agreement our
researchers there could not participate in illegal
gaming). We also conducted a systematic review
of relevant case law, legislation, and regulatory
guidance, official records of  political debate,
consultations, and annual reports from bingo
regulators and operators.
We collected much more data that we had
expected to. We had a sense before we started
our research that bingo was important. But we
didn’t expect that we’d find so much material
about its regulation that we’d have to increase our
allocated server space three times in order to
store the information. We have a collection of  over
1000 relevant legal cases across the four case
studies, stretching back to 1845.1We also have
thousands of  pages of  political debate about
bingo, stretching back to 1936.
Brazil
To understand the rise and demise of  licensed
bingo in Brazil we examined the regulatory
systems, processes and requirements established
to govern the game and spoke to key informants
with relevant experience of  the game and its
regulation. We did not directly observe or
participate in any games because bingo halls
were unlawful at the time of  the study. However we
have sought to access the experience of  bingo as
reported by key informants and in media accounts
and contemporaneous studies. Our data consist
of  the following sources: 
Twenty semi-structured interviews with twenty four
people knowledgeable about the game of  bingo in
Brazil during and after legalisation. We talked to
current and former players and ex-bingo owners,
a judge, lawyers and public servants involved in
law enforcement, industry experts, journalists, a
politician, addiction researchers and support
services providers. Informants were located in São
Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul (the two states that
hosted the highest numbers of  bingo businesses
when bingo was legal), Rio de Janeiro (a state that
has a long tradition of  popular gambling and is
home to prominent industry analysts), and Distrito
Federal (the home of  the nation’s capital and seat
of  the Federal government which is responsible for
gambling legislation). One informant, interviewed
by Skype, is in London, UK. 
Legislative and regulatory texts from the
liberalisation period and recent bills that are part
of  the contemporary legalisation debate.We
collected and reviewed 20 legislative texts on
bingo regulation at the national/federal level and
analysed in depth the most significant sources for
the bingo sector (Lei Zico, Lei Pelé, Lei Maguito
and their respective Decretos). At the state level,
16 legislative sources were analysed from the
states of  Rio Grande do Sul, São Paulo, Rio de
Janeiro and Distrito Federal. 
Analysis of  superior court cases (ten in the
Superior Tribunal de Justiça (Superior Court of
Justice) and seven in the STF (Supremo Tribunal
Federal (Federal Supreme Court), and more than
400 cases at the Tribunal de Justiça do Rio
Grande do Sul (Court of  Appeals of  the State of
Rio Grande do Sul). Our data include also legal
cases from two other Brazilian states (São Paulo
and Minas Gerais) selected by reference to
specific topics that were actively litigated in those
regions, such as the licensing of  occasional
charitable bingos in Minas Gerais.
Reports of  the Commissão Parliamentar de
Inquérito dos Bingos (CPI dos Bingos), a
comprehensive parliamentary inquiry into 
bingo that reported in 2007. It included
Interviewees, by case study
N = 255 
Court Cases collected, by case study
N = 1035
Brazil Canada











1 Allport v Nutt [1845] 1 C.B. 972, S. C. 3 D. & L. 233; 14 Lr J. C. P. 272; 9 Jur. 900. This case concerned illegal
gambling in a public house.
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Finally we conducted observations in different
bingo spaces (seaside arcades, bingo halls,
sports clubs, holiday parks, working men’s clubs
etc). This gave us a chance to see how
regulations are interpreted in different venues,
and to chat informally with staff  and other
customers. 
European Union 
At the European Union (EU) level we collected
judgments from the Court of  Justice of  the
European Union and the Court of  Justice of  the
European Free Trade Association court, along
with the opinions of  the Advocate Generals and
the available data relating to infringement
proceedings initiated by the European
Commission. 
Although there is no sector specific legislation 
on gambling at the EU level, we collected EU
legislation that applies to the online gambling
sector such as the Unfair Commercial Practices
Directive, the Notification Direction, the Money
Laundering Directive and the Data Protection
Directive and Regulation. 
We used the European Commission’s Technical
Regulation Information System (TRIS) as a means
by which to identify changes in Member States’
regulation of  online bingo. 
We examined policy documents and political
debates at the EU level relating to gambling, and
more recently, online gambling, with a focus on
the European Commission, the European
Parliament, the Council of  the European Union
and the European Council.
In addition to informal scoping chats, we
conducted 40 semi-structured interviews with 41
online bingo stakeholders between June 2015
and March 2016. The types of  organisations
represented in the interviews included regulators,
trade associations, lottery operators, commercial
operators, charities, testing houses, law firms,
software providers, affiliate marketers and
responsible gambling consultants. 
We undertook observations of  online bingo sites
during the research. Six online bingo sites were
chosen. They ranged from a large operator
running proprietary software, a leading UK brand,
a small commercial white label site, and white
label sites operated by charities. The
observations not only gave us a sense of
mechanics of  the game and the interactions that
occur during play, but also how regulations
impact upon and are experienced by players as
they sign-up, play and (sometimes) win. We also
conducted participant observation at nine
industry conferences and events. 
contemporaneous surveys of  bingo
establishments, interviews, and reports on site
visits conducted before the market was formally
closed. 
Data and commentary published by non-
governmental sources including industry analysts'
reports on bingo and other forms of  gambling in
Brazil; newspaper archives, journal articles,
websites, blogs and theses. 
Canada
We analysed relevant law, policy, and guidance
(eg gambling legislation, licensing regulations 
at provincial, municipal, and First Nations level;
codes of  practice; guidelines; information
bulletins from regulators); annual reports from
provincial gambling operators and regulators;
and data on licensees and use of  proceeds. We
have records of  official federal and provincial
political debate on bingo (stretching back to
1938), and we collected and reviewed 271 cases
involving bingo. These ranged from high level
cases involving constitutional debates at the
Supreme Court of  Canada, to divorce cases,
labour disputes, and civil lawsuits over how to
divide up bingo winnings.
In Ontario in 2015 we conducted 19 recorded
interviews (with 24 people); 3 unrecorded
interviews with notes (with 3 people), and 5
scoping chats (involving 8 people). In 2015 in 
BC we conducted 25 transcribed interviews
(involving 28 people), and a further 7
untranscribed interviews (involving 12 people). In
total 59 interviews were funded by this research
grant (with 75 people). We also participated in
bingo games, of  varying scales, across British
Columbia and Ontario. 
England and Wales
We analysed relevant legislation, case law, policy,
guidance, and licensing statements on land-
based bingo in Great Britain, including Hansard
references to bingo/housey-housey (going back
to 1936); legislation, proposed legislation, and
early day motions (going back to 1908); case law
(we collected a total of  163 relevant cases, going
back to 1845), operator codes of  practice and
training manuals, regulators’ annual reports; and
consultations and inquiries in which bingo was a
consideration.
We also conducted 98 interviews, with 115
people involved in bingo in England and Wales.
We spoke with a range of  informants, from
volunteers running small non-profit games in
members’ clubs to commercial bingo executives.
We also targeted local level licensing officials
alongside national level regulators. 
Classifications for the EU Interviews
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Regulator
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Classifications for the England and Wales Interviews
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APPENDIX 1: RESEARCH METHODS
AND APPROACH TO ANALYSIS
71www.kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject
APPENDIX 2: ACADEMIC SOURCES
WE HAVE FOUND USEFUL
Adams, P. 2008. Gambling, Freedom and
Democracy. London: Routledge.
Baker, T. and J. Simon (eds.). 2002. Embracing
Risk: The changing culture of  insurance and
responsibility. London: University of  Chicago
Press.
Baldwin, R., M. Cave, and M. Lodge. 2012.
Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy,
and Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Balleisen, E., and D. Moss (eds.). 2012.
Government and Markets: Toward a New
Theory of  Regulation. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Bedford, K. (forthcoming). ‘Bingo Regulation and
the Feminist Political Economy of  Everyday
Gambling: In Search of  the Anti-Heroic.’
Globalizations.
———. 2015. Regulating volunteering: Lessons
from the bingo halls. Law & Social Inquiry,
40(2), 461–490.
Bell, K. 2011. ‘Legislating Abjection? Secondhand
Smoke, Tobacco Control Policy and the Public’s
Health’. Critical Public Health 21 (1): 49–62.
Black, J. 2001. ‘Decentring Regulation:
Understanding the Role of  Regulation and Self
Regulation in A “post-Regulatory” world’.
Current Legal Problems 54 (1): 103–46.
Belanger, Y. (ed.). 2011. First Nations Gaming in
Canada. Winnipeg: University of  Manitoba
Press.
Bogaert, S. and A. Cuyvers. 2011. ‘Money for
nothing”: The case law of  the EU Court of
Justice on the regulation of  gambling.’
Common Market Law Review 48(4): 1175-1213.
Bourgeois, D. 2002. The Law of  Charitable and
Not-for-Profit Organizations. 3rd ed. Markham,
ON: Butterworths.
Campbell, C. 2000. Non-profits and gambling
expansion: the British Columbia experience.
Gambling in Canada research report no. 9.
Calgary.
Campbell, C., T. Hartnagel, and G. Smith. 2005.
The Legalization of  Gambling in Canada.
Ottawa. Prepared for the Law Commission.
Campbell, C. and G. Smith. 1998. ‘Canadian
Gambling: Trends and Public Policy Issues’.
Annals of  the American Academy of  Political
and Social Science 556: 22–35.
———. 2003. ‘“Gambling in Canada-From Vice to
Disease to Responsibility: A Negotiated
History”.’ Canadian Bulletin of  Medical History
20 (1): 121–49.
Casey, R. (2008). Working class women,
gambling and the dream of happiness.
Feminist Review 89: 122–137.
Cassidy, R., A. Pisac and C. Loussouarn (Eds.).
2012. Qualitative research in gambling.
Exploring the production and consumption of
risk. London: Routledge.
Cassidy, R, C. Loussouarn and A. Pisac. 2013.
Fair Game: Producing Gambling Research
(The Goldsmith report). London: Goldsmiths.
Cassidy, R. 2009. Casino Capitalism and the
Financial Crisis. Anthropology Today 25(4): 10-
13.
Chazkel, A. 2011. Laws of  Chance: Brazil’s
Clandestine Lottery and the Making of  Urban
Public Life in Brazil. Durham: Duke University
Press.
Cherrington, R. 2012. Not Just Beer and Bingo! A
social history of  working men’s clubs.
Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse.
Chinn C. 1991. Better Betting with a Decent Feller:
Bookmaking, Betting and the British Working
Class, 1750–1990. London: Harvester
Wheatsheaf.
Christensen, R. et al. 2009. Light and Dark Sides
of Nonprofit Activities and the Rules to Manage
Them: The Case of  Charitable Bingo.
Administration and Society 41 (2): 213–34.
Clark, G. 1999. Betting on lives: The culture of  life
insurance in England, 1695–1775. Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
Cosgrave, J. (Ed.). 2006. The sociology of  risk
and gambling reader. New York: Routledge.
Cosgrove, J. and T. Klassen. 2009. Casino State:
Legalized Gambling in Canada. Toronto:
University of  Toronto Press.
Della Sala, V. 2010. ‘Stakes and states: gambling
and the single market.’ Journal of  European
Public Policy 17(7): 1024-1038.
Dixey, R. 1987. It’s a Great Feeling When you Win:
Women and Bingo. Leisure Studies 6(2): 199-
214.
Douglas, A. 1995. British Charitable Gambling
1956-1994. London: The Athlone Press.
Downs, C. 2009. A Social, Economic and Cultural
History of  Bingo (1906-2005). Berlin: VDM.
Eckert, S. 2015. The Social Face of  the
Regulatory State: Reforming Public Services in
Europe. Manchester: Manchester University
Press.
Edensor, T. et al. (Eds.). 2009. Spaces of
vernacular creativity: Rethinking the cultural
economy. London: Routledge. 
Forrest, D. 2013. ‘An Economic and Social Review
of Gambling in Great Britain.’ The Journal of
Gambling Business and Economics 7 (3): 1-34.
Gidluck, L. 2015. ‘Funding Policy and the
Provincial Lottery: Sport, Culture and
Recreation in Saskatchewan.’ In P. Elson (ed).
Funding Policies and the Nonprofit Sector in
Western Canada: A Case Study Analysis. P
184-204. Toronto: University of  Toronto Press. 
Haller, M. 1991. ‘Policy gambling, entertainment,
and the emergence of  black politics: Chicago
from
1900 to 1940.’ Journal of  Social History 24(4):
719–739.
Hancock, L. 2011. Regulatory Failure?: The Case
of  Crown Casino.Melbourne: Australian
Scholarly Publishing.
Harrigan, K., V. MacLaren, and R. Huckle. 2013.
The Modernization of  Bingo in Ontario:
Recommendations for Responsible Gambling.
Report to Ontario Problem Gambling Research
Centre.
Hörnle, J. and B. Zammit. 2010. Cross-border
online gambling law and policy. London:
Edward Elgar.
72 The Bingo Project
Morris, D. 1999. Volunteering: A Nice Little Job 
for a Woman? In Feminist Perspectives on
Employment Law, ed. A. Morris and T.
O’Donnell, 113–38. London: Cavendish.
Morton, S. 2003. At Odds: Gambling and
Canadians 1919–1969. Toronto: University 
of  Toronto Press.
Nicoll F. 2012. ‘Bad habits: Discourses of
addiction and the racial politics of  intervention.’
Griffith Law Review 21(1): 164–189.
Reith, G. 2002. The Age of  chance: Gambling 
in Western Culture. London: Routledge.
———. 2007. Gambling and the Contradictions
of Consumption: A Genealogy of  the
‘Pathological’ Subject. American Behavioral
Scientist 51(1): 33–55.
Paarlberg, L. et al. 2005. ‘Charitable Bingo in
Indiana: Issues and Implications’. Nonprofit
Management and Leadership 15 (4): 433–48. 
Parke, A., A. Harris, J. Parke, J. Rigbye, A
Blaszczynski. 2014. Responsible Marketing
and Advertising in Gambling: a Critical Review.
Journal of  Gambling Business and Economics
8.3: 21-35. 
Phillips, J., B. Chapman and D. Stevens (eds).
2001. Between State and Market: Essays on
Charities Law and Policy in Canada. Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Phillips, S. and S. Rathgeb Smith (eds). 2011.
Governance and Regulation in the Third Sector.
London: Routledge.
Planzer, S. 2014. Empirical views on European
gambling law and addiction. Springer.
Prestes Filho, L C. 2013. Inteligência Empresarial
37: O tempo livre como ativo economico. Um
jogo entre o licito e o ilicito. CRIE-UFRJ: Rio de
Janeiro.
Ragazzo, C.E.J. and Riberio, G.S.A. 2012. ‘O
Dobro ou nada: a regulação de jogos de azar.’
Revista Direito GV. São Paulo 8 (2): 625-650.
Ramsay, I. 2006. ‘Consumer law, regulatory
capitalism and the new learning in regulation.’
Sydney L. Rev. 28 (2006): 9-35.
Schüll, N. 2012. Addiction by Design: Machine
Gambling in Las Vegas. Princeton University
Press.
Silbey, S (ed). 2013. ‘Organizational Challenges to
Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance: A
New Common Sense about Regulation’. The
ANNALS of  the American Academy of  Political
and Social Science 649 (1).
Stäheli, U. 2013. Spectacular speculation: Thrills,
the economy and popular discourse. (E.
Savoth, Trans.). Stanford: Stanford University
Press.
Strange, S. 1986. Casino Capitalism. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.
Williams, R., R. Wood, and J. Parke (eds). 2012.
Routledge International Handbook on Internet
Gambling. London: Routledge.
Williams, T. 2010. ‘Open the box: an exploration of
the Financial Services Authority’s model of
fairness in consumer financial transactions.’ In
M. Kenney, J. Devenney and L. Fox O’Mahoney
(eds.) Unconscionability in European Private
Financial Transactions: protecting the
vulnerable (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press) pp. 227-45.
White, M. et al. 2010. ‘Bingo in Alabama: More
than Just a Game.’ Cumberland Law Review
41:509–32.
Hutter, B. 2001. Regulation and Risk:
Occupational Health and Safety on the
Railways. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fijnaut, C. and A. Littler (eds). 2006. The
Regulation of  Gambling: European and
National Perspectives. Leiden ; Boston: Brill
Kingma, S. (Ed.). (2010). Global gambling:
Cultural perspectives on gambling
organizations. London: Routledge.
Kingma, S. 2008. ‘The liberalization and (re)
regulation of  Dutch gambling markets: National
consequences of  the changing European
context.’ Regulation & Governance 2(4): 445-
458.
Lange, B., D. Thomas, and A. Sarat (eds.). 2013.
From Economy to Society? Perspectives on
Transnational Risk Regulation. Studies in Law,
Politics, and Society Vol. 62. Emerald Group
Publishing Limited.
Laybourn, K. 2008. ‘“There Ought Not to Be One
Law for the Rich and Another for the Poor
Which Is the Case To-Day”: The Labour Party,
Lotteries, Gaming, Gambling and Bingo,
c.1900–c.1960s’. History 93 (310): 201–23.
Light, R. 2007. ‘The Gambling Act 2005:
Regulatory Containment and Market Control’.
The Modern Law Review 70 (4): 626–53
Littler, A. 2011. ‘Member states versus the
European Union: The regulation of  gambling.’
Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers.
Marionneau, V. 2015. ‘Justifications of  national
gambling policies in France and Finland.’
Nordic Studies on Alcohol and Drugs 32(3):
295-309
Maurutto, P. 2003. Governing Charities: Church
and State in Toronto’s Catholic Archdiocese,
1850–1950. Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s
University Press.
Miers, D. 2004. Regulating commercial gambling:
Past, present, and future. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Mohun, A. 2012. Risk: Negotiating Safety in
American Society. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
APPENDIX 2: ACADEMIC SOURCES




Principal Investigator: Dr Kate Bedford, Reader in
Law, Kent Law School 
My academic research is on law and political
economy. I have conducted research on gender
and sexuality in development lending, especially
in Latin America, and on international debates
about care policy. I am interested in bingo
because it is a key site of  working class women’s
gambling, and because it often mixes charity and
commerce. I therefore think that it offers important
lessons to academics and policymakers about
gender, class, and the regulation of  speculation. 
I have also played bingo since I was a child, and I
enjoy learning about how the game is run,
regulated, and played in different places. 
I led the research on this project, drawing on
previous research on bingo regulation in seaside
Kent (England), and Ontario and Alberta
(Canada). My favourite parts of  the research are
when people share their bingo stories with me. 
Dr Oscar Alvarez-Macotela, Research Associate,
Kent Law School 
My academic work focuses on law and
development. I have undertaken research on law
and financial development looking at both
developed and emerging countries, and on
international debates about policy and legal
reforms to boost local and regional economies. I
have worked as a legal practitioner in international
business and commercial law, and I have
experience with social anthropological research
examining oral histories of  daily life in Uganda,
and on ethical finance. 
I have worked on the case studies of  England
and Wales and the EU. 
I think bingo is an intriguing activity. It is an old
game that has survived, and evolved, in many
countries. 
Dr Donal Casey, Lecturer in European Law, Kent
Law School 
My research concerns multilevel and
transnational regulation, and the role that law,
standards and other norms play in shaping
regulatory regimes. In particular, I am interested
in how regulatory actors seek to legitimate their
activities. I have published in leading international
journals including the European Law Journal, the
Journal of  Law and Society, the British Food
Journal and Regulation & Governance. I was a
fellow of  the Hague Institute for the
Internationalisation of  Law in connection with the
project Transnational Private Regulation:
Constitutional Foundations and Governance
Design. I have also previously held a visiting
position at Osgoode Hall Law School (York
University, Toronto) as a fellow of  the Critical
Research Law in Law and Society.
I led the European Union (EU) case study that
examined the regulation of  online bingo within the
EU. This case proved a fascinating laboratory for
study as gambling, and online gambling in
particular, represent significant and long running
sites of  contestation within the European Union.
Moreover, given the distinctive culture and
character of  bingo, I was interested to see how
the game is operated, played and regulated
when it moves from its traditional land-based
environment to the virtual world. 
Maria Luiza Kurban Jobim, Research Assistant,
Kent Law School 
My academic research focuses on consumer and
regulatory law with particular emphases on the
economic and social aspects of  law, and the
extent to which legislation contributes to
development. 
Working in the field of  gambling regulation
allowed me to apply many of  the lessons learnt
during my previous studies. I focused on the
reasons why gambling, and particularly bingo,
remain so popular and widely-practiced. The
interaction of  legal and social issues in the
international regulation of  gambling was also an
interesting research focus. 
Professor Toni Williams, Professor of Law, Kent
Law School 
My current research concerns regulation,
economic development and the role of  personal
finance products such as loans and insurance in
familial and household relationships. I have written
about microcredit and financial education, and
about financial consumer protection in the wake
of the recent financial crisis. Much of  my work
focuses on the development of  a transnational
model of  personal finance regulation that aims to
increase household dependence on consumer
finance products. I am interested in the gendered
understandings of  risk and responsibility that this
model entails as well as the gender implications
of increasing household reliance on personal
finance markets. I have worked on these
questions with colleagues in Brazil, Germany,
Canada, Australia and Canada. 
I was excited about the bingo project because it
engaged with my interests in global and
transnational changes to regulation and
governance and gendered understandings of
risk. More specifically, the Brazilian case study
was an exciting opportunity to explore gender
aspects of  debates about the effects of  personal
credit expansion and recent reforms to gambling
regulation. 
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Joao Araujo Monteiro Neto, Portuguese Translation,
Kent Law School 
I am a PhD candidate at Kent Law School. My
work engages with the study of  internet
governance and law. I am especially interested in
the impact of  multi-stakeholder practices within
the Internet governance system.
I have translated the website and the transcribed
the Portuguese language interviews for the
research team. I am interested in how different
groups engaged with the policy making process
around bingo in Brazil construct strategic legal
narratives to promote or block the regulation of
gambling.
Mark Dean, IT support, Kent Law School
After finishing my MPhil, I worked in the NHS and
in Social Services on a variety of  projects
supporting people with disabilities. I developed
an interest in ICT whilst enabling people with
limited speech to communicate using early BBC
computers with specialist input devices. I then
worked for several years as a freelance consultant
and trainer and in mainstream ICT support with a
Microsoft partner company before joining Kent
Law School.
Sarah Gilkes, Assistant to the Research Support
Administrator, Kent Law School 
I am responsible for assisting with KLS research
activities, including co-ordinating the organisation
of internal and external conferences and
workshops,  providing administrative support to
the School’s research staff  and centres, and
managing general post-award administrative
processes for research grants. I organise the
Bingo Project’s research events, booked most of
the research travel, and helped with the compiling
of data, reports, and webpages. 
Helen Johnson, NVIVO Coding, Kent Law School 
I have coded some of  the interviews for the Bingo
Project. I have over ten years of  research and
project management experience in the legal,
policy, charity and academic spheres. I have
worked as a barrister, research consultant,
wellbeing specialist and policy advisor. I
specialise in the use of  innovate qualitative
methods, gender, service provision, emotions and
desistance.  
Melina Malli, NVIVO Coding, Kent Law School 
I am a PhD Candidate in Applied Psychology,
SSPSSR (Tizard Centre. My academic research
focuses on attitudes and stigma, with particular
emphasis on children with intellectual and
developmental disabilities within the school
environment. I have experience with semi-
structured and in-depth interviews. I have coded
many of  the Canadian interviews for the project.
The Bingo Project grasped my attention because
it explores attitudes and believes about gambling.
It also uses personal narratives and experiences
to better understand changes within the sector,
which is interesting to me.
Linda Pitt, Transcription, LAPTOP Confidential 
I run a transcription company based in
Withernsea, specialising in transcriptions for
academic work. I have transcribed the English-
language interviews that the research team have
conducted. 
This has been an interesting project for me to
work on and it has been a pleasure to work with
Kate, Donal, and Oscar.
Andrea Shieber, Communications Coordinator, Kent
Law School
My role is one of  communications support for the
research team, helping to disseminate news of
project events. I’ve also enjoyed employing my
amateur photography skills to capture images of
bingo memorabilia gathered by the team during
the course of  fieldwork. Exposure to the world of
bingo regulation was a major influence in my
decision to photograph people playing bingo for
an Adult Education class project. During visits to
my local bingo hall in Herne Bay I discovered for
myself  just how much it’s valued by players as a
space to enjoy the company of  friends. Many of
the players are women who have been members
for more than 15, 20 and even 25 years. They go
on the same night each week, sit in the same
seat, order the same drink and, as one of  them
explained, they ‘share a gossip, a laugh and a
joke.’ For them ‘winning is a bonus’ but it would
seem the real bonus is the very existence of  the
bingo hall within the community.
Sarah Slowe, Research Support Administrator, Kent
Law School 
I provide administrative support for all aspects of
research at Kent Law School, including research
grant applications and grant management. I have
been involved in the Bingo Project since the first
pilot project based in seaside Kent towns, and
throughout both the pilot and this project.
I provide excel wizardry and emotional support.




Miles Baron holds an M.B.A. from the University
of  Leeds. Mr. Baron joined the bingo industry in
1983. He worked for Mecca Bingo in a variety of
positions such as Operations Director and Sales
and Marketing Director. His expertise and
leadership in the sector are witnessed by his
appointment in 2012 as the Chief  Executive of  the
Bingo Association and, at the same time, Chief
Executive of  the National Bingo Game.
Professor Colin S Campbell
Gambling law and policy expert; author of  several
key studies of  charitable gambling in Canada.
Professor Campbell teaches criminology at
Douglas College, Coquitlam (British Columbia). 
Dr Emma Casey
Sociologist specialising in women’s gambling
cultures. Dr Casey is Senior Lecturer in Sociology
at Kingston University. Her books include Women,
Pleasure and the Gambling Experience (Ashgate,
2008) which was shortlisted for the BSA Philips
Abrams Memorial Prize, and Gender and
Consumption: Domestic Cultures and the
Commercialisation of  Everyday Life (edited with
Lydia Martens, Ashgate, 2007). She is currently
working with the Mass Observation Archive on an
ESRC funded project on the theme of  gambling
and households.
Professor Rebecca Cassidy
Professor Cassidy is a gambling anthropologist.
She is the Principal Investigator for GAMSOC, an
ERC-funded project which used ethnography to
investigate the expansion of  commercial
gambling in Europe. and coordinator of
Goldsmith’s network on gambling. She is the
author of  several key research texts on gambling
including Sport of  Kings: kinship, class and
thoroughbred breeding in Newmarket
(Cambridge University Press, 2002) and co-editor
of  Qualitative Research in Gambling: exploring
the production and consumption of  risk
(Routledge , 2013)
She writes an occasional blog about gambling at:
https://gamblingacrossborders.wordpress.com.
Professor Amy Chazkel
Historian of  gambling criminalization in Brazil,
and Associate Professor of  History at Queens
College and the CUNY Graduate Center.
Professor Chazkel is the author of  a socio-legal
study on the criminalization of  Brazil’s ‘animal
lottery,’ Laws of  Chance: Brazil’s Clandestine
Lottery and the Making of  Urban Public Life in
Brazil (Duke University Press, 2011). Other
publications include articles on penal institutions,
illicit gambling, and forced labor in post-colonial
Brazil. 
Dr Ruth Cherrington
Dr Cherrington is a leading authority on the
history, development and decline of  Working
Men’s Clubs. Brought up on a post-war housing
estate where most residents regularly used the
local club, Ruth witnessed the centrality of  this
institution to people’s lives. Decades later she
combined her sociological training with personal
experiences and insights to document this club.
Her book ‘Not Just Beer and Bingo!’ A social
history of  working men’s clubs, was published in
2012. She has written academic articles on the
club movement and she has presented at
numerous conferences. She gives regular media
interviews on club-related issues, and is the
owner/editor of  the website
www.clubhistorians.co.uk. A member of  the
Warwick Drinking Studies Network, Ruth is
currently Employability Manager at the School of
Business and Law, University of  East London.
Dr Carolyn Downs
Dr Downs is an expert in historical and cultural
analysis of  bingo, and the former coordinator of
the Leisure, Recreation and Heritage Research
Group at the University of  Salford. Carolyn has
pioneered research into virtual gambling and
content-generated risks to young people from
online social networking. She led the first UK
study into gambling-related debt, and a pilot
study into the relationship between leisure and
under-age alcohol use. Her academic work on the
social, economic and cultural history of  bingo
(1906-2005) acted as a springboard for her
current research into various social aspects of
gambling. That research was featured in the BBC
documentary ‘Eyes Down! The Story of  Bingo,’
broadcast in 2012.
Cherry Hosking
With prior expertise as Company Secretary in
commercial property and the professional
services industry, Cherry joined the Bingo
Association (the trade association of  licenced
bingo operators in Great Britain) in 2007. She is
Company Secretary to the Executive Council.
Cherry is also Company Secretary for The
National Bingo Game Association Limited
(NBGA), which holds a remote bingo operating
licence from the Gambling Commission. The
NBGA has operated games of  combined bingo,
linking hundreds of  clubs to play joint games,
since 1986.
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Dr Jane Rigbye
Dr Rigbye is the Director of  Commissioning at the
Responsible Gambling Trust (UK). She is
responsible for the Trust’s harm prevention and
treatment programmes. Her doctoral dissertation,
on the psychology of  gambling, is titled: ‘Barriers
to Treatment Access among Young Problem
Gamblers’ (Nottingham Trent University). Prior to
her current appointment, Jane was Head of  Youth
Services and Policy Development at GamCare.
She has lectured on gambling studies at the
University of  Salford (Salford Business School)
and at Nottingham Trent University (Division of
Psychology), and has published a range of
academic and consultancy papers on gambling
and problem gambling. 
Jonathan Watkin
Mr Watkin is a gambling industry specialist and
Senior Policy Development Officer with the
Gambling Commission (UK). He is the
Commission’s research liaison with the Bingo
Project. 
all aspects of  licensing and is accredited by the
British Institute of  Innkeeping Awarding Body
(BIIAB). David is also regional Chairman of  the
Institute of  Licensing (East Midlands) and a
member of  the Board of  the Institute.  He has
contributed to Paterson’s Licensing Acts
(Butterworths) on the Licensing Act 2003 and
Gambling Act 2005. 
Professor Debra Morris
Professor Morris specialises in charity law,
property, and employment law. Her research has
focused on many different aspects of  charity law
and regulation, ranging from the ‘public benefit’
test through to the regulation of  fundraising.
Debra’s work on charity mergers and acquisitions
and the resolution of  disputes in the charitable
sector was carried out in close consultation with
the charitable sector and this approach helps to
ensure that the recommendations are pertinent
and useful to charities. Debra has also published
on the legal position of  private schools and not-
for-profit hospitals. Debra is currently examining
the impact of  the Equality Act 2010 on charities.
Debra teaches Equity and Trusts, Land Law,
Employment Law at the University of  Liverpool.
Professor Gerda Reith (Chair)
Professor Reith works in the sociology
department at the University of  Glasgow. Her
research interests centre on problematic forms of
consumption, particularly those considered risky
or ‘addictive.’  She is a leading expert in critical
gambling studies, with publications including
Consumption: Regulation and Excess (2005,
Routledge) and The age of  chance: gambling in
Western culture (2002, Routledge). 
Professor Reith is a Gambling policy expert and
former Chair of  the Research Panel at the
Responsible Gambling Strategy Board.
Dr Sytze Kingma
Dr Kingma is a European gambling policy analyst.
He works in the Organisation Sciences
department of  VU (University of  Amsterdam). He
is the author of  several key texts on global
gambling liberalisation trends, including Global
gambling: Cultural perspectives on gambling
organizations (Routledge).
Professor Roy Light
Professor Light is a leading licensing barrister
and academic analyst of  gambling law. With
expertise in administrative law, licensing, and
planning, he is a member of  St Johns Chambers
(Bristol). He writes and lectures extensively,
regularly speaks at national conferences and
provides training for local authorities and others.
He is professor emeritus at Bristol Law School,
and a member of  the Portman Group
Independent Complaints Panel. He also sits on
the editorial board of  Licensing Review.
Dr Alan Littler
Dr Littler is an academic specialising in gambling
law within the European Union. He is the author of
several key articles on European gambling
regulation, including on remote gambling. He
practices at a gambling law firm in Amsterdam.
Dr. Littler is also an ‘Extramural Fellow’ of  the
Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) at
Tilburg University (The Netherlands), where he
completed his PhD.
David Lucas
David has over 30 years experience in licensing
law. He specialises in all aspects of  gambling,
alcohol, and entertainment licensing. With a client
list which includes national and local operators,
licensing and responsible authorities he has
practical experience of  all aspects of  licensing
and regulatory issues. David is the solicitor
instructed by Greene King in their landmark bingo
operating licence case. He provides training on
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